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Abstract
The distinction of cognition into kinds of cognitive process has proven theoretically
fruitful and empirically compelling, but there remain significant challenges in deciding
how best to carve cognition. First, it is unclear how to design measurement procedures
that select distinct kinds of cognitive processing as exclusively as possible and,
conversely, how to interpret the results of different kinds of measurement procedure.
Second, the distinction between kinds of cognition must be specified with enough
precision to derive empirically testable and falsifiable predictions. Third, there must be a
reasonable explanation, ultimately compatible with phylogenetic evidence, for the
existence of the specified distinction between kinds of cognition. The present research
investigates the mutual influences between implicit and explicit self-knowledge and the
influence of perceived validity on implicit and explicit evaluations. The findings
challenge existing specifications of the distinction between kinds of cognition, which
suggest that implicit cognition should be less sensitive than explicit cognition to
situational context. As an alternative, it is suggested that the key distinction between
kinds of cognition involves the capacity for quantification, which is a result of
differences in the principles of lower-level and higher-level mental representation.
Specifically, lower-level cognition is assumed to be holistic, rooted in distributed
representations, whereas higher-level cognition is assumed to be symbolic, rooted in
localist representations. Interaction between these processes therefore involves
quantifying across holistic tokens to produce symbolic types. This perspective has
important implications for theory and measurement in empirical psychology.
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1

Three Problems for Carving Cognition

The desire to carve cognition into kinds is as old as psychology itself. James (1890) wrote
of the distinction between an inarticulate stream of thought and a discrete train of ideas.
Freud (1927) focused on the perpetual conflict between the impulsive id and the rational
ego. Indeed, the creation of taxonomy—the ordering of the world into component parts
and their relations—is central to science, and is especially critical during the early
development of a field. Yet it is only with the recent refinement of “indirect”
measurement procedures (De Houwer, 2006), which attempt to measure cognition
without requiring any direct self-assessment, that the theoretically useful distinction
between kinds of cognition has become empirically compelling. These procedural
advances have fueled research into the relation between indirectly measured “implicit”
cognition and directly measured “explicit” cognition, although the nature of this
distinction, and the extent to which these measurement procedures capture it, remain
challenging questions.
Within social-cognitive psychology in particular, the idea of a dual-process mind has
produced a wealth of relevant data that appear to support the hypothesis that human
social behavior is the product of two distinct kinds of cognition. Yet it is far from clear
what this evidence tells us about the nature of these cognitive kinds—or even if carving
cognition into discrete kinds obscures a more graded relation between cognitive
processes. The goal of the present work is to critically examine current perspectives on
the dual-process mind in social-cognitive psychology, using my own research to
illuminate potential shortcomings and to suggest new theoretical directions in response.
The present chapter is structured around three key problems facing dual-process theories
of cognition (Samuels, 2009). The measurement problem concerns how different kinds of
cognition can be empirically distinguished: How well do different measurement
procedures selectively assess different kinds of cognition? The specification problem
concerns the challenge of adequately characterizing different kinds of cognition: What
are the key distinctions that make them different? Finally, the unity problem asks a more
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fundamental question about the specification of these processes: Why is the mind divided
into these, as opposed to some other, kinds of cognition?
Consideration of these problems reveals two general perspectives on the dual-process
mind in social-cognitive psychology that differ in how they characterize higher-level,
explicit and lower-level, implicit cognition. It is against this background that my own
research will be presented in order to challenge assumptions underlying both of these
perspectives. The final chapter will seek to make sense of these data with respect to the
three problems identified above and to pursue their implications for developing a new
perspective on the dual-process mind.

1.1

The measurement problem

Because cognition cannot be directly observed, psychologists must rely upon the
observation of behavior to draw inferences about cognitive processes. The fact that the
observation of cognition is necessarily indirect lies at the heart of the enduring problem
of measurement in psychology: The link between observed behavior and underlying
cognition requires an inferential leap that often seems blind. In practice, this problem
makes it difficult to know what is being measured in psychological research and leaves
any claims about underlying cognitive processes vulnerable to alternative explanation
1

(Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden, 2004). The dual-process approach to
cognition provides a framework for an answer to this problem by specifying how
different kinds of measurement procedure assess different kinds of cognitive process. In
this way, dual-process theories can be understood as setting constraints on inferences
from observed behavior to underlying cognition, providing a degree of guidance in the
leap from one to the other.

1

Understanding how information is mentally represented and processed is, of course, a problem unique to
the cognitivist tradition of empirical psychology, which seeks to explain behavioral phenomena in terms of
mediating cognitive processes. Psychologists working within the behaviorist tradition do not face this
problem, since they do not appeal to cognitive processes in explaining how a stimulus causes a behavior.
Given that radical behaviorism has failed as a basis for psychological explanation, however (e.g.,
Chomsky, 1959), the problem of measurement discussed here is of quite general relevance for modern
empirical psychology.
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From this perspective, psychological m
measurement
easurement procedures can be classified according
to the conditions they establish for the observation of behavior. In the current state of
social-cognitive
cognitive psychology, indirect measurement procedures attempt to establish
conditions necessary for the observation of “automatic” behavior, where automaticity is
defined
ined by the (disjunctive) presence of various functional properties of behavior (e.g.,
resource-efficiency,
efficiency, unawareness, uncontrollability, uni
unintentionality,
ntentionality, etc.; Bargh, 1994;
1994
De Houwer, 2006; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). These functional properties are assumed
assu
to provide the initial link between behavior and underlying cognition, such that behaviors
that qualify as automatic are assumed to be produced by automatic cognitive processing
(De Houwer, 2006).. Hence, the functional properties that characterize a certain
ce
kind of
behavior are equated to the operating conditions of a certain kind of cognition (Figure
(
1.1).

Figure 1.1.. The functional properties of behavior as the mediating link in the
measurement of a certain kind of cognition. In practice, the functional properties of a
kind of behavior are assumed to be identical to the operating conditions of a kind of
cognition (e.g.,
e.g., automatic behavior is produced by automatic cognition; De Houwer,
2006).

research,, the functional properties of automatic behavior (e.g.,
In social-cognitive research
resource-efficiency, unawareness, unintentionality, etc.) are assumed to correspond to
empirical
rical properties of indirect measurement procedures (e.g., being multi-tasked,
multi
subliminal, speeded, etc.;; De Houwer, Teige
Teige-Mocigemba,
Mocigemba, Spruyt & Moors, 2009).
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Hence, indirect measurement procedures are interpreted as revealing the operation of
automatic cognitive processes. Currently, the most popular indirect measurement
procedures within social-cognitive psychology are the Implicit Association Test (IAT;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the evaluative priming task (EPT; Fazio,
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), and the affect misattribution procedure (AMP;
Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). The IAT requires participants to quickly sort
stimuli from two different categories (e.g., pictures of black vs. white persons and
positive vs. negative words) into overlapping groups, and differences in reaction times
are interpreted as an index of the strength of association between the categories. For
example, in an IAT designed to measure automatic evaluations of black vs. white
persons, the left-hand response category may be “Black person or Negative word” and
the right-hand response category may be “White person or Positive word” (or the
converse race/valence combinations). Usually, participants are slower to provide correct
responses when the race/valence combinations are stereotypically incongruent (i.e.,
“Black person or Positive word”) compared to when they are stereotypically congruent
(i.e., “Black person or Negative word”), suggesting an automatic evaluative bias (Nosek
et al., 2007). The EPT is procedurally simpler, as it requires participants only to indicate
whether a target word is positive or negative as quickly as possible; however, each word
is briefly preceded by a prime (e.g., a picture of a black or white person), the valence of
which is assumed to influence the reaction time of evaluative decisions about the target
words. For example, in an EPT designed to measure automatic evaluations of black vs.
white persons, the typical finding is that correct evaluations of negative words are faster
following primes of black persons, whereas correct evaluations of positive words are
faster following primes of white persons (Fazio et al., 1995). Finally, in the AMP,
participants are required to indicate whether a Chinese pictograph (assumed to be
meaningless) is more or less visually pleasing than average. As with the EPT, each
pictograph is preceded by a prime, and the typical finding is that the valence of the prime
influences ratings of the following pictograph—even when participants are explicitly
admonished to avoid its influence (Payne et al., 2005).
In contrast to indirect measurement procedures, which are designed to reduce the
influence of introspective self-assessment on responses, direct measurement procedures
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simply allow participants to report what they think. To do so, direct measurement
procedures attempt to establish conditions necessary for the observation of “controlled”
behavior, which is defined in contrast to the functional properties of automatic behavior
(e.g., resource-inefficiency, awareness, controllability, intentionality, etc.). The functional
properties of controlled behavior are assumed to correspond to empirical properties of
direct measurement procedures (e.g., being non-distracted, supraliminal, non-speeded,
etc.), and direct measurement procedures are therefore interpreted as revealing the
operation of controlled cognitive processes (see Figure 1.1). The most common form of
direct measurement procedure in social-cognitive psychology is the basic self-report item
or questionnaire. For example, in investigations of racial evaluations, direct measurement
procedures often rely upon self-reported evaluations of black and white persons,
frequently taking the shape of a “feeling thermometer” that allows participants to rate
their warmth toward a given social group. These ratings are typically interpreted in terms
of deliberate (as opposed to automatic) evaluative biases, and are often found to be
dissociated from indirectly measured, automatic biases (Nosek et al., 2007).
Currently, the distinction between indirect and direct measurement procedures in socialcognitive psychology is not sharp, largely because there is no standard set of observation
conditions (e.g., being multi-tasked, subliminal, speeded, etc.) that a procedure must
establish to qualify as one or the other. Moreover, it is unclear if any of the functional
properties traditionally used to distinguish between automatic and controlled behavior
(e.g., resource-efficiency, awareness, intentionality, etc.) should be regarded as necessary
or sufficient (De Houwer, 2006). As a result, these properties and their empirical
realizations in measurement procedures are typically treated as disjunctive, leading to
measurement procedures that combine both automatic and controlled properties (e.g.,
speeded self-report; Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008). The use of such procedures—
and the difficulty they pose for interpretation—highlight the deeper issue of how
selectively any measurement procedure can assess automatic vs. controlled cognition, an
issue that will be discussed in more detail shortly (see §1.1.1).
The correspondence between the observation conditions established by a certain kind of
measurement procedure (e.g., indirect vs. direct) and the operating conditions of a certain
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kind of cognitive process (e.g., automatic vs. controlled) is a fundamental psychometric
assumption in cognitivist psychology—hence I will refer to it as the psychometric
covariation thesis. Indeed, all cognitivist psychological research is predicated on this
initial link between the conditions under which behavior is observed and the conditions
under which cognition is assumed to operate; when left unspecified, the default
assumption is simply that there is no theoretically meaningful variation in the operating
conditions of cognition, and therefore that any observation conditions established by a
measurement procedure correspond to the same (and only) operating condition of
cognition. With regard to the received view of dual-process cognition, however, the
assumption is that the observation conditions established by a measurement procedure do
distinguish, in a theoretically meaningful way, between two different operating
conditions of cognition. For example, a procedure that requires speeded responses to
stimuli while combined with a distracter task would generally be assumed to measure
automatic behavior, and hence to reflect automatic cognitive processing, whereas a
procedure that places no time or capacity constraints on responses (e.g., a standard
questionnaire) would be assumed to measure controlled behavior, and hence to reflect
controlled cognitive processing.
The key insight of dual-process theories of cognition lies specifically in the assumption
that there is more than one theoretically meaningful operating condition for cognition,
which is to say that different operating conditions correlate with different kinds of
cognitive process. In particular, the distinction between kinds of cognitive process
becomes theoretically meaningful when different processes are assumed to process
information in different ways (e.g., via syllogistic reasoning vs. similarity; Sloman,
1996). Dual-process theories of cognition are thus defined by how they specify the
covariation between the operating conditions of cognitive processes (via the observation
conditions established by a kind of measurement procedure) and the operating principles
that characterize different kinds of cognitive process (see Figure 1.2). I will refer to this
second link, between the operating conditions and operating principles of cognition, as
the cognitive covariation thesis.
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Figure 1.2.. The psychometric and cognitive covariation theses as a function of the
observation conditions established by a measurement procedure, the operating conditions
of cognition, and the operating principles of cognition. The distinctions drawn between
each of these criteria according to the “received view” of dual
dual-process
process social-cognition
social
are noted.

From this perspective, the received view of dual-process cognition (sometimes
sometimes referred to
as the “dual-systems” approach) is canonically defined in terms of covar
covariation
iation between
(1) the conditions of automaticity and the principles of implicit processing and (2) the
conditions of control and the principles of explicit processing. Although there are
important differences between individual theories (see §1.2),, the received view of dualdual
process cognition offers a general characterization of the difference between explicit and
implicit cognition that informs much of the dual-process
cess theorizing in social-cognitive
social
psychology.. On this view, explicit cognition operates according to the principles of
syllogistic (rule-based) reasoning and is highly flexible in terms of the information it can
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process. Implicit cognition, in contrast, operates according to the principles of similarity
(e.g., between a perceived stimulus and an object in memory), and is constrained to the
associative processing of information available in the immediate situation (e.g.,
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Sloman, 1996; Smith &
DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
The essential idea of covariation, as discussed here, encapsulates the problem of
measurement for dual-process theories of cognition. The problem comes down to how
strong the psychometric and cognitive covariations really are (Figure 1.2). If both
covariations are strong, then the initial link between the observation conditions
established by a measurement procedure and the operating conditions of cognition can be
used to draw an equally strong (though necessarily indirect) inference from that
measurement procedure to the kind of cognition it is measuring. This is, of course, the
hope of dual-process theorists—that indirect measurement procedures allow observation
of automatic, and hence implicit, cognition, whereas direct measurement procedures
allow observation of controlled, and hence explicit, cognition. If, however, either
covariation is weak, then the inference from observation conditions to operating
principles does not go through, leaving the characterization of the cognitive processing
underlying observed behavior much less constrained, and hence difficult to describe in
the precise terms of a psychological mechanism.

2

For researchers theoretically committed to the existence of multiple kinds of cognition,
the covariation theses offer a natural means to resolve the problem of measurement. Yet
both of these theses have also been criticized as the cause of this problem, for both
statistical and conceptual reasons. To move research on dual-process cognition forward,
it is necessary to make sense of these conflicting views. Toward that end, I will first
discuss two problems endemic to dual-process measurement that have led some theorists

2

The present discussion generalizes to all multi-process theories, although the focus will be on dualprocess theories in particular given their dominance in the social-cognitive literature (cf. Sherman, 2006).
In principle, an n-process model can be specified in terms of both the psychometric and covariation theses,
given pairwise relations between n kinds of observation conditions, operating conditions, and operating
principles.
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to criticize the covariation theses. I will then attempt to clarify what this criticism entails
and whether the theses have the potential to offer a solution to the problem of
measurement.

1.1.1
1.1.1.1

Problems in the measurement of dual-process cognition
Statistical problems

A first problem in the interpretation of empirical evidence for the distinction between
implicit and explicit cognition hinges on how indirect and direct measurement outcomes
are statistically compared. A common approach is to draw conclusions about
correspondence vs. dissociation between implicit and explicit cognition based on the
zero-order correlation between indirect and direct measurement outcomes; thus, low
correlations are interpreted as supporting the distinction between two kinds of cognitive
process.
There are, however, a number of problems with this interpretation due to the many
alternative factors that can attenuate statistical correlations (Hofmann, Gschwendner,
Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005). For example, indirect measurement outcomes typically contain
a greater proportion of random measurement error compared to direct measurement
outcomes, which reduces the strength of correlations between the two (e.g., Bosson,
Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). Beyond random
measurement error, there may be systematic sources of error variance specific to indirect
procedures, such as the presentation order of critical trials or practice effects on the IAT
(Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007), that attenuate correlations. At a more conceptual
level, there is also the problem of construct correspondence between procedures, which
requires that the stimuli used in parallel direct and indirect procedures be matched as
closely as possible (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Payne,
Burkley, & Stokes, 2008; see also Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). These problems are inherent
in dual-process research, given that such research rests upon a distinction between
empirical observation conditions that opens the door to unwanted variation between
different kinds of measurement procedure. Considering the very different observation
conditions that typically characterize direct vs. indirect measurement procedures (e.g.,
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speeded vs. non-speeded, subliminal vs. supraliminal, etc.), it should not be surprising
that low statistical correlations between measurement outcomes can often be explained
on methodological grounds.
Several responses to this problem are available, though none is perfect. One approach is
to attempt to reduce measurement error by increasing the reliability (internal consistency)
of indirect measurement procedures. For example, Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, and
Deutsch (2010) found that controlling attention to specific features of a prime stimulus
(i.e., race vs. age) during a Black/White EPT increased the reliability of the procedure.
To reduce the influence of method-specific variance, a finding can be replicated using
multiple indirect measurement procedures. The best solution, however, appears to require
abandoning the correlational approach to dissociation in favor of an experimental
approach, in which a single experimental manipulation is shown to produce different
effects on parallel direct and indirect measurement procedures (Hofmann & Wilson,
2010). In contrast to the correlational approach, this approach compares the same kind of
measurement procedure across experimental conditions, thereby eliminating confounds
arising from comparisons between direct and indirect measurement procedures.
The experimental approach to dissociation is not a panacea, however. For one thing, the
low reliability of indirect measurement procedures adversely affects the replicability of
experimental findings, which can contribute to incorrect conclusions about the distinction
between kinds of cognition (LeBel & Paunonen, 2011). In addition, construct
correspondence remains an issue, as no matter how closely the experimenter seeks to
match stimuli between direct and indirect measurement procedures, it remains unclear
which features of the stimulus and context are driving responses under different operating
conditions (Hofmann et al., 2005). For example, controlled responses may be inherently
more (or less) context-sensitive than automatic responses, and context-sensitivity may
even vary between particular indirect measurement procedures (Gawronski et al., 2010).
This question bears strongly upon the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis,
and will be discussed in more detail below (see §1.2).
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1.1.1.2

Conceptual problems

A second problem in the interpretation of empirical evidence for the distinction between
implicit and explicit cognition hinges on the notion of process purity, which is the
assumption that measurement procedures are pure reflections of a single kind of cognitive
process, uncontaminated by any other kind of processing. The assumption of process
purity is widely regarded as a fallacy within social-cognitive psychology, and substantial
evidence suggests that existing indirect and direct measurement procedures cannot be
regarded as selective measures of automatic and controlled processes, or alternatively, of
implicit and explicit processes (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom,
2005; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, in press; Sherman, Klauer, & Allen, 2010). This
stance has produced a peculiar conflict for dual-process researchers: On one hand, current
dual-process theories are essentially claims about the covariation between distinct kinds
of measurement procedures, cognitive operating conditions, and cognitive operating
principles; on the other hand, the assumption that this covariation is strong is criticized as
leading to the misinterpretation of data.
To make sense of this conflict, it helps to examine the notion of process purity with
respect to the two covariation theses separately, since each thesis independently bears
upon the interpretation of data. In other words, measurement procedures might be
assumed to be pure reflections of particular operating conditions (e.g., automaticity vs.
control), or they may be assumed to be pure reflections of particular operating principles
(e.g., implicit vs. explicit). In the former case, the process purity critique is understood as
a failure of the psychometric covariation thesis: that is, as insufficient covariation
between the observation conditions established by a measurement procedure and the
operating conditions of a kind of cognitive process (Figure 1.2). From the canonical dualprocess perspective, the failure of the psychometric covariation thesis is implied by
evidence that (a) indirect measurement procedures are not pure measures of automatic
cognition and that (b) direct measurement procedures are not pure measures of controlled
cognition, such that behavioral responses measured using either kind of procedure appear
to reflect a mixture of automatic and controlled processing. To the extent this is the case,
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the standard practice of using indirect and direct measurement procedures to distinguish
between automatic and controlled cognition is undermined.
The strongest evidence against the process purity of measurement procedures comes from
the application of mathematical modeling to indirect measurement outcomes (Sherman et
al., 2010). Mathematical modeling is an analytic technique that mathematically
decomposes responses on a measurement procedure into underlying processes. Applied
to indirect measurement procedures, modeling techniques suggest that the cognitive
processing underlying behavioral responses is not purely automatic, but is also (to a
variable extent) controlled (e.g., Conrey et al., 2005; Payne, 2001). The strong evidence
against the process purity of existing indirect measurement procedures suggests that
mathematical modeling is indispensible for the interpretation of data testing dual-process
theories. In practice, this means that measurement outcomes must be routinely
decomposed into automatic and controlled components to draw inferences about dualprocess cognition. Some proponents of mathematical modeling go even further,
advancing an a priori argument against the psychometric covariation thesis (e.g., Jacoby,
1991; Sherman, 2008; Sherman et al., 2010). The claim is that because behavioral
responses on any measurement procedure are inevitably influenced by both automatic
and controlled processes, behavioral measurement procedures are in principle incapable
of isolating a single cognitive operating condition.
Even if the psychometric covariation thesis were assumed sound, however, the process
purity critique can be understood in a second, independent sense as a failure of the
cognitive covariation thesis: that is, as an insufficient covariation between the operating
conditions of different kinds of cognitive process and the operating principles that
characterize them. In fact, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009) originally identified the
cognitive covariation thesis (although they did not refer to it by that name) in order to
criticize it on the grounds of process purity. Specifically, evidence increasingly suggests
that the automatic/controlled distinction crosscuts the implicit/explicit distinction, given
standard assumptions about how implicit and explicit processes operate (i.e., implicit
processes being associative and explicit processes being rule-based; Sloman, 1996). For
example, Gawronski, LeBel, and Peters (2007) reviewed evidence demonstrating that
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implicit cognition is not necessarily any less conscious, controllable, or context-sensitive
than explicit cognition.
In light of this evidence, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009) argued that kinds of
cognition should be empirically distinguished primarily with respect to their operating
principles rather than with respect to the canonical dual-process operating conditions (i.e.,
automaticity vs. control). For example, according to Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s
(2006; in press) Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, the key distinction
between implicit (“associative”) and explicit (“propositional”) cognition is the sensitivity
to perceived validity, such that only propositional processes are qualified by the
perceived validity of information. Thus, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (in press) claim
that “there is no one-to-one mapping between operating principles and operating
conditions, such that associative processes would operate automatically, whereas
propositional processes operate in a controlled fashion…. Instead, both associative and
propositional processes have automatic and controlled aspects” (p. 6). From the
perspective of the APE model, then, Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2009) proposal
appears to require distinguishing between kinds of cognition post-hoc, based on the
empirical sensitivity to perceived validity in a particular processing situation, rather than
3

a priori, based on the functional properties of cognition.

1.1.1.3

Summary

The problem of measurement in dual-process research raises the question of how
different kinds of process can be measured and, conversely, how to know what kind (or
kinds) of process a measurement procedure reflects. The statistical problems inherent in
comparing measurement outcomes from different kinds of procedure are substantial but

3

This proposal might also be interpreted as calling for a re-specification of the operating conditions of
cognition in terms of different functional properties, which promote or suppress the influence of perceived
validity (as opposed to the standard properties used to distinguish automaticity vs. control; Bargh, 1994).
From this perspective, Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2009) criticism of the cognitive covariation thesis
for failing to maintain process purity is not a rejection of the thesis in principle, but is rather a call to revise
its specification. It remains an empirical question whether different operating conditions can be identified
that successfully discriminate between associative and propositional processing (i.e., in terms of sensitivity
to perceived validity).
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become more tractable in experimental research. On the other hand, the conceptual
problems arising from assumptions about the process purity of these different
measurement procedures appear more troublesome, calling into question the validity of
both the psychometric and cognitive covariation theses. From this perspective, the
problem of measurement in dual-process research appears to be caused by the covariation
theses, as each implies an assumption of process purity (between observation conditions
and operating conditions, and between operating conditions and operating principles) that
can lead to the misinterpretation of data. Yet I have also suggested that these theses are
vital not only to dual-process research but to the practice of cognitivist psychology in
general. The next section attempts to resolve these conflicting views.

1.1.2

The value of the covariation theses

To understand the value of the covariation theses in dual-process research, it is necessary
to examine both of the process-purity criticisms discussed above in more detail.

1.1.2.1

Defending the psychometric covariation thesis

First, with regard to the psychometric covariation thesis, it has been argued that
behavioral responses inevitably reflect the operation of cognition under multiple
conditions (in particular, reflecting both automatic and controlled cognition), and
therefore that any behavioral measurement procedure will inevitably be process-impure
(Jacoby, 1991; Sherman, 2008; Sherman et al., 2010). From this perspective, it is
logically impossible for the observation conditions established by a measurement
procedure to select a specific kind of cognitive operating condition—implying a rejection
of the psychometric covariation thesis in principle.
This argument, however, begs the question of whether behavioral responses are
inevitably process-impure. In fact, the process purity of behavioral responses is an
empirical question, which will depend on how the distinction between kinds of process is
specified. Consequently, the psychometric covariation thesis cannot be rejected on logical
grounds. It is entirely reasonable to expect that this thesis would hold given a more
appropriate specification—that is, by identifying the specific observation conditions and
operating conditions that do covary. Thus, although evidence from mathematical

15

modeling suggests that responses on current measurement procedures are the product of a
combination of automatic and controlled processes, it would be incorrect to interpret this
empirical fact as implying the rejection of any specification of the psychometric
covariation thesis: Empirical evidence cannot rule out the possibility that there is a
different distinction between observation conditions (other than that between direct and
indirect) that would cleanly distinguish between cognitive operating conditions (in terms
of automaticity vs. control or some alternative distinction; see §4.2.2.1 for such a
proposal).

1.1.2.2

Defending the cognitive covariation thesis

Based on evidence that automatic and controlled conditions do not select purely implicit
or explicit cognitive processing, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009) argued that the
automatic/controlled distinction should not be used as a guide to distinguishing between
the operation of implicit and explicit cognition. This negative claim does not necessitate
the rejection of the cognitive covariation thesis in principle, as it leaves open the
possibility that a revised specification of operating conditions and operating principles
could covary more strongly. Nevertheless, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009, in press)
appear to claim that the principle of covariation should be abandoned (though see
Footnote 3 for an alternative interpretation). In practice, this means that there is no a
priori way to test dissociations between implicit and explicit processes, since there is no
established link between operating conditions and operating principles that can guide the
choice of measurement procedure to reveal the operation of explicit vs. implicit cognition
(Figure 1.2). This not only makes it difficult to formulate experimental designs to test
predicted dissociations, but it also leaves multi-process theorizing disorganized, since
there are no particular conditions of cognitive operation (and hence of behavior) that are
characterized by specific kinds of cognitive processing (i.e., operating principles). From
this perspective, researchers might claim that there are two (or more) kinds of cognition
but would have no means to specify when one or the other would be expected to
influence behavior. More fundamentally, this approach does not eliminate the necessity
of the cognitive covariation thesis for psychological research. Operating principles are
theoretical properties that can be empirically identified only indirectly via their
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covariation with operating conditions (and, ultimately, observation conditions; Figure
1.2). The fact that automatic processing does not appear to be purely associative, or
controlled processing purely rule-based, does not imply that the assumption of
covariation between operating conditions and operating principles should be abandoned,
but rather that their specification may be in need of revision.

1.1.2.3

Two choices

The broader point to be made here, with respect to both covariation theses, is that they are
fundamental assumptions required for empirical research in cognitivist psychology—they
cannot simply be rejected, since doing so would make the inferences (from behavioral
observation to cognitive process) on which cognitivist psychological explanation is based
unwarranted (see Figure 1.2). Rather, it is the specific form of each thesis that should be
subjected to criticism, not the principle of covariation itself. In the absence of a dualprocess theory that explicitly specifies the form of these theses, cognitivist research is
nevertheless predicated on an assumption of uniformity, such that all kinds of
measurement procedure reflect the same (and only) operating principles of cognition,
regardless of variability in operating conditions. Although this assumption sounds rather
simple, it constitutes a theoretical claim about covariation no less significant than that of
the most complex multi-process theory (see Kruglanski, Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, & Chun,
2006, for one effort to develop such a single-process model). Consequently, given the
necessity of the covariation theses for cognitivist research, dual-process theorists face a
choice between working with process-impure (i.e., weak) covariation theses and
attempting to refine the resulting data, or striving to specify process-pure (i.e., strong)
covariation theses.
A priori arguments about process purity aside, the availability of sophisticated
mathematical modeling techniques for interpreting psychological data might be seen as
compensating for weak covariation theses. From this perspective, there is no need to
strive for process-pure theses if weaker versions can be “corrected” with the systematic
use of mathematical models. The problem with this argument is that data (whether the
product of behavioral observation or mathematical analysis) cannot unambiguously
“correct” theory: There is a dialectical relation between the two, with data constraining
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theoretical claims and theory informing the interpretation of data. In particular,
mathematical modeling is not theory-free, since modeling techniques themselves require
theoretical assumptions in order to specify model parameters—that is, assumptions about
how to divide cognition into different kinds of process and about the conditions under
which each kind of process will produce a certain behavioral outcome (Payne & Bishara,
2009; Sherman et al., 2010). Thus, mathematical modeling fails to compensate for weak
covariation theses because—resting on process assumptions itself—it cannot be viewed
as a bedrock source of data for evaluating theoretical claims about the operation of
distinct psychological processes in the interpretation of behavioral data.
The alternative is to focus on developing stronger covariation theses that approach
process-purity. This choice implies a stronger, and hence more functional, dialectic
between theory and data in dual-process research. Indeed, the psychometric and cognitive
covariation theses jointly constitute a description of this dialectic, running from observed
behavior to theoretical process and back (Figure 1.2). A dual-process researcher can
therefore start from measurement procedures, try to determine what operating conditions
the established observation conditions correspond to, and then try to determine the
operating principles that characterize processing under those conditions; based on
empirical feedback, the researcher can then revise operating principles, which should
inform assumptions about the conditions under which those processes operate, and then
seek to modify or design measurement procedures to correspond to those conditions.
These approaches are complementary and are equally valuable. Given that the
psychometric and cognitive covariation theses are indispensible for cognitivist research,
then, the most practical response to the problem of process purity is to view any
specification of observation conditions, operating conditions, and operating principles as
provisional distinctions susceptible to revision, rather than viewing any particular
specification as inevitable (and inevitably flawed).

1.1.3

Summary

The problem of measurement in dual-process research is reflected in conflicting views of
the psychometric and cognitive covariation theses. The principle of covariation linking
observed behavior to inferred process (Figure 1.2) would seem to be a key insight of
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dual-process theories, but it has also been criticized for encouraging assumptions about
process purity that can lead to the misinterpretation of behavioral data. I have argued that
the problem is not the principle of covariation itself, which is necessary for cognitivist
research, but rather how to specify that covariation. Thus, although data (whether the
product of behavioral observation or mathematical analysis) can speak to the adequacy of
particular specifications of these theses, they cannot be used to reject them in principle.
Instead, data should be used to revise the two covariation theses in order to make their
specification more empirically adequate. Since dual-process research has primarily
focused on how to characterize the distinction between different kinds of cognitive
process in terms of their operating principles, the next section will consider the problem
of how to specify the cognitive covariation thesis in particular.

1.2

The specification problem

The specification problem in dual-process research can be treated with respect to both the
psychometric and cognitive covariation theses. As discussed above, the conjunction of
these theses constitutes a dialectic between observable behavior and theoretical process
that can be approached from either direction. Specification of the psychometric
covariation thesis is undoubtedly an important question, and dual-process researchers
have increasingly turned their attention to this challenge (De Houwer, 2008; De Houwer
et al., 2009; Gawronski, Deutsch, LeBel, & Peters, 2008). It is the specification of the
cognitive covariation thesis, however, that has been of primary interest to dual-process
researchers: How is cognition carved into different kinds of process? How are these kinds
characterized, and what is the key (necessary and sufficient) distinction between them? In
pursuing these questions, researchers have generally assumed the standard specification
of the psychometric covariation thesis, which equates indirect measurement procedures
with the conditions of automaticity and direct measurement procedures with the
conditions of control. Although this assumption is vulnerable to empirical process purity
criticisms, it is (in some form) necessary for testing theories about the operating
principles that characterize different kinds of psychological process. Moreover, empirical
feedback from these tests ultimately informs the design of measurement procedures as a
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result of the observation/process dialectic—an implication that will be explored later in
light of the present research (see §4.2).
The current section will focus on two major attempts to specify the cognitive covariation
thesis in social-cognitive psychology. Many dual-process theories have been proposed to
explain various aspects of social behavior, including evaluation, persuasion, and
impression formation. These theories differ in detail, but they share fundamental
similarities in how they characterize the distinction between automatic and controlled
cognitive processes. In particular, the assumption is that, by default, automatic processing
provides the input to controlled processing, which serves a regulatory or “corrective”
function. Dual-process theories of social-cognition generally describe this relation in
terms of distinct lower-level, automatic, and higher-level, controlled kinds of cognitive
process. These attempts to specify the cognitive covariation thesis constitute hypotheses
about how to carve cognition. Thus, one approach has been to distinguish between kinds
of cognitive process in terms of the degree of sensitivity to the situational context, which
I will refer to as the contextualization hypothesis. Another approach has been to
distinguish between kinds of cognitive process in terms of sensitivity to perceived
validity, which I will refer to as the validation hypothesis. Admittedly, this analysis might
be criticized for painting the crowded field of dual-process theories of social-cognition
with a broad brush, missing their many nuances. Yet this level of abstraction is necessary
for identifying precisely what each model assumes to be the necessary distinction
between kinds of cognition, as opposed to merely probabilistic or “symptomatic” features
of their operation (Samuels, 2009). Indeed, to the extent that any given dual-process
theory cannot be described in terms of at least one necessary distinction between kinds of
cognition, it becomes difficult to falsify and loses empirical value.
Below, I will first outline the basic assumptions underlying the two major attempts to
specify the cognitive covariation thesis. I will then identify specific models of each type
that have been proposed to explain various aspects of social behavior, along with their
empirical successes and challenges. Afterward, I will address the related question of the
number of mental representations required by dual-process theories, which will be
relevant to the interpretation of the present research.
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1.2.1
1.2.1.1

The contextualization hypothesis
Basic assumptions

The philosopher John Locke proposed that complex ideas are built out of combinations of
simple ideas, which are themselves irreducible. The notion that thought is compositional
in this way underlies the contextualization hypothesis about how to carve cognition.
From this perspective, the key distinction between lower-level and higher-level cognition
is the level of complexity, or contextual detail, of the information upon which each kind
of process operates. The basic idea is that the distinction between lower-level and higherlevel cognition is marked by a bottom-up transition from general, memory-based
categories to individuated instances through the higher-level integration of situational
information; in other words, automatic processes operate upon types, whereas controlled
processes, by integrating situational details, individuate types into tokens. For example,
when applied to impression formation, the contextualization hypothesis suggests that
early, automatic reactions toward a social target will reflect relatively rough categorical
representations (i.e., stereotypes), whereas later, controlled reactions may be influenced
by details in the immediate situation that can be used to individuate the target (e.g., Fiske
& Neuberg, 1990). Because of this type-to-token dynamic, dual-process models of this
sort are naturally structured by a monitoring-and-correction processing schema, in which
higher-level, controlled processing serves to “correct” automatically activated, lowerlevel category knowledge as the situation demands. Consequently, these models are often
assumed to operate primarily in a bottom-up fashion, such that lower-level processing
influences higher-level processing, but not vice versa.
The basic distinction between type-dependent processing and token-dependent processing
specified by the contextualization hypothesis assumes that behavioral responses driven by
automatic processing are rooted in stable category knowledge stored in memory, and
hence should be insensitive to situational context. In contrast, behavioral responses
driven by controlled processing are assumed to reflect the integration of individuating
contextual information, and hence should be more situationally appropriate. Typically,
the type/token distinction is augmented by an additional assumption about how typedependent and token-dependent cognitive processes operate. Specifically, automatic,
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type-dependent processing is assumed to be associative, such that it is purely a function
of similarity; controlled, token-dependent processing is assumed to be rule-based,
characterized by the principles of syllogistic reasoning (see Table 1.1). From this
perspective, higher-level, explicit knowledge should be learned quickly as a function of
reasoning, whereas lower-level, implicit knowledge—being immune to the top-down
influence of rule-based processing—should be learned slowly as a function of repeated
associations (Smith & DeCoster, 2000).

The Contextualization Hypothesis
Operating Conditions
Automatic
Unintentional
Uncontrollable
Resource-efficient
Outside awareness

Controlled
Intentional
Controllable
Resource-inefficient
Within awareness
Operating Principles

Implicit
Situation-insensitive*
Associative

Explicit
Situation-sensitive*
Rule-based

Table 1.1. The specification of the cognitive covariation thesis per the contextualization
hypothesis.
*
Denotes the key distinction between cognitive operating principles.

An important consequence of the equation of situation-insensitive processing with
associative principles, and of situation-sensitive processing with rule-based principles, is
that these two kinds of cognition become imbued with significant normative
connotations. Thus, similarity-based processing across rough, memory-based categories
will frequently appear unintelligent, rigid, and potentially maladaptive. In contrast, rulebased processing of detailed, context-sensitive tokens will appear intelligent, flexible, and
adaptive. Returning to the example of impression formation, the contextualization
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hypothesis suggests that automatic evaluations of a social target will reflect stable,
stereotypical knowledge, which is automatically activated merely as a function of
similarity between the target and a social category. Lacking the “corrective” influence of
rule-based processing, which can deliberately qualify evaluations of the target based on
individuating information, automatic evaluations would in many situations be expected to
lead to unwarranted discrimination (e.g., Devine, 1989). Despite the fact that these
normative connotations remain tacit in the social-cognitive literature (or perhaps for this
reason), they have played a significant role in shaping dual-process research in the field.
For example, the standard distinction between the operating conditions of automatic and
controlled cognition (i.e., in terms of resource-efficiency, awareness, controllability, and
intentionality) is largely informed by the conditions under which cognitively simple
(unintelligent) vs. complex (intelligent) processes would be expected to operate
(Greenwald, 1992). Moreover, these connotations perpetuate the folk taxonomy of
cognition (i.e., rational/reflective vs. irrational/impulsive), which continues to color
theorizing about the cognitive processes underlying human behavior.

1.2.1.2

Empirical applications and challenges

The contextualization hypothesis characterizes many of the classic dual-process models
of social-cognition. These early models were generally inspired by the belief that
organisms need to quickly sort stimuli into rough categories to facilitate fast, possibly
life-saving, behavioral responses, and that contextual, individuating details could be
added given more time. Bruner (1957) helped set the tone for this work by referring to
early cognitive processing as “primitive categorization” and describing the overall
perceptual process as “a ‘bracketing’ one, a gradual narrowing of the category placement
of the object” (p. 130). In social psychology, this basic notion of contextualization was
most readily translated into the domain of impression formation in an inter-racial context,
where it has distinctly negative implications (e.g., Devine, 1989). Although the use of
rigid categorical knowledge to quickly discriminate predator from prey might seem to be
evolutionarily adaptive, in the modern world the use of such stereotypes would frequently
lead to unwarranted discrimination (Dovidio, Kawakami, Smaok, Gaertner, 2008; cf.
Arkes & Tetlock, 2004). On this view, evaluative and conceptual knowledge associated
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with a category in memory is automatically activated upon perception of a similar
stimulus. It is the job of higher-level, controlled processing to monitor activated
categorical knowledge and “correct” it, through the addition of situational information, as
appropriate.
These early dual-process models of social-cognition were primarily focused on
explicating how the bottom-up, monitoring-and-correction schema could describe
impression formation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and racial prejudice in
particular (Devine, 1989). For example, both Brewer (1988) and Fiske and Neuberg
(1990) offered models in which the early impressions underlying automatic evaluations
are based on categorical representations of a social target; controlled evaluations are then
assumed to make use of individuating information available in the situation, thereby
correcting erroneous stereotypical impressions, but only given time and effort. As Brewer
(1988) put it:
Impressions are based on an active categorization process in which
available ‘person types’ are matched to the information given about the
new person. The search [for a matching category] is presumed to continue
in an iterative … process, starting at the most general level of
categorization and progressing to more specific subtypes, until an
adequate fit is achieved. (p. 17).
Similarly, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) assumed that “the sequential priority of processes
[in impression formation] goes from category confirmation, to recategorization, to
piecemeal integration of attributes” (p. 2). Devine (1989) applied this schema specifically
to model the interaction between learned stereotypes and deliberate beliefs about social
groups that was assumed to underlie prejudicial behavior:
Whereas high-prejudice persons are likely to have personal beliefs that
overlap substantially with the cultural stereotype, low-prejudice persons
have decided that the stereotype is an inappropriate basis for behavior or
evaluation and experience a conflict between the automatically activated
stereotype and their personal beliefs. The stereotype conflicts with their
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nonprejudiced, egalitarian values. The model assumes that the lowprejudice person must create a cognitive structure that represents his or
her newer beliefs (e.g., belief in equality between the races, rejection of
the stereotype, etc.). Because the stereotype has a longer history of
activation (and thus greater frequency of activation) than the newly
acquired personal beliefs, overt nonprejudiced responses require
intentional inhibition of the automatically activated stereotype and
activation of the newer personal belief structure. Such inhibition and
initiation of new responses involves controlled processes. (p. 6)
With the subsequent development of easily administered and fairly reliable indirect
measurement procedures, a major goal of dual-process research became to explain the
relation between responses on these procedures compared to responses on direct
measurement procedures, which often appeared to be dissociated (e.g., Fazio & Olson,
2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Much of this research focused specifically on
evaluative responses, leading to the development of a number of models describing the
interaction between indirectly measured, automatic, implicit attitudes and directly
measured, controlled, explicit attitudes in terms of the contextualization hypothesis (e.g.,
Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999;
Hofmann et al., 2005; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).
Fazio’s MODE model (Fazio, 2007; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), which had a strong
influence on the field, is perhaps the prototypical contextualization model. The acronym
MODE stands for “Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants" of the influence of
attitudes on behavior, where attitudes are specifically conceptualized as stable objectevaluation associations stored in memory. The automatic activation of these “summary”
evaluations in memory is assumed to influence behavior unless the actor has both the
motivation and opportunity to “correct” this influence by taking contextual details of the
situation into account. As Fazio and Towles-Schwen (1999) described it, “The [automatic
process] focuses upon preexisting attitudes and their accessibility from memory. This can
be contrasted with a much more deliberative process in which the individual focuses not
upon any preexisting attitude, but upon the raw data” (p. 99).
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The contextualization hypothesis has received empirical support across several domains
of social-cognitive research. For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2004) developed their
theory of aversive racism based on the idea that stable negative associations with
outgroups in memory often conflict with egalitarian goals; once activated, these stable
outgroup associations can be corrected only under controlled operating conditions (see
also Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Consistent with this idea, the more strongly
outgroups are associated with negativity, the more cognitively depleting are cross-race
interactions, presumably due to efforts to control the expression of these automatically
activated associations (Richeson et al., 2003; Richeson & Shelton, 2003). The
monitoring-and-correction processing schema has also been applied to self-regulation
behaviors more generally, such that the influence of stable, automatically activated
associations in memory can be “corrected” with respect to the current situational context,
but only under conditions of control (e.g., Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). In addition,
both self-esteem and the self-concept have been understood in these terms, with stable
self-associations in memory influencing explicit self-descriptions unless controlled
cognition is able to qualify these self-stereotypes (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000;
Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald,
2002).
Although the contextualization hypothesis appears to be consistent with a wide range of
empirical evidence, it also faces significant challenges. First, evidence for top-down
influences, in which higher-level processing directly affects lower-level processing,
challenges the bottom-up flow of processing implied by the hypothesis. For example,
Peters and Gawronski (2011a, Experiment 2; see §2.2) found that being motivated to
perceive oneself as extraverted (or introverted) produced congruent changes in explicit
self-knowledge; significantly, these explicit changes mediated changes in the activation
of implicit self-knowledge, presumably due to the top-down influence of a biased search
for relevant memories. Similarly, Whitfield and Jordan (2009) found that reading
behavioral descriptions of social targets (e.g., “Dan is rude to his mother”) influenced
explicit evaluations of the targets, and that these changes in explicit evaluations mediated
changes in implicit evaluations of the targets. This mediation pattern was observed for
both novel and familiar targets, suggesting that top-down processing can underlie both
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formation and change of evaluations in memory. Such findings are inconsistent with the
contextualization hypothesis, which views higher-level processing essentially as a
downstream integrator and modifier of automatically activated knowledge; from the
perspective of this hypothesis, higher-level processing should be able to “correct”
activated knowledge at the time of behavioral expression, but should not have a
retroactive influence on knowledge stored in memory.
A second, more trenchant, challenge to the contextualization hypothesis comes from
accumulating evidence that lower-level processing can be quite sensitive to situational
context, often even more so than higher-level processing. In fact, empirical evidence for
the context-insensitivity of implicit cognition is surprisingly rare (e.g., Foroni & Mayr,
2005; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Peters & Gawronski, 2011b). In contrast, implicit
cognition has been found to be sensitive to situationally active goals (Ferguson & Bargh,
2004; Foroni & Mayr, 2005), visual context (Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet, & De Houwer,
2010), social roles and status (Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 2004; Dasgupta &
Greenwald, 2001; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005; Wittenbrink, Judd, &
Park, 2001), directed imagination (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001), and the physical
environment (Cesario, Plaks, Hagiwara, Navarrete, & Higgins, 2010; Schaller, Park, &
Mueller, 2003).
Strong evidence for the context-sensitivity of lower-level processing is difficult to
reconcile with the contextualization hypothesis and the bottom-up, monitoring-andcorrection models it informs. As a specification of the cognitive covariation thesis, the
contextualization hypothesis seeks to carve cognition into two kinds of process that are
distinguished principally by their sensitivity to situational context. Thus, lower-level
processing is assumed to involve stable, categorical knowledge rooted in memory (i.e.,
stereotypes), whereas higher-level processing is assumed to involve flexible, individuated
knowledge sensitive to situational demands. Faced with contradictory evidence, some
proponents of the contextualization hypothesis have attempted to defend it through posthoc adjustments to their models that would allow lower-level processing to be more
context-sensitive. Fazio (2007), for example, has defended his MODE model by arguing
that evidence for the context-sensitivity of lower-level processing can be explained by a
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change in how the object of evaluation is construed rather than by a change in the
evaluation associated with the original object. Specifically, Fazio argues that because
most objects are multiply categorizable, the evaluation of an object depends on how it is
categorized within a given context; yet blurring the distinction between object and context
weakens the conceptual foundation of the MODE model (i.e., the stability of objectevaluation associations in memory), making it difficult to distinguish from a more
constructivist approach in which the “object of evaluation” is a unique construction based
on the present context (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2007; Schwarz, 2007). Ultimately, to the
extent such post-hoc adjustments are made, the key distinction that makes these dualprocess models empirically interesting (i.e., the contextualization hypothesis) is
weakened, and the models become increasingly difficult to falsify.

1.2.2
1.2.2.1

The validation hypothesis
Basic assumptions

In distinguishing between different kinds of cognition, the contextualization hypothesis
depends centrally upon the notion of compositionality, such that higher-level processing
combines lower-level types, as the situation demands, to produce individuated tokens.
From this perspective, higher-level processing serves a monitoring-and-correction
function by contextualizing stable category knowledge to make it more situationally
appropriate. The validation hypothesis builds upon the same monitoring-and-correction
processing schema, but it does not draw the distinction between kinds of cognition in
terms of representational complexity; thus, lower-level representations are assumed to be,
in principle, as complex and situation-sensitive as higher-level knowledge. Instead, the
distinction is drawn in terms of sensitivity to truth-values, such that the activation of
lower-level knowledge and its influence on automatic behavior occurs independent of its
perceived validity, but its influence on controlled behavior does depend on its perceived
validity (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The validation
hypothesis therefore suggests that higher-level processing monitors lower-level
processing by evaluating its validity and, if necessary, corrects it by rejecting activated
knowledge perceived to be false.
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According to Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006), the perceived validity of activated
knowledge is assumed to be a function of situational consistency—that is, consistency
with the set of currently endorsed (i.e., previously validated) beliefs that make up an
individual’s current state of consciousness. Thus, as discussed below, perceived validity
can be considered one particular aspect of the situational context. For example, whether
or not the implication of an automatic negative reaction to a Black man (i.e., “I dislike
black people”) is perceived as valid will depend upon its consistency with other beliefs
that are endorsed in the current situation (e.g., “Discrimination against minorities is
wrong”; Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008).
A second point of difference between the validation and contextualization hypotheses
concerns the direction of influence between lower-level and higher-level processing. The
distinction between degrees of representational complexity assumed by the
contextualization hypothesis has typically been understood as implying that the
monitoring-and-correction schema operates in a bottom-up direction, whereby higherlevel processing moderates the connection between lower-level processes and controlled
behavior, but does not exert a retroactive influence on lower-level processes themselves.
This is because the more complex, contextualized tokens represented at the higher level
cannot, by assumption, be represented at the lower level. From the perspective of the
validation hypothesis, however, top-down influences are more plausible since both
processing levels are capable of equal representational complexity. Thus, direct
manipulations of higher-level knowledge are expected to depend upon the activation of
(indeed, to be identical with the activation of) corresponding lower-level knowledge. In
contrast to the contextualization hypothesis, it is not the manipulation of higher-level
knowledge in general that should have an asymmetric influence on higher-level and
lower-level processes but specifically the manipulation of perceived validity. Thus,
controlled recall of “true” knowledge (e.g., via logical inference) is assumed to rely upon
the top-down activation of that knowledge at the lower level. On the other hand, the
rejection of activated knowledge as “false” in higher-level processing should have no topdown influence on activated knowledge, since lower-level processing is assumed to be
unaffected by perceived validity; for example, rejecting one’s automatic negative reaction
toward a Black man as invalid because it is inconsistent with one’s egalitarian beliefs
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would not be expected to deactivate that negative association, which might then be
expressed in automatic behaviors (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
Finally, as with the contextualization hypothesis, the dual-process models based on the
validation hypothesis also invoke the distinction between associative and rule-based
operating principles in characterizing lower-level and higher-level processes (see Table
1.2). Thus, the automatic activation of knowledge is assumed to be a function of
similarity between associations stored in memory, although the increased representational
complexity of these associations makes associative processing more flexible. Likewise,
higher-level processing is assumed to be a function of syllogistic rules, made possible by
4

sensitivity to truth-values.

The Validation Hypothesis
Operating Conditions
Automatic
Unintentional
Uncontrollable
Resource-efficient
Outside awareness

Controlled
Intentional
Controllable
Resource-inefficient
Within awareness
Operating Principles

Implicit
Insensitive to perceived validity*
Associative

Explicit
Sensitive to perceived validity*
Rule-based

Table 1.2. The specification of the cognitive covariation thesis per the validation
hypothesis.
*
Denotes the key distinction between cognitive operating principles.

4

In Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2006) APE model, higher-level processing is described as
“propositional” rather than “rule-based” to emphasize its sensitivity to truth-values.
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By invoking the associative/rule-based distinction, validation models carry normative
connotations similar to those based upon the contextualization hypothesis, although these
connotations are somewhat weaker given the increased context-sensitivity of lower-level
processing. In fact, given these similarities and the common adherence to a monitoringand-correction processing schema, it can be useful to view the validation hypothesis as a
special case of the contextualization hypothesis in which sensitivity to one specific
situational factor (i.e., perceived validity)—rather than to the situational context in
general—distinguishes between kinds of cognitive process.

1.2.2.2

Empirical applications and challenges

The validation hypothesis as described above is realized most completely in Gawronski
and Bodenhausen’s (2006, in press) APE model and in Strack and Deutsch’s (2004)
Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM). Both of these models view sensitivity to perceived
validity as the key distinction between kinds of cognition. Moreover, viewed as special
cases of contextualization models, the APE model and the RIM were specifically
formulated to improve upon the empirical weaknesses of the monitoring-and-correction
processing schema by allowing for lower-level context-sensitivity and top-down
influences. Consequently, these models are consistent with the wealth of evidence for the
context-sensitivity of implicit cognition and have led to a number of confirmed
predictions regarding the top-down influence of explicit cognition on implicit cognition
(e.g., Peters & Gawronski, 2011a; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009; see Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2006, for a review). In addition, the APE model has been used to integrate
various theoretical conceptions of prejudice, including Dovidio and Gaertner’s (2004)
theory of aversive racism, into a single conceptual framework based on the consistency
between implicit evaluations and explicit beliefs (Gawronski et al., 2008).
Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the validation hypothesis, however, is the
demonstration of an asymmetric influence of perceived validity on explicit and implicit
cognition. For example, Gawronski and Strack (2004) employed the classic induced
compliance paradigm from cognitive dissonance research to manipulate the availability
of a situational explanation for writing a counter-attitudinal essay. When a situational
explanation was available, writing the essay had no effect on participants’ explicit or
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implicit evaluations of the topic. In contrast, when a situational explanation was
unavailable, explicit evaluations of the topic became more positive, presumably to
maintain consistency between attitudes and behavior. Critically, however, no effect of
consistency was observed for implicit evaluations of the essay topic, which remained
negative. Another line of evidence involves the asymmetric influence of negation on
explicit and implicit cognition (Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; Deutsch, KordtsFreudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009). For example, Deutsch et al. (2006) found that
the process of negating a valenced word (e.g., “no cockroach”) requires a fixed amount of
time that is unaffected by practice. Deutsch et al. interpreted this resistance to practice as
evidence that negation is inherently a higher-level, rule-based process that cannot be
automatized.
Despite its consistency with existing evidence and support for its novel predictions, the
validation hypothesis has begun to face challenges as a specification of the cognitive
covariation thesis. In particular, evidence has appeared that calls into question the
distinction between automatic and controlled processes in terms of their sensitivity to
truth-values. For example, Deutsch et al. (2009) found that evaluations can be quickly
and efficiently negated when they are assessed with the AMP. As will be discussed in
more detail below, the present research also suggests that negation exerts a powerful
influence on the formation of implicit evaluations (Peters & Gawronski, 2011b; see §3).
As with the contextualization hypothesis, proponents of the validation hypothesis have
attempted to defend their models by weakening the specification of the cognitive
covariation thesis. Thus, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009, in press) have responded to
these empirical challenges by suggesting that automatic and controlled processes are not
cleanly distinguished by their sensitivity to perceived validity (see §1.1.1.2). Once again,
however, these efforts to defend the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis by
weakening it—which amounts to denying the principle of covariation—make the models
built upon the validation hypothesis more difficult to falsify. Instead, as argued above
(§1.1.2), contradictory evidence may be more fruitfully used to make the specification of
both covariation theses more empirically adequate. I will pursue this approach below by
suggesting that it is not perceived validity per se that distinguishes between kinds of
cognitive process, but rather how it is manipulated (see §4.3.1).
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1.2.3

How many representations are there?

In pursuing this revised specification of the cognitive covariation thesis, the debate over
the number of mental representations (i.e., memory traces) assumed to underlie dualprocess cognition will be of central importance. This question was not addressed above
because it is ultimately irrelevant for describing the contextualization and validation
hypotheses: Existing single- and dual-representation versions of either hypothesis are
theoretically interchangeable and empirically indistinguishable (Greenwald & Nosek,
2008). The reason for this is that existing dual-process models all assume that mental
representation is compositional, such that complex thoughts are built from simple
thoughts that possess a basic, discrete meaning and are themselves irreducible (Szabó,
2009). Contextualization models directly employ this assumption to distinguish between
kinds of cognition, such that lower-level processes operate upon simple, decontextualized
representations, which are combined by higher-level processes to create complex,
contextualized representations. Existing validation models also assume that mental
representation is compositional, but do not employ this assumption as a general
distinction between kinds of cognition; instead, these models suggest it is the perceived
validity, not the complexity, of mental representations that marks the distinction. In either
case, then, existing dual-process models assume that mental representation is
compositional, with the key consequence that representation at the higher level is
assumed to be reducible to representation at the lower level. Thus, in dual-representation
theories, which posit two distinct memory traces underlying implicit and explicit
cognition, complex representations must be additive (non-emergent) combinations of
simple representations; this means that a complex representation can in principle be
completely reduced to simple representations, though the complex representation is
assumed to exist as a distinct memory trace. In single-representation theories, on the
other hand, complex representations are not assumed to exist as distinct memory traces,
but just are combinations of simple representations.
Although it might seem natural to assume that distinct kinds of cognitive process operate
upon distinct memory traces (especially when those processes are assumed to operate in
parallel), the independent assumption that higher-level representations are reducible to
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lower-level representations leaves dual-representation models vulnerable to criticism on
the grounds of parsimony. Specifically, dual-process models that posit two distinct
memory traces, one of which is reducible to the other (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;
Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Wilson et al., 2000), introduce a redundancy that is not
found in single-representation models (e.g., Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Gawronski
5

& Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The root problem is that the
compositional relation between the two memory traces in dual-representation models
undermines their classification as qualitatively different kinds: Because both higher-level
and lower-level representations are built from the same components, they must in
principle be reducible. Conversely, the parsimony critique implies that singlerepresentation theories must assume that higher-level representation is completely
reducible to lower-level representation, such that there is no loss of information when
knowledge moves across levels; thus, these models are committed to a single kind of
mental representation.
The parsimony critique is valid when targeting existing dual-representation models:
Compositionality implies the reducibility of one kind of representation to another,
creating a theoretical redundancy. As a critique of dual-representation theories in general,
however, this argument begs the question by assuming that there is only one way an
“object” can be mentally represented—that is, compositionally. This assumption reflects
an entrenched linguocentrism in psychology, whereby natural language, which is

5

Although dual-representation models in social-cognition generally avoid explicit statements of
representational assumptions, these can be inferred from how implicit cognition is characterized. For
example, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) define an implicit construct as an “introspectively unidentified (or
inaccurately identified) trace of past experience” (p. 5), but do not claim that these constructs are
unidentifiable in principle. Consistent with this interpretation, Greenwald and Banaji assume that the key
empirical property of indirect measurement procedures is that they do not alert the participant to what is
being measured, implying that it is possible for implicit constructs to be explicitly represented. Echoing
Fazio’s (1995) definition of an attitude as an object-evaluation association, Wilson et al. (2000) state that
implicit and explicit attitudes are “summary evaluations that can be based on a variety of sources of
information” (p. 107); thus, Wilson et al. claim that implicit and explicit attitudes do not differ in terms of
how or what information is represented, but in the extent to which the attitude has become “ingrained” or
automatized. Rydell and McConnell (2006) take a similar approach, assuming that all attitudes are objectevaluation associations, and distinguishing between explicit and implicit attitudes in terms of how they are
learned. In each of these cases, the authors appear to assume that implicit representations can in principle
be represented explicitly, implying their reducibility.
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generally assumed to be compositional (Fodor, 2007; Szabó, 2009), is treated as the
paradigm example of cognitive information processing. Consequently, the principles by
which language operates are expected to inform our understanding of cognition:
Since the birth of cognitive science, language has provided the dominant
theoretical model. Formal cognitive models have taken their structure
from the syntax of formal languages, and their content from the semantics
of natural language. The mind has been taken to be a machine for formal
symbol manipulation, and the symbols manipulated have assumed
essentially the same semantics as words of English. (Smolensky, 1988, p.
4, emphasis in orginal)
This reasoning reached its apex in Fodor’s (1975) language of thought hypothesis, which
claimed that cognition can only be understood as computation—that is, as the rule-based
manipulation of discrete symbols (see also Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). Opposition to the
classical, linguocentric view of mental representation grew out of evidence for a
distinction between verbal and imagistic cognitive processing (e.g., Kosslyn, 1980;
Paivio, 1971) as well as advances in neural network modeling techniques that provided a
plausible explanation for how non-computational cognition might be implemented. These
connectionist models demonstrated that weighted networks of densely interconnected
nodes could simulate many aspects of human cognition (Rogers & McClelland, 2004).
Critically, however, these models do not require an assumption of compositionality, such
that individual nodes would each possess a discrete meaning or represent a discrete
object. Instead, they can also be constructed such that meaning is found only in overall
patterns of activated nodes (Chrisley, 1998; Smolensky, 1988), analogous to the way in
which the pattern of pixels on a monitor can be meaningful without any one pixel
carrying a discrete meaning. This holistic, distributed style of representation is indeed a
qualitatively different kind of mental representation compared to the classical, localist
style of representation, and as such it provides a basis for dual-representation theories that
are not vulnerable to the parsimony critique: Because distributed representations are noncompositional, they cannot be reduced to localist, compositional representations (and vice
versa). Loosely speaking, this is why a bitmap image of a scene and a verbal description
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of the same scene will inevitably be non-equivalent—because they carry different kinds
of information. Thus, as Smolensky (1988) noted, localist descriptions of distributed
cognitive processing will inevitably be “incomplete (describing only certain aspects of
the processing) or informal (describing complex behaviors in, say, qualitative terms) or
imprecise (describing the performance up to certain approximations or idealizations…)”
(p. 7).
In fact, dual-process models of social-cognition frequently appeal to the distinction
between classical and connectionist architectures in specifying the cognitive covariation
thesis (e.g., Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), but
for very particular reasons. First, connectionist architectures provide a mechanism for
similarity-based associative processing via the phenomenon of pattern matching, in
which the activation of one pattern of nodes facilitates the activation of overlapping (and
hence similar) patterns without any need for rule-based, symbolic computation (Smith,
1996). Second, connectionist architectures provide a plausible implementation-level
account of associative processing, as they are inspired by the networks of neurons that
make up the brain (Smolensky, 1988).
Most appeals to connectionist architectures in social-cognition, however, ignore the
further possibility of non-compositional, distributed representation, and instead treat
connectionist architectures simply as providing an associative (as opposed to rule-based)
mechanism for processing compositional, localist representations. For singlerepresentation models, adhering to a localist version of connectionism makes sense,
because these models must assume that there is only one kind of mental representation.
Indeed, single-representation theorists are admirably clear on this point. For example,
Fazio (2007, p. 612) argues that the object-evaluation associations underlying his MODE
model would be represented equivalently in either classical or connectionist architectures.
Likewise, both Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2006, in press) APE model and Strack
and Deutsch’s (2004) RIM appeal to connectionist networks underlying lower-level
associative processing, but conceive of these networks in terms of discrete, localist nodes.
For example, Strack and Deutsch (2004, Figure 3) describe the activation of nodes in a
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network representing the discrete concepts PERSON, ELDERLY, SLOW, etc., which
can be directly combined into truth-evaluable propositions by higher-level processing.
The commitment to a single, localist kind of representation becomes less tenable,
however, in light of empirical evidence suggesting that mental representation is not
always discrete and categorical (Medin, 1989; Murphy, 2002; Rogers & McClelland,
2004). In summarizing this literature, Medin (1989) pointed to three critical findings: The
inability of lay persons and experts alike to specify core feature sets for concepts;
typicality effects, whereby some objects are considered “better” examples of a concept
than others (e.g., an orange is a better exemplar of the concept FRUIT than a tomato);
and unclear cases, whereby appeal to defining features seems to be unhelpful (e.g., does a
rug count as instance of the concept FURNITURE?). The ubiquity of these findings
suggests that category representations in general are not sets of necessary features, but are
rather clusters of (sub-featural) properties that tend to covary—in other words, they are
more like distributed patterns than discrete definitions. Based on such evidence, it seems
that the question begged by the parsimony critique of dual-representation theories is not
trivial. If different kinds of process are assumed to operate upon genuinely different kinds
of representation (i.e., localist vs. distributed), the distinction between kinds of cognitive
process will be, at least partly, a result of the distinction between kinds of representation;
therefore, the theoretical properties distinguishing kinds of representation should lead to
testable predictions about how to distinguish kinds of process, and in this way should
inform the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis.
Below, I will explore the possibility of a dual-process theory that combines localist and
distributed representations, and thereby takes full advantage of the insights from
connectionist modeling (see Conrey & Smith, 2007, Smith & Conrey, 2007, for initial
steps in this direction). As I will discuss, the possibility of non-compositional, distributed
representation and its relation to compositional, localist representation may provide a
solution to the challenges facing the contextualization and validation hypotheses.
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1.2.4

Summary

In discussing the problem of specification in dual-process research, I have focused on
how to specify the relation between the operating conditions and the operating principles
of cognition—that is, the cognitive covariation thesis. Any such specification constitutes
a hypothesis about how to carve cognition into distinct kinds of process. The two major
hypotheses in social-cognitive psychology are both built upon a monitoring-andcorrection processing schema in which knowledge automatically activated in lower-level
processing is monitored relative to some criterion and corrected, given the conditions of
control, by higher-level processing. In the case of the contextualization hypothesis, the
criterion is situational appropriateness, such that higher-level processing functions to
qualify automatically activated, stable category knowledge with respect to situational
demands. The key principle distinguishing automatic and controlled processes is
therefore assumed to be sensitivity to the situational context. In the case of the validation
hypothesis, the criterion is situational consistency, such that higher-level processing
functions to evaluate the validity of automatically activated knowledge with respect to
currently endorsed beliefs. From this perspective, the key principle distinguishing
automatic and controlled processes is assumed to be sensitivity to perceived validity.
Both hypotheses have received empirical support but also face significant challenges. The
contextualization hypothesis does not readily predict top-down influences of controlled
processing on automatic processing, and it is contradicted by evidence of the contextsensitivity of the latter. The validation hypothesis is consistent with both lines of
evidence, but is itself challenged by findings suggesting that automatic processing can be
sensitive to perceived validity. In response, I have suggested that the specification of the
cognitive covariation thesis may need to account for distinct kinds of mental
representation (i.e., localist vs. distributed) underlying kinds of cognitive process. This
distinction has been largely ignored or misconstrued in existing dual-process models,
which assume the compositionality of mental representation and thus that representations
at one level are reducible to those at the other. If this is not the case, then understanding
the relation between these (genuinely) different kinds of mental representation may be
critical to the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis.
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1.3

The unity problem

Most research and theorizing in the dual-process literature has focused on the
specification problem and, to a lesser extent, the measurement problem. Yet there
remains a more fundamental question that is rarely addressed: Why would cognition be
divided into distinct kinds of cognition in the first place? And why would that division
take the particular shape it does? Samuels (2009) refers to this as the unity problem, and
he discusses it with respect to the common “cluster” approach to specifying the cognitive
covariation thesis, in which clusters of operating principles correlate with different
clusters of operating conditions (e.g., the received view of associative, similarity-based
processing is that it is resource-efficient, unintentional, uncontrollable, and less
accessible to conscious awareness). For Samuels, the unity problem follows on the heels
of the specification problem: That is, once the cognitive covariation thesis has been
specified, one can ask why this particular cluster of operating principles correlates with
this particular cluster of operating conditions. For example, why is associative processing
inherently less accessible to conscious awareness? Why is rule-based processing more
controllable and less resource-efficient?
In fact, despite its popularity in the social-cognitive literature, the cluster approach to the
specification problem involves dangerous theoretical excess, since there is no a priori
reason that specification of the cognitive covariation thesis requires paired clusters of
principles and conditions rather than a single key distinction to characterize each. Of
course, the cluster approach to specification would seem to have the virtue of making the
cognitive covariation thesis more falsifiable, because it makes stronger empirical claims.
For example, on the received view, all of the functional properties of automaticity should
be perfectly coincident, and should always correspond to the operating principles of
implicit cognition. These are indeed strong empirical claims, and are readily
disconfirmed by evidence that these clusters are not aligned (e.g., Gawronski et al., 2007;
Moors & De Houwer, 2006; see Keren & Schul, 2009). The cluster approach to
specifying the cognitive covariation thesis survives, however, because in practice these
clusters are treated more like heuristics for deriving predictions rather than theoretical
claims, making them moving targets that are difficult to falsify. Consequently,
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disconfirming evidence is more easily attributed to the failure of the psychometric
covariation thesis—that is, due to the failure of indirect and direct measurement
procedures to select purely automatic and controlled cognitive processes. As argued
above, however (see §1.1.2.3), the process purity of measurement cannot be abandoned
without compromising the ability to draw inferences about cognitive processes from
observed behavior. For this reason, restricting specification of the cognitive covariation
thesis to single distinctions between operating conditions and operating principles is not
only theoretically simpler but empirically safer, as there is less room to maneuver around
disconfirming evidence.
This has been the approach taken above, in which I sought to identify the key distinctions
between operating conditions and operating principles that characterize the two major
attempts to specify the cognitive covariation thesis. Thus, the contextualization
hypothesis characterizes automatic processing as being comparatively insensitive to the
situational context (Table 1.1), whereas the validation hypothesis characterizes automatic
processing as being comparatively insensitive to perceived validity (Table 1.2). An
advantage of these one-dimensional distinctions is that the unity problem becomes more
tractable: Rather than explaining why clusters of operating principles covary with clusters
of operating conditions in monolithic systems (cf. Keren & Schul, 2009), the challenge is
to explain why a specific principle characterizes cognitive processing operating under a
specific condition. Based on the earlier characterization of both major hypotheses in
terms of a monitoring-and-correction processing schema, the question is therefore why
early processing would be comparatively insensitive to the situational context (either in
general or with respect to situational consistency in particular).
Although any response to the unity problem will almost certainly be speculative, it
nevertheless imposes an important constraint on attempts to specify the cognitive
covariation thesis—that is, that the specification respect known neurological, and
ultimately phylogenetic, distinctions between cognitive processing capacities (Evans,
2008). At minimum, then, any specification of the cognitive covariation thesis should be
supported by a prima facie valid story about why cognitive processes are distinguished
into the particular kinds specified. Conversely, dual-process theories unable to supply a
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reasonable explanation for the distinction in cognitive processes they propose should lose
a measure of support. Below, I will briefly consider three such explanations of the
monitoring-and-correction processing schema, which forms the basis for both the
contextualization and validation hypotheses, and argue that all three are inadequate.

1.3.1

The architectural explanation

To the extent that they provide an explicit response to the unity problem, dual-process
theories of social-cognition have focused on implementation-level analyses. As discussed
earlier, many dual-process models have appealed to the distinction between classical and
connectionist cognitive architectures to ground the distinction between controlled and
automatic processes (e.g., Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Smith &
DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The general idea is that classical architectures
provide the capacity to flexibly qualify and “correct” stable knowledge automatically
activated in connectionist networks, either with respect to the situational context in
general or situational consistency in particular. Such uses of the classical/connectionist
distinction, however, ignore the deeper implications of localist vs. distributed
representation—specifically, that distributed representations are inherently no less
flexible and context-sensitive than localist representations (and potentially even more so;
Smolensky, 1988). Nor are connectionist networks in principle incapable of encoding
truth-values as a property of learned information, though distributed representations of
truth-values may be more probabilistic than binary (cf. Osherson & Smith, 1981).

1.3.2

The neurophysiological explanation

A slightly different approach is to ground the distinction within two physiologically
distinct memory systems in the brain (e.g., Lieberman, 2007), usually divided into
subcortical and cortical systems. The cortical system is assumed to have exclusive access
to serial working memory, which accounts for both its capacity for deliberate, syllogistic
reasoning and its relative slowness and inefficiency. As critics have pointed out,
however, dependence on working memory may provide an explanation for the properties
of controlled processing but sheds little light on the nature of automatic processing
(Evans, 2008; Samuels, 2009). In response, the neurophysiological distinction is
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sometimes linked to the architectural distinction, such that the subcortical system is
assumed to implement connectionist processing while the cortical system implements
classical (rule-based) processing (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). As just discussed, however,
the classical/connectionist distinction provides no inherent justification for the distinction
between early and late processing in terms of sensitivity to the situational context when
both architectures are assumed to operate upon localist representations.

1.3.3

The phylogenetic explanation

Nevertheless, it is often assumed that the neurophysiological distinction reflects a deeper
phylogenetic distinction, such that the subcortical system is evolutionarily older than the
cortical system (Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2004). Ultimately, the appeal to phylogeny boils
down to an evolutionary story that has (often tacitly) provided the inspiration for the
monitoring-and-correction processing schema (see §1.2.1.1). The assumption is that, to
be evolutionarily adaptive, the early cognition underlying fast responses must quickly
match stimuli in the environment with rough, stable categories (e.g., predator vs. prey).
The incorporation of contextual information, either to individuate the early stimulus
representation or to assess the situational consistency of the early response, is thus a
luxury afforded by time. Moreover, it is assumed that only higher animals have
developed the capacity for this downstream, controlled processing (which is an important
source of the normative connotations that continue to color dual-process theorizing in the
monitoring-and-correction tradition).
The problem with this evolutionary story is that it doesn’t make much sense: To be
evolutionarily adaptive, early responding needs to be flexible and context-sensitive, not
rigid and context-insensitive (Schwarz, 2007). In the complexity of the ecological
environment, the discrimination of a stimulus as predator vs. prey would frequently fail if
the situational context were not taken into account; rather, early cognition needs to do its
best with incomplete and varying contextual cues to determine what a stimulus is. This
supposition is strongly supported by the evidence reviewed in §1.2.1.2, which
demonstrates that that early affective reactions to a stimulus are moderated by the context
in which it is perceived (e.g., Cesario et al., 2010; Schaller et al., 2003).
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1.3.4

Summary

In the end, the monitoring-and-correction processing schema appears to lack a reasonable
explanation for the distinction between cognitive processes in terms of sensitivity to the
situational context. Architectural, neurophysiological, and phylogenetic explanations
have all been proposed, but none stands up to analysis (see also Samuels, 2009).
Although this is not a devastating flaw, it does cast doubt on the accuracy of the
monitoring-and-correction processing schema and, by implication, the contextualization
and validation hypotheses built upon it.

1.4

Overview of present research

Above, I discussed three problems that must be addressed in any attempt to carve
cognition into distinct kinds of process. Based on this discussion, the received view of
how to carve cognition (Figure 1.2) appears to face serious difficulties. To begin with, the
measurement problem cannot be solved by rejecting the covariation theses in principle, as
these are required for cognitivist research; instead, the lack of process purity indicates a
need to draw cleaner distinctions between observation conditions, operating conditions,
and operating principles. The two major attempts to specify the cognitive covariation
thesis in social-cognitive psychology both face empirical challenges. Furthermore, these
hypotheses lack reasonable explanations for why higher-level processing would be
distinguished by greater sensitivity to the situational context (either generally or with
respect to situational consistency in particular). These difficulties suggest that the
underlying monitoring-and-correction processing schema, in which higher-level
processes function to control or make sense of lower-level impulses, may provide a
misleading metaphor for carving cognition.
The present research has implications for each of these problems. In both sets of studies,
the observed relations between implicit and explicit cognition cast doubt on current
assumptions about how these processes interact. The first manuscript investigates the
dynamics underlying self-concept change in terms of the interaction between implicit and
explicit self-knowledge. This research demonstrates that implicit and explicit cognition
exert mutual bottom-up and top-down influences on each other, which is consistent with
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the validation hypothesis but inconsistent with the assumption of the contextualization
hypothesis that higher-level processing functions merely as an integrator of automatically
activated lower-level knowledge. The second manuscript investigates the mechanisms
underlying evaluative learning, demonstrating that perceived validity can, under certain
conditions, have an impact on the learning of both explicit and implicit evaluations. To
the extent that implicit and explicit evaluations are assumed to be learned via different
mechanisms, this research has two implications immediately relevant to the current
discussion. First, it suggests a strong top-down effect of rule-based learning, which again
contradicts the assumption of the contextualization hypothesis that the direction of
processing is bottom-up. Second, it suggests that implicit cognition may be sensitive to
perceived validity under certain conditions, which contradicts the assumption of the
validation hypothesis that implicit cognition should be insensitive to perceived validity.

6

In the final chapter, I will discuss the implications of this research for the questions raised
above. The major goal will be to provide a more empirically accurate specification of the
psychometric and cognitive covariation theses, which can help guide future research on
dual-process cognition. Ultimately, I will argue that existing social-cognitive theories
have identified important pieces of the dual-process puzzle, but have put them together in
the wrong way. The present research points toward a different and potentially more
accurate approach to fitting these pieces together.

6

To prevent confusion, it should be noted that the research reported in §2 on self-concept change is framed
in terms of the validation hypothesis, and the APE model in particular. Although the findings from these
studies are consistent with this perspective, they contradict the assumptions of the contextualization
hypothesis. Furthermore, these findings are also consistent with an alternative interpretation of the relation
between higher-level and lower-level cognition developed later (see §4).
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2

Mutual Influences between the Implicit and
Explicit Self-Concepts: The Role of Memory
Activation and Motivated Reasoning7

Historically, the self-concept has been understood as the collection of things we believe
about ourselves. The use of recently developed techniques for indirectly measuring
mental contents, however, has suggested that an individual’s self-concept can differ
depending on how it is measured—specifically, depending on whether information about
the self is explicit or implicit in behavioral responses on the measurement procedure (cf.
De Houwer, 2006). Thus, measures of the “explicit” self-concept, typically assessed via
self-report, have been shown to diverge from measures of the “implicit” self-concept,
typically assessed via performance-based measures (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000;
see Schnabel & Asendorpf, 2010, for a review). Measures of the implicit self-concept
predict behavior above and beyond measures of the explicit self-concept (Asendorpf,
Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2009), and this incremental validity
appears to derive from a difference between the conditions under which the two types of
self-information influence behavior. For example, Asendorpf et al. (2002) found evidence
for a double dissociation between explicit and implicit self-concepts, such that the
explicit self-concept uniquely predicted controlled behaviors and the implicit self-concept
uniquely predicted spontaneous behaviors. Moreover, it has been shown that
discrepancies between the explicit and implicit self-concepts on a particular dimension
(e.g., shyness) uniquely predict behaviors intended to reduce these discrepancies (Briñol,
Petty, & Wheeler, 2006).
Based on these findings, it appears that measures of explicit and implicit self-concepts do
tap different types of information about the self, and that these different self-conceptions
can become dissociated. It is currently less clear, however, how these two selfconceptions may correspond. Based on theoretical perspectives that conceive of the self

7

A version of this chapter has been published elsewhere (Peters & Gawronski) and has been used with
permission of Elsevier Limited.
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as an integrated system for facilitating adaptive behavior (Cross & Markus, 1990; Steele,
1988), it makes sense to expect these conceptions to be related. In fact, measures of the
explicit and implicit self-concepts are typically correlated, suggesting a significant degree
of correspondence. For example, Asendorpf et al. (2002), Briñol et al. (2006), and Back
et al. (2009) observed correlations in the range of .30 to .40 between measures of the
explicit and implicit self-concepts. A meta-analysis of correlations between self-report
measures and the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998) also found that these assessments of the explicit and implicit self-concepts
correlated at .21, more strongly than assessments of self-esteem and roughly equal to the
overall correlation between self-report measures and the IAT across research domains
(Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwender, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). Thus, although explicit and
implicit self-conceptions appear to be distinct, it is equally clear that they can correspond,
raising the possibility that these two aspects of self-representation are related through
processes of mutual influence.
The aim of the present research is to provide a framework for understanding these mutual
influences by viewing the explicit and implicit self-concepts as distinct but interacting
aspects of an individual’s self-representation. Within this framework, measures of the
implicit self-concept are assumed to reflect the momentary activation of specific selfassociations in memory. Measures of the explicit self-concept are assumed to reflect
validated self-beliefs, which are descriptive propositions about the self based on activated
self-associations that are regarded as true by the individual. From this perspective, the
explicit self-concept can be considered a “working” self-concept, in that it constitutes a
continuously maintained network of beliefs about the self (Markus & Wurf, 1987). The
implicit self-concept provides an online, context-sensitive source of activated information
that substantiates, and potentially informs the revision of, this network of self-beliefs.
The construction and maintenance of the working self-concept—a process we refer to as
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self-construal—is thus understood as a fundamentally epistemic enterprise involving the
generation and validation of self-beliefs (Kruglanski, 1989; Quine & Ullian, 1970).

8

This framework for relating the explicit and implicit self-concepts suggests two specific
routes of influence underlying the general process of self-construal. First, a bottom-up,
“data-driven” process of self-construal can occur when self-associations in memory are
activated without the intention to revise the explicit, working self-concept. The increased
accessibility of newly activated self-knowledge will then promote its incorporation into
the explicit, working self-concept. Second, a top-down, “hypothesis-driven” process of
self-construal can occur when the explicit, working self-concept is intentionally revised,
which involves asserting the validity of a new propositional belief about the self (e.g., “I
am extraverted”). To test this hypothesis about the self, autobiographical memory can be
searched for relevant evidence; however, it is expected that this search will be biased
toward activating confirmatory information that substantiates the asserted self-belief
(Klayman & Ha, 1987; Kunda, 1990). In either of these cases, the process of selfconstrual should produce correspondence between the explicit and implicit self-concepts.
The key difference is that during bottom-up self-construal, change in the implicit selfconcept is expected to mediate change in the explicit self-concept, whereas during topdown self-construal, the reverse mediation is expected.
The following two experiments were designed to test these predictions concerning the
mutual influences between the explicit and implicit self-concepts. In Experiment 1, selfassociations in memory were activated independently of the intention to revise the
explicit, working self-concept as a test of bottom-up self-construal. In Experiment 2,
participants were motivated to revise their working self-concepts directly as a test of topdown self-construal. By relating the explicit and implicit self-concepts together within an

8

In line with the broader use of the term construal in the social-cognitive literature, we use the term selfconstrual to refer to a general process of constructing beliefs based on momentarily accessible information.
Previous use of the term self-construal to refer to the influence of culture on self-definition (e.g., Markus &
Kitayama, 1991) can thus be understood within the present framework as self-construal in a particular
content domain, whereby cultural factors influence the accessibility and desirability of specific selfinformation (e.g., independent versus interdependent self-characteristics).
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overall framework of self-construal, this research promises to clarify the connection
between these two aspects of self-representation.

2.1

Experiment 1

The first experiment tested the proposed account of bottom-up self-construal by asking
participants to recall autobiographical memories relating to a specific personality trait
(ostensibly as part of a study investigating the relation between personality styles and
autobiographical memory). The recall task was intended to activate specific selfassociations in memory independent of the intention to revise the working self-concept,
thus initiating a process of bottom-up self-construal. To ensure that most participants
would possess relevant memories and that the revision of the working self-concept
implied by activated self-associations would not be resisted, it was necessary to
manipulate a relatively broad and malleable domain of self-knowledge. Toward that end,
the trait dimension of extraversion-introversion was identified as sufficiently fluid to
ensure that most participants would be willing and able to see themselves as more or less
extraverted (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990).
The current experiment tested three specific predictions derived from the framework of
self-construal outlined above. First, the measure of the implicit self-concept (in this case,
a self-concept IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) was expected to reflect the selective
activation of self-associations congruent with the personality trait (i.e., extraversion or
introversion) targeted in the memory recall task. Second, the measure of the explicit,
working self-concept was expected to reflect the revision of beliefs about the self in line
with the recalled memories, such that participants recalling extraverted (or introverted)
memories would report more (or fewer) extraversion-related self-beliefs. Finally, it was
predicted that these changes in the explicit, working self-concept would be mediated by
changes in the activation of self-associations in the implicit self-concept, consistent with
the proposed account of bottom-up self-construal.
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2.1.1
2.1.1.1

Method
Sample and design

A total of 118 undergraduate students (80 women and 38 men) participated in a study on
personality and autobiographical memory for course credit. The experimental design
consisted of a single between-subjects factor with two conditions (Recalled Trait:
Extraversion vs. Introversion). Order of the two dependent measures was
counterbalanced across participants.

2.1.1.2

Memory recall task

Upon entering the lab, participants were seated at individual computer carrels and given
informed consent documents to sign. Participants then began the memory recall task,
which guided them through the process of sequentially recalling and describing two
memories of their past behavior that they considered to be extraverted or introverted,
according to the experimental condition. To encourage recalled behaviors to be
interpreted as arising from the self rather than situational influences, participants were
instructed to recall each memory using an observer’s (as opposed to an actor’s) visual
perspective (Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005). For each memory, once the participant
indicated that the requested memory had been recalled, a series of brief questions was
asked to increase its vividness (e.g., “Can you see what your facial expression was?”;
Libby et al., 2005). Participants were then asked to describe the recalled memory briefly
in writing, again using an observer’s visual perspective.

2.1.1.3

Measurement of implicit self-concept

A “self/extravert” IAT was used to assess the selective activation of trait-related selfknowledge following the memory recall task (see Appendix A for stimuli). The IAT
compares reaction times to responses that pair a target (e.g., me) with an attribute (e.g.,
extraverted) against responses that pair the same target (e.g., me) with a complementary
attribute (e.g., introverted). The resulting difference score provides a sample-relative
index of the degree to which target-attribute associations are activated in memory. In the
first block of the IAT, “me” and “not me” words had to be assigned to the categories Me
(right) and Not Me (left). In the second block, extraversion and introversion words had to
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be assigned to the categories Extravert (right) and Introvert (left). In the third block,
target and attribute trials were presented in alternating order, with “me” and extraversion
words on the right and “not me” and introversion words on the left. In the fourth block,
participants practiced categorizing only extraversion and introversion words with key
assignments reversed. In the fifth block, target and attribute trials were again combined,
with “me” and introversion words on the right and “not me” and extraversion words on
the left. Blocks 1, 2, and 4 consisted of 20 trials, and blocks 3 and 5 consisted of 80 trials.
The inter-trial interval was 250 ms. Following incorrect responses the word “ERROR!”
was presented in the center of the screen for 1000 ms.

2.1.1.4

Measurement of explicit self-concept

A self-report rating scale was used to measure participants’ perceptions of their own
personality traits, which are assumed to reflect the self-beliefs constituting the explicit,
working self-concept. To mitigate demand effects following the memory recall task,
participants were told that the researchers were “also interested in how a variety of
personality dimensions influence recalled memories” and the scale was therefore
presented as a general personality assessment. The scale consisted of six items relating to
extraversion and six items relating to introversion (identical to the stimuli used in the
IAT), along with six positively valenced filler items and six negatively valenced filler
items (see Appendix B). The items were presented in an a priori randomized order and
were rated on a 7-point scale.
All participants were debriefed at the completion of the experiment. None indicated
suspicion of a link between the memory recall task and either of the dependent measures.

2.1.2
2.1.2.1

Results
Data preparation

An index of extraversion-related (vs. introversion-related) self-associations was
calculated from responses in the IAT following Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji’s (2003)
D-600 algorithm (Cronbach’s α = .84). Scores were calculated such that higher values
reflect stronger associations between the self and extraversion (compared to introversion)
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in the implicit self-concept. An index of extraversion-related (vs. introversion-related)
self-beliefs was calculated from the self-report scale by reverse-coding the six
introversion-related items and computing the combined mean of the six extraversionrelated items with the six reverse-coded introversion items (Cronbach’s α = .92). Higher
scores therefore reflect a more extraverted (compared to introverted) explicit, working
self-concept. The index of activated self-knowledge and the index of self-beliefs were
significantly correlated, r = .53, p < .001.

2.1.2.2

Effects of memory recall task

Inspection of participants’ written descriptions of recalled memories suggested that they
complied with instructions to recall the requested extraversion- or introversion-related
memories. Means and standard deviations for the two self-concept measures are
presented in Table 2.1. As predicted, participants who recalled extraversion-related
memories revealed significantly stronger associations between the self and extraversion
(relative to introversion) on the IAT compared to participants who recalled introversionrelated memories, t(116) = 2.54, p = .01, d = 0.47. Similarly, and again in line with
predictions, participants who recalled extraversion-related memories reported
significantly more extraverted (relative to introverted) self-beliefs than participants who
recalled introversion-related memories, t(116) = 1.97, p = .05, d = 0.37.

Experiment 1
Recall
Extraversion
Measure

Experiment 2

Recall
Introversion

ProExtraversion

ProIntroversion

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Explicit
Self-Concept

4.64

1.10

4.24

1.09

4.98

1.04

4.53

1.04

Implicit
Self-Concept

0.61

0.56

0.35

0.53

0.61

0.45

0.44

0.52

Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations by condition for measures of explicit and
implicit self-concepts in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2.
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2.1.2.3

Mediation analysis

The third prediction tested in the current experiment was that the activation of traitrelated self-associations in memory would mediate the effect of the recall task on the
explicit, working self-concept, in line with the proposed account of bottom-up selfconstrual (see Figure 2.1). To test this prediction, self-report scores were simultaneously
regressed on both the memory recall task and IAT scores (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The
relation between IAT scores and self-report scores remained significant, β = .51, t(115) =
6.31, p < .001, but the effect of the recall task became non-significant, β = .06, t(115) =
0.77, p = .45. Thus, changes in the implicit self-concept fully accounted for changes in
the explicit self-concept. The indirect effect of the memory recall task on self-report
scores when IAT scores were included as a mediator was significant, Sobel’s Z = 2.38, p
= .02.

Implicit Self-Concept
β = .23*

(IAT)

β = .53*

Explicit Self-Concept

Recall Task

(Self-Report)
β = .18† (.06)
Figure 2.1. Mediation model tested in Experiment 2.1 (on the basis of Baron &
Kenny, 1986). The indirect effect of the recall task on the explicit self-concept
(mediated by the implicit self-concept) is statistically significant, Sobel’s Z = 2.38, p
= .02.
†
p = .05; *p < .05.

To rule out the alternative possibility of a top-down influence, we also tested the reverse
mediation model, in which IAT scores were simultaneously regressed on both the
memory recall task and self-report scores. In this mediation model, changes in self-report
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scores failed to account for the obtained effect on IAT scores, in that the memory recall
task still had a marginally significant effect on IAT scores after controlling for self-report
scores, β = .14, t(115) = 1.76, p = .08. Thus, changes in the implicit self-concept fully
accounted for changes in the explicit self-concept, but not the other way around.

2.1.3

Discussion

The results of Experiment 1 provided support for all three predictions concerning bottomup self-construal. The memory recall task selectively activated trait-related selfassociations in the implicit self-concept and also led to congruent revision of the explicit,
working self-concept. The mediation analysis supported the prediction that the effect of
the recall task on the explicit self-concept would be mediated by activation of selfassociations in the implicit self-concept. Consistent with this prediction, changes in selfassociations fully accounted for changes in explicit self-beliefs, but not the other way
around. Taken together, these findings suggest that differences in participants’ explicit,
working self-concepts between the memory recall conditions were due to the bottom-up
integration of the self-beliefs implied by activated self-associations in memory.

2.2

Experiment 2

The second experiment was designed to test the proposed account of top-down selfconstrual. In contrast to bottom-up self-construal, in which the explicit, working selfconcept is influenced independent of the intention to revise it, top-down self-construal
begins with the intentional revision of the working self-concept. Thus, participants in the
current experiment were asked to generate explanations for (fabricated) scientific
findings linking either extraversion or introversion to successful life outcomes. By
making a specific personality trait desirable, this manipulation was intended to motivate
participants to assert the validity of the corresponding propositional belief about
themselves (i.e., “I am extraverted” or “I am introverted”). Having marked this
propositional belief as valid, participants were expected to treat it as a hypothesis to be
tested by searching autobiographical memory for relevant evidence. Due to the
confirmatory nature of hypothesis testing (Klayman & Ha, 1987), however, participants
were expected to selectively activate self-associations in memory that would substantiate
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the asserted propositional belief (Sanitioso et al., 1990), leading to corresponding effects
on the explicit and implicit self-concepts.
The current experiment tested three specific predictions derived from the proposed
framework of self-construal. First, the measure of the explicit, working self-concept was
expected to reflect the revision of beliefs about the self in line with the motivation
manipulation, such that participants motivated to see themselves as extraverted (or
introverted) would report more (or fewer) extraversion-related self-beliefs. Second, the
measure of the implicit self-concept (a self-concept IAT) was expected to reflect the
selective activation of self-associations congruent with the personality trait (i.e.,
extraversion or introversion) that participants were motivated to believe they possessed.
Finally, it was predicted that these changes in the implicit self-concept would be
mediated by changes in the explicit, working self-concept, consistent with the proposed
account of top-down self-construal.

2.2.1
2.2.1.1

Method
Sample and design

A total of 148 undergraduate students (111 women and 37 men) participated in a study on
personality and explanation styles for course credit. The experimental design consisted of
a single between-subjects factor with two conditions (Desired Trait: Pro-Extraversion vs.
Pro-Introversion). Order of the two dependent measures was counterbalanced across
participants.

2.2.1.2

Motivation induction task

Upon entering the lab, participants were seated at individual computer carrels and given
informed consent documents to sign. Participants then began the motivation induction
task (adapted from Sanitioso et al., 1990). The task was framed as an investigation of
how people generate explanations for scientific findings. As with Experiment 1, the
current experiment manipulated self-perceptions along the extraversion-introversion
dimension of personality. Participants were presented with a fabricated newspaper
clipping reporting the findings of a recent scientific study comparing the benefits of
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extraverted personality traits with introverted personality traits (Appendix C). The
clipping briefly described a study that found that extraversion leads to more academic
and job success than introversion (or vice versa in the Pro-Introvert condition). After
reading the clipping, participants were asked to write down two brief explanations for the
observed relationship between extraversion (or introversion) and positive life outcomes.
Generating the two explanations was intended to strengthen the manipulation and
reinforce the cover story. Because most people presumably desire to see themselves as
successful in life, the newspaper clipping was expected to motivate participants to
hypothesize that they themselves possessed the personality trait that contributed to
positive life outcomes, thereby initiating a process of top-down self-construal.

2.2.1.3

Dependent measures

The measures of the implicit and explicit self-concepts were identical to those used in
Experiment 1.

2.2.1.4

Control measure and manipulation check

A manipulation check was included to ensure that the motivation induction task
influenced the desirability of extraverted and introverted personality traits. For three of
the extraversion-related and three of the introversion-related trait words used in the
measurement of the explicit self-concept, participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point
scale how much that trait contributed to success after university.
All participants were debriefed upon completion of the experiment. None indicated
suspicion of a link between the motivation induction task and either of the dependent
measures.

2.2.2
2.2.2.1

Results
Data preparation

Indices of extraversion-related (vs. introversion-related) self-associations (Cronbach’s α
= .76) and of extraversion-related (vs. introversion-related) self-beliefs (Cronbach’s α =
.91) were calculated as described in Experiment 1. The two indices were significantly
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correlated, r = .46, p < .001. For the manipulation check, an index of the degree to which
extraversion vs. introversion contributes to positive life outcomes was calculated by
reverse-coding the three introversion-related items and computing the combined mean
with the three extraversion-related items (Cronbach’s α = .85). Higher scores thus reflect
increased desirability of extraversion compared to introversion.

2.2.2.2

Manipulation check

The motivation induction task led participants in the Pro-Extravert condition to report
that extraversion was more desirable (M = 5.82, SD = 0.75) than participants in the ProIntrovert condition (M = 5.10, SD = 0.78), t(146) = 5.75, p < .001, d = 0.95. Thus, given
that most people desire positive life outcomes for themselves, it is reasonable to assume
that the induction task indeed motivated participants to perceive themselves as possessing
more extraverted or introverted qualities, according to the experimental condition.

2.2.2.3

Effects of motivation induction task

Means and standard deviations for the primary measures are presented in Table 2.1.
Participants in the Pro-Extravert condition revealed significantly stronger associations
between the self and extraversion (relative to introversion) on the IAT compared to
participants in the Pro-Introvert condition, t(146) = 2.10, p = .04, d = 0.35. Similarly, and
again in line with predictions, participants in the Pro-Extravert condition reported
significantly more extraverted (relative to introverted) self-beliefs than participants in the
Pro-Introvert condition, t(146) = 2.65, p = .01, d = 0.44.

2.2.2.4

Mediation analysis

The third prediction tested in the current experiment was that asserting the validity of a
propositional belief within the explicit, working self-concept would initiate a biased
search through memory to activate substantiating self-associations, thereby mediating the
effect of the motivation induction on the implicit self-concept (see Figure 2.2). To test
this prediction, IAT scores were simultaneously regressed on both the motivation
induction and self-report scores (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The relation between self-report
scores and IAT scores remained significant, β = .45, t(145) = 5.97, p < .001, but the effect
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of the motivation induction became non-significant, β = .08, t(145) = 1.00, p = .32. Thus,
changes in the explicit self-concept fully accounted for changes in the implicit selfconcept. The indirect effect of the motivation induction on IAT scores when self-report
scores were included as a mediator was significant, Sobel’s Z = 2.44, p = .02.

Explicit Self-Concept
β = .21*

(Self-Report)

β = .46*

Implicit Self-Concept

Motivation Induction

(IAT)
*

β = .17 (.08)
Figure 2.2. Mediation model tested in Experiment 2.2 (on the basis of Baron &
Kenny, 1986). The indirect effect of the motivation induction on the implicit selfconcept (mediated by the explicit self-concept) is statistically significant, Sobel’s Z =
2.44, p = .02.
*
p < .05.

To rule out the alternative possibility of a bottom-up influence, we also tested the reverse
mediation model, in which self-report scores were simultaneously regressed on both the
motivation induction and the IAT scores. In this mediation model, changes in IAT scores
failed to account for the obtained effect on self-report scores, in that the motivation
induction still had a marginally significant effect on self-report scores after controlling
for IAT scores, β = .14, t(115) = 1.88, p = .06. Thus, changes in the explicit self-concept
fully accounted for changes in the implicit self-concept, but not the other way around.

2.2.3

Discussion

The results of Experiment 2 provided support for all three predictions concerning topdown self-construal. The motivation induction led to revision of the explicit, working
self-concept in line with the desired trait and selectively activated congruent trait-related
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self-associations in the implicit self-concept. The mediation analysis supported the
prediction that the effect of the motivation induction on the implicit self-concept would
be mediated by changes in the explicit self-concept. Consistent with this prediction,
changes in explicit self-beliefs fully accounted for changes in self-associations, but not
the other way around. Taken together, these findings suggest that differences in
participants’ implicit self-concepts between motivation induction conditions were due to
the top-down, intentional activation of self-associations in memory to substantiate the
assertion of a propositional belief within the explicit, working self-concept.

2.3

General Discussion

The current experiments were designed to test a framework specifying how the explicit
and implicit self-concepts are related through processes of mutual influence. The results
of these two experiments provide converging evidence for the predictions derived from
this framework regarding the roles of memory activation and motivated reasoning in
achieving correspondence between these two aspects of self-representation. In
Experiment 1, participants recalled specific autobiographical memories independent of
the intention to revise the explicit, working self-concept. The recall task produced
congruent changes in the implicit and explicit self-concepts and, consistent with the
proposed account of bottom-up self-construal, changes in the implicit self-concept fully
mediated changes in the explicit self-concept. In Experiment 2, participants were
motivated to revise their explicit, working self-concepts directly by asserting the validity
of a propositional self-belief. The induced motivation produced congruent changes in the
explicit and implicit self-concepts; however, in this case—consistent with the proposed
account of top-down self-construal—changes in the explicit self-concept fully mediated
changes in the implicit self-concept. These results together support the claim that the
explicit and implicit self-concepts are integrated, interacting aspects of a dynamic selfsystem.
Although the mediation analyses generally confirmed our predictions about bottom-up
and top-down self-construal, a potential concern is that the reverse mediation models in
both experiments revealed evidence for partial mediation (for similar findings, see
Gawronski & Walther, 2008; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009). Specifically, the reverse

66

mediation models showed simultaneous direct and indirect effects that were close to or at
9

statistical significance. These data patterns reflect an inherent limitation of correlationbased approaches to mediation, in which mediation is established on the basis of the
shared covariance between two measured variables and an independent variable (cf.
Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). The possibility of partial mediation, however, becomes
theoretically implausible when examined alongside evidence from the predicted
mediation models. In Experiment 1, the effect of the recall task on self-associations fully
accounted for changes in explicit self-beliefs. Likewise, in Experiment 2, the effect of the
motivation induction on explicit self-beliefs fully accounted for changes in selfassociations. If the current manipulations influenced our dependent measures through
processes of partial mediation, the proposed mediators in the two experiments would be
unable to fully account for changes in the proposed distal outcomes. Rather, there should
still be a direct effect on the distal outcome in the predicted mediation model after
controlling for the proposed mediator. For instance, if the data in Experiment 1 reflected
the operation of a direct influence on self-associations and a simultaneous indirect
influence on self-associations mediated by a direct influence on explicit self-beliefs, the
obtained effect on explicit self-beliefs should remain significant after controlling for selfassociations. Similarly, if the data in Experiment 2 reflected the operation of a direct
influence on self-beliefs and a simultaneous indirect influence on self-beliefs mediated by
a direct influence on self-associations, the obtained effect on self-associations should
remain significant after controlling for self-beliefs. This was not, however, the case.
Instead, changes in self-associations fully accounted for the obtained effect on self-beliefs
in Experiment 1, and changes in self-beliefs fully accounted for the obtained effect on
self-associations in Experiment 2. These results are consistent with the current

9

In Experiment 1, the reverse mediation model revealed a marginally significant direct effect, β = .14,
t(115) = 1.76, p = .08, and a marginally significant indirect effect, Sobel’s Z = 1.89, p = .06; in Experiment
2, the reverse mediation model revealed a marginally significant direct effect, β = .14, t(115) = 1.88, p =
.06, and a significant indirect effect, Sobel’s Z = 1.99, p = .05.
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hypotheses of bottom-up and top-down construal, but they are inconsistent with the
10

alternative possibility of partial mediation.

2.3.1

Correspondence vs. Dissociation

The present research emphasized the correspondence between measures of the explicit
and implicit self-concepts, in contrast to previous research that has emphasized their
dissociation (Schnabel & Asendorpf, 2010). An obvious question for the proposed
framework of self-construal, then, is how to account for such dissociations. To begin
with, the results of the current experiments provide evidence for mutual influences
between the explicit and implicit self-concepts via a knowledge-activation process
(Förster & Liberman, 2007). All else being equal, the activation of self-knowledge,
whether occurring via a process of bottom-up or top-down self-construal, should increase
correspondence between the explicit and implicit self-concepts. This correspondence may
break down during either of these processes, however, resulting in a dissociation. First, in
the case of bottom-up self-construal, the influence of self-associations on explicit selfbeliefs is likely moderated by a belief-validation process. Following Gawronski and
Bodenhausen (2006, in press), the belief-validation process is expected to operate
according to principles of cognitive consistency, such that activated self-associations that
are inconsistent with other (subjectively valid) self-beliefs may be rejected as invalid
information about the self. Whereas validation of activated self-associations should
increase the correspondence between the explicit and implicit self-concepts, invalidation
should result in a dissociation within the relevant domain of self-knowledge. Second, in
the case of top-down self-construal, dissociations may arise when new beliefs are
asserted as valid within the explicit, working self-concept, but are not substantiated via
selective activation of confirmatory self-associations. Thus, whereas selective activation
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Further evidence for our mediation hypotheses could be obtained through experimental approaches that
do not rely on simple covariations between the mediator and the distal outcome (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong,
2005). One option is to experimentally manipulate the effect of the proposed mediator on the distal
outcome (see Gawronski & LeBel, 2008, for an example). To the extent that the effect of the mediator on
the distal outcome can be disrupted, the effect of the original manipulation (e.g., the motivation induction)
should remain intact for the mediator (e.g., explicit self-concept), but it should disappear for the distal
outcome (e.g., implicit self-concept).
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of confirmatory self-associations should increase the correspondence between the explicit
and implicit self-concepts, disrupting the process of confirmatory information search
should lead to a dissociation.
Accounting for both correspondence and dissociation between the explicit and implicit
self-concepts suggests a more comprehensive framework for understanding self-construal
as an epistemic enterprise, characterized in terms of the basic principles of knowledgeactivation and belief-validation (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007). Such a framework
has the potential to clarify both how the explicit and implicit self-concepts correspond
and how they become dissociated.

2.3.2

Future Directions

Based on the above discussion, an important next step in the development of this
framework is to investigate the proposed account of self-concept dissociations. In
particular, the framework predicts that the overall self-system comprising the explicit and
implicit self-concepts can become “unbalanced” when the processes that maintain
correspondence break down. On the one hand, inconsistent beliefs implied by selfassociations activated within the implicit self-concept may not be validated for
incorporation into the explicit, working self-concept (though self-associations may
nevertheless influence spontaneous behaviors; Asendorpf et al., 2002). On the other hand,
propositional beliefs asserted within the explicit, working self-concept may remain
unsubstantiated if the activation of confirmatory self-associations in memory is
interrupted. The resulting discrepancies may promote uncertainty in self-definition
(Briñol et al., 2006) and compensatory behaviors intended to substantiate the asserted
self-beliefs (e.g., Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981). Thus, the current framework not only
offers specific predictions about the mutual influences between these two aspects of selfrepresentation, but also integrates earlier findings on the dynamics of the explicit and
implicit self-concepts, providing intriguing directions for future research.
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2.5

Appendix A
Implicit Association Test Stimuli

The following tables list the stimuli used in the Implicit Association Test (IAT) for the
target (“me” vs. “not me”) and attribute (“extravert” vs. “introvert”) categories in
Experiments 1 and 2.

Target words

Attribute words

“me”

“not me”

“extravert”

“introvert”

I

few

active

passive

me

some

talkative

quiet

my

any

sociable

withdrawn

mine

it

outgoing

private

self

other

assertive

reserved

73

2.6

Appendix B
Self-Report Scale of Self-Perceived Personality Traits

For each of the 24 items in the scale, subjects rated the statement “I am X,” where X was
one of the personality traits below, on a 7-point agree/disagree scale. The same scale was
used in Experiments 1 and 2.

Extraversion

Introversion

Filler (positive)

Filler (negative)

active

passive

curious

anxious

talkative

quiet

disciplined

impulsive

sociable

withdrawn

generous

selfish

outgoing

reserved

humorous

dishonest

assertive

private

optimistic

cynical

extraverted

introverted

rational

superstitious
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2.7

Appendix C
Manipulation of Motivation in Experiment 2

The following text was presented in the form of a fake newspaper clipping (adapted from
Sanitioso et al., 1990). The text used in the Pro-Extravert condition is shown here; in the
Pro-Introvert condition, all references to extraversion and introversion were switched.
Extraverts get ahead
A recent study at Stanford University investigating the effects of extraverted
personality on academic and job success has concluded that outgoing people are
more successful than their less talkative peers. Dr. Brian Carswell, the lead
investigator, reports that although roughly equal numbers of extraverts and
introverts exist in the population, being extraverted appears to predict success in
these settings to a high degree. In particular, Carswell and his colleagues found
that extraverts tend to receive higher grades in school and are more likely to earn
graduate and professional degrees compared to introverts. Carswell also reports
that extraverted individuals are more likely to end up in successful, high-paying
careers. “Extraversion appears to confer distinct advantages in the modern world,”
Carswell said.
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3

Are We Puppets on a String?
Comparing the Impact of Contingency and
Validity on Implicit and Explicit Evaluations

In the run-up to the 2008 US Presidential election, as the competition between Barack
Obama and John McCain intensified, The New Yorker magazine published a cover
illustration depicting Obama as a terrorist occupying the Oval Office. The resulting
uproar from Obama’s supporters reflected a suspicion that the illustration could lead
voters to form negative associations with Obama even if they rejected the depicted link to
terrorism (Banaji, 2008). Negative political campaigning has likewise been criticized for
exploiting the ease with which evaluative associations can be manipulated (e.g., Carraro,
Gawronski, & Castelli, 2010), and the veracity of these associations matters, as they have
been shown to predict voting behavior in undecided voters independent of conscious
beliefs (Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski, 2008; Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, Lelkes, Akhtar, &
Thompson, 2010). These examples suggest that learning might involve more than just the
formation of beliefs, such that evaluative associations might be formed independent of,
and even despite, conscious assessment of their validity. The unnerving implication is
that we may be no more than “puppets on a string,” helpless to resist being influenced by
all the contingencies to which we are exposed in an information-saturated world.
The difference between associations and beliefs is supported by research in social
cognition showing that it is possible for people to express divergent evaluations of the
same object under different conditions (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, for a
review). For instance, explicit evaluations expressed under conditions of controlled
processing often diverge from implicit evaluations expressed under conditions of
automatic processing (Bargh, 1994). These results suggest that evaluative responses do
not always reflect conscious beliefs about an object and that automatically activated
associations may influence evaluative responses under suboptimal processing conditions.
In line with suspicions about the effects of media influence, evaluative dissociations are
often explained by appeal to dual-process theories of learning, which posit two learning
processes that may operate in parallel (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell &
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McConnell, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). On this account, explicit evaluations are the
product of a belief-based learning process, which qualifies the evaluation implied by
object-valence contingencies by the perceived validity of these contingencies. Implicit
evaluations, in contrast, are thought to be the product of a contingency-based learning
process, which encodes contingencies independent of their perceived validity and hence
is sensitive to the dominant valence associated with an object. Because the two learning
processes are assumed to operate in parallel, evaluative dissociations may already occur
at the time of learning if the evaluation implied by observed contingencies is qualified by
conscious beliefs about its validity.
Indeed, evidence for dual-process theories of learning seems compelling, such that
evaluative dissociations may often arise at the time of learning about an object. For
example, Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, and Strain (2006) employed a learning procedure
in which participants had to guess the validity of valenced behavioral descriptions about a
social target named Bob. Preceding the display of Bob’s photograph on each trial,
participants were subliminally presented with a prime word whose valence was opposite
to the evaluation implied by the validity of the behavioral descriptions. Rydell et al.
found that explicit evaluations of Bob reflected the valence of the valid behavioral
descriptions whereas implicit evaluations of Bob reflected the valence of the subliminal
primes.
Although findings like these provide evidence that implicit and explicit evaluations are
differentially sensitive to contingency-based versus belief-based learning processes, they
remain silent about whether the two learning mechanisms can operate simultaneously on
the basis of the same information (as is implied in the depiction of Obama as a terrorist).
In particular, the currently available evidence is limited in answering this question given
that demonstrations of learning-related dissociations typically involved multiple
manipulations of an object’s valence via distinct sources of information. For instance, in
Rydell et al.’s (2006) study, contingency-based learning was driven by the subliminal
primes that preceded the presentation of Bob, whereas belief-based learning was driven
by the validity of the behavioral descriptions that followed the presentation of Bob.
Moreover, the contingencies established through the priming manipulation may not be
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subject to conscious qualification if they are learned outside awareness. Consequently, it
remains unclear if evaluative dissociations can arise in situations in which the evaluation
implied by contingencies can itself be assessed as true or false. Such conditions are more
consistent with the examples of media influence described above, where the observer is
frequently confronted with information that is immediately perceived to be invalid.
The present experiments aim to address this question by directly manipulating the
perceived validity of object-valence contingencies in a single learning episode. Based on
dual-process theories that propose two parallel learning mechanisms (e.g., Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), we expected
an evaluative dissociation in this situation due to the simultaneous operation of beliefbased and contingency-based learning processes. Specifically, given evidence that the
negation of an association has been shown to qualify explicit, but not implicit,
evaluations (Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006),
evaluative dissociations were expected to arise when the valence most frequently
associated with an object is perceived to be false. In these cases, explicit evaluations
should reflect the perceived validity of observed contingencies, whereas implicit
evaluations should reflect observed contingencies independent of their perceived validity.
To anticipate our findings, this prediction was not confirmed in our studies. Contrary to
the assumption that contingency-based and belief-based learning mechanisms may
operate simultaneously on the basis of the same information, we found that the perceived
validity of evaluative information about social targets qualified both explicit and implicit
evaluations when validity information was available during the learning of the valence
information. The expected dissociations only occurred when the presentation of validity
information was delayed, which reduced its qualifying effect on implicit, but not explicit,
evaluations. Taken together, these results support accounts that explain evaluative
dissociations in terms of expression-related, as opposed to learning-related processes,
such that dissociations can be explained by the rejection of previously formed
associations during the course of generating a controlled evaluative response (see
Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005, for a review). Consequently, these
findings pose a challenge to the view that evaluative dissociations may be explained by
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the simultaneous operation of two independent learning mechanisms on the basis of the
same information.

3.1

Experiment 1

In the first experiment, we sought to test the basic question of whether an evaluative
dissociation can arise during a single learning episode, in which the perceived validity of
object-valence contingencies is directly manipulated. The experiment involved a social
learning task that required participants to form impressions of four novel targets by
reading valenced behavioral descriptions about each of them. To manipulate the
perceived validity of the resulting contingencies, each behavioral description was
immediately marked as either true or false. The four targets in the learning task thus
differed according to the valence with which they were most frequently associated
(positive vs. negative) as well as the “true” valence of each target. The key empirical
question is whether an evaluative dissociation will arise when the “true” valence diverges
from the valence most frequently associated with the target. Based on the assumption that
contingency-based and belief-based learning mechanisms may operate simultaneously on
the basis of the same information, we originally expected that explicit evaluations would
reflect the observed contingencies qualified by their perceived validity, whereas implicit
evaluations would reflect these contingencies without any qualification.

3.1.1
3.1.1.1

Method
Participants and design

A total of 28 undergraduate students (20 women; 8 men) participated in a study on
impression formation for course credit. The experiment employed a 2 (Dominant
Valence: 75% Positive vs. 75% Negative) × 2 (Validity of Dominant Valence: True vs.
False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) factorial design with all three variables
varying within-participants. Order of the two evaluation measures was counterbalanced
across participants.
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3.1.1.2

Learning task

Upon entering the lab, participants were seated at individual computers and signed
informed consent documents. Participants then began the computerized learning task, in
which they were asked to form accurate impressions of four different people based on
minimal information about each of them. The learning paradigm consisted of a guessing
task in which participants were sequentially presented with photographs of four men
along with valenced behavioral descriptions of each of them. Participants’ task was to
guess the accuracy of each description with feedback provided immediately following
each guess (i.e., “RIGHT!” or “WRONG!”; see Rydell et al., 2006). Feedback following
guesses was 100% consistent for all targets so that there was no misleading feedback
about the true valence of any target. Each participant thus learned the true valence of each
target according to his or her own pattern of guesses. In addition, instructions preceding
the task informed participants that, when a behavioral description turned out to be false,
they should infer that the opposite of the implied evaluation was true (i.e., a positive
description that turns out to be false implies a negative evaluation, and vice versa).
A total of 20 behavioral descriptions (adapted from Rydell et al., 2006) were presented
for each of the four targets, including both positively valenced descriptions (e.g., “Mike
lent money to a friend in financial trouble”) and negatively valenced descriptions (e.g.,
“Mike cheated during a poker game”). The valence of the behavioral descriptions for
each target was held in 3:1 proportion such that two targets were paired with 15 positive
and 5 negative descriptions and two targets were paired with 5 positive and 15 negative
descriptions. The “true” valence was varied orthogonally to the dominant valence of the
behavioral descriptions so that either the positive descriptions were true and the negative
descriptions were false, or vice versa. These two manipulations created four different
impression-formation targets: (1) a target with mostly positive descriptions that were
described as accurate, (2) a target with mostly negative descriptions that were described
as accurate, (3) a target with mostly positive descriptions that were described as
inaccurate, and (4) a target with mostly negative descriptions that were described as
inaccurate. The particular mappings of the four photographs with the four experimental
conditions were counterbalanced across participants.
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With 20 behavioral descriptions presented for each of the four targets, the learning
procedure consisted of a total of 80 trials presented to each participant in computerrandomized order. Each learning trial started with the presentation of a shoulder-up
photograph of one of the four impression-formation targets, all of whom were young,
white men, centered on the computer screen. At the same time, a valenced behavioral
description was displayed below the picture. Participants were instructed to use two
response keys on the keyboard to indicate their true/false guess on each trial. Upon
making a response, the display was cleared and participants were given feedback about
the validity of their guess. The feedback remained centered on the screen for 1000
milliseconds, followed by a 1000 millisecond inter-trial interval.

3.1.1.3

Measurement of explicit evaluations

Following the learning procedure, participants completed measures of explicit and
implicit evaluations in counterbalanced order. To assess explicit evaluations, participants
completed three self-report items (likeability, friendliness, and trustworthiness) for each
of the four impression-formation targets in computer-randomized order. Responses for all
items were made on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

3.1.1.4

Measurement of implicit evaluations

The affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005)
was used to measure implicit evaluations of each of the four impression-formation
targets. Each trial of the AMP was displayed in the following sequence: A fixation cross
was presented for 1000 milliseconds; a valenced stimulus (i.e., a photograph of one of the
four targets) for 75 milliseconds; a blank screen for 125 milliseconds; a Chinese
pictograph for 100 milliseconds; and finally, a pattern mask of black and white noise was
presented. Participants were instructed that, upon presentation of the mask, they were to
indicate how “visually pleasant” they found the preceding Chinese pictograph using two
response keys on the keyboard signifying less pleasant and more pleasant. Following
Payne et al. (2005), participants were told that the pictures appearing before the Chinese
pictographs may bias responses and that they should try not to let the pictures influence
their judgments. Twenty-five AMP trials were presented for each impression-formation
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target, resulting in a total of 100 trials presented in computer-randomized order.
Participants were debriefed following completion of the dependent measures.

3.1.2
3.1.2.1

Results
Data preparation

The three self-report items were averaged to create an index of the explicit evaluation of
each of the four targets (all Cronbach’s α > .56). To create an index of the implicit
evaluation of each target, the proportion of more pleasant responses on the relevant AMP
trials was calculated, which varied between 0% (negative) and 100% (positive).

3.1.2.2

Explicit and implicit evaluations

The primary analyses collapsed across the order of the two evaluation measures. To test
the effects of validity information on explicit and implicit evaluations, indices of both
explicit and implicit evaluations were standardized to obtain a common metric and then
submitted to a 2 (Dominant Valence: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity of Dominant
Valence: True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Significant main effects were observed for valence, F(1,
27) = 19.07, p < .001, η2p = .41, and validity, F(1, 27) = 11.77, p = .002, η2p = .30. In
addition, significant two-way interactions were observed between valence and validity,
F(1, 27) = 73.07, p < .001, η2p = .73, and validity and evaluation type, F(1, 27) = 25.89, p
< .001, η2p = .49. Finally, the three-way interaction between valence, validity, and
evaluation type was significant, F(1, 27) = 17.63, p < .001, η2p = .40. Further inspection
of this interaction suggests that the qualification of the validity × valence effect by
evaluation type does not reflect the expected dissociation between explicit and implicit
evaluations as a function of validity. Instead, the interaction simply reflects a slightly
weaker effect size of the valence × validity cross-over interaction for implicit evaluations,
as described below.
To specify the obtained three-way interaction, the effects of the valence and validity
manipulations were assessed separately for both explicit and implicit evaluations using
raw scores for all analyses. With respect to explicit evaluations, significant main effects
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of valence, F(1, 27) = 22.53, p < .001, η2p = .46, and validity, F(1, 27) = 64.57, p < .001,
η2p = .63, were observed, qualified by a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 27) = 72.30,
p < .001, η2p = .73. As shown in Figure 3.1, validity information influenced explicit
evaluations as expected, such that explicit evaluations reflected the dominant valence
when it was true and the opposite of the dominant valence when it was false. Pairedsamples t-tests revealed that when the dominant valence was true, explicit evaluations
favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(27) = 9.08, p <
.001; but when the dominant valence was false, explicit evaluations favored negatively
described targets over positively described targets, t(27) = 6.04, p < .001. Moreover,
when the dominant valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, explicit evaluations
were more positive when the validity feedback for the dominant information was true
rather than false, t(27) = 12.80, p < .001; but when the dominant valence of behavioral
descriptions was negative, explicit evaluations were more positive when the validity
feedback for the dominant information was false rather than true, t(27) = 4.28, p < .001.
7.00

Explicit Evaluations

6.00

5.00

4.00

Positive
Negative

3.00

2.00

1.00

True

False

Figure 3.1. Explicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative)
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false), Experiment 3.1. Error bars represent
standard errors.
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With respect to implicit evaluations, no main effects were significant but the two-way
interaction between valence and validity was significant, F(1, 27) = 16.85, p < .001, η2p =
.38. As shown in Figure 3.2, the interaction effect for implicit evaluations was identical to
that obtained for explicit evaluations; that is, implicit evaluations reflected the dominant
valence when it was true and the opposite of the dominant valence when it was false.
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the dominant valence was true, implicit
evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(27) =
4.03, p < .001; but when the dominant valence was false, implicit evaluations favored
negatively described targets over positively described targets, t(27) = 2.66, p = .013.
Moreover, when the dominant valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, implicit
evaluations were more positive when the validity feedback for the dominant information
was true rather than false, t(27) = 3.16, p = .004; but when the dominant valence of
behavioral descriptions was negative, implicit evaluations were more positive when the
validity feedback for the dominant information was false rather than true, t(27) = 3.44, p
11

= .002.

11

The order of the two evaluation measures did not moderate the effect of valence and validity information
on the measure of implicit evaluations, F(1, 26) = .02, p = .879, η2p < .01, but did moderate the effect of
valence and validity on the measure of explicit evaluations, F(1, 26) = 6.59, p = .016, η2p = .20. The order
effect reflects a stronger effect of the valence × validity interaction on explicit evaluations when the
measure of explicit evaluations was completed first, although in both cases the interaction remained
significant. Specifically, when the measure of explicit evaluations was completed after the measure of
implicit evaluations, the two-way interaction between valence and validity was relatively weaker, F(1, 13)
= 15.62, p = .002, η2p = .55, compared to when it was completed first, F(1, 13) = 133.60, p < .001, η2p =
.91. Because measurement order had no effect on the results in Experiments 2 and 3, we refrain from
speculating on the nature of this effect.
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Figure 3.2. Implicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative)
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false), Experiment 3.1. Error bars represent
standard errors.

3.1.3

Discussion

Counter to our predictions, Experiment 1 revealed that perceived validity qualified the
effect of object-valence contingencies for both explicit and implicit evaluations. When
the dominant valence was true, explicit and implicit evaluations reflected the dominant
valence, but when the dominant valence was false, explicit and implicit evaluations
reflected the opposite of the dominant valence. Thus, no evaluative dissociation was
observed when the perceived validity of observed contingencies was manipulated in a
single learning episode. This pattern of results challenges the assumption that beliefbased and contingency-based learning may operate simultaneously on the basis of the
same information. Drawing on dual-process theories that propose the simultaneous
operation of two parallel learning mechanisms, we originally expected that explicit
evaluations would reflect the perceived validity of contingencies, whereas implicit
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evaluations would reflect contingencies independent of their perceived validity. This
prediction was clearly disconfirmed in the current study. There is, however, a
methodological concern with drawing this conclusion directly from the present results,
which was addressed in the next experiment.

3.2

Experiment 2

The present experiment sought to rule out the concern that the absence of a dissociation
in Experiment 1 resulted from inadequate measurement procedures. Recent evidence
suggests that validity information pertaining to the primes can influence responses on the
AMP (Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009), whereas Fazio’s
evaluative priming task (EPT; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) remains
unaffected by validity information (Deutsch et al., 2006, 2009). Moreover, the AMP and
the EPT have been shown to produce divergent effects of the same experimental
manipulation under some conditions, suggesting that task-specific mechanisms may
shape responses on these measures in a non-trivial manner (e.g., Deutsch & Gawronski,
2009; Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, & Deutsch, 2010). It would therefore be valuable
to replicate the findings from Experiment 1 using an EPT to ensure that they are not
unique to one measure of implicit evaluations but reflect a genuine effect that replicates
across different measures of the same construct.

3.2.1
3.2.1.1

Method
Participants and design

A total of 45 undergraduate students (37 women; 8 men) participated in a study on
impression formation for course credit. One participant was excluded from analysis due
to chance responding on the EPT (error rate > 40%). As with Experiment 1, this
experiment employed a 2 (Dominant Valence: 75% Positive vs. 75% Negative) × 2
(Validity of Dominant Valence: True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs.
Implicit) factorial design with all three variables varying within-participants. Order of the
two evaluation measures was counterbalanced across participants.
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3.2.1.2

Procedure

The learning task and the measure of explicit evaluations were identical to Experiment 1.
Fazio et al.’s (1995) EPT was used to measure implicit evaluations of the four
impression-formation targets. Each trial of the EPT was displayed in the following
sequence: A fixation cross was presented for 500 milliseconds; a valenced prime (i.e., a
photograph of one of the four targets) for 200 milliseconds; and then a positive or
negative target word (e.g., “paradise” or “poison”), which remained onscreen until the
participant indicated whether the word was positive or negative using one of two
response keys on the keyboard. If the response was incorrect, “ERROR!” was displayed
for 1500 milliseconds. An interval of 1000 milliseconds preceded the start of the next
trial. According to Fazio et al. (1995), the affect elicited by the prime should facilitate
evaluative decisions for valence-congruent target words but inhibit evaluative decisions
for valence-incongruent target words, so that response latencies to the target words can be
used to infer implicit evaluations of each impression-formation target. Each of the four
targets served as a prime on 20 trials, split between 10 trials with negative and 10 trials
with positive target words, creating a total of 80 trials presented in computer-randomized
order. Participants were debriefed following completion of the dependent measures.

3.2.2

Results

3.2.2.1

Data preparation

Indices of the explicit evaluation of each of the four impression-formation targets were
calculated as described in Experiment 1 (all Cronbach’s α > .83). In creating indices of
the implicit evaluation of each of the four impression-formation targets, EPT trials with
incorrect responses (5.1%) were excluded. To control for anticipations and outliers
(Ratcliff, 1993), response cutoffs were employed to exclude trials with reaction times
shorter than 300 milliseconds or longer than 1000 milliseconds (8.7% of valid trials).
Then, for each of the four primes in the EPT, the mean reaction time to trials with
positive target words was subtracted from trials with negative target words, so that higher
scores reflect a relatively more positive implicit evaluation of the target (see Wentura &
Degner, 2010).
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3.2.2.2

Explicit and implicit evaluations

The order of the two evaluation measures had no effect, so analyses collapsed across this
factor. To test the effects of validity information on explicit and implicit evaluations,
indices of both explicit and implicit evaluations were standardized and submitted to a 2
(Dominant Valence: 75% Positive vs. 75% Negative) × 2 (Validity of Dominant Valence:
True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) repeated measures ANOVA.
Significant two-way interactions were observed between valence and validity, F(1, 43) =
358.08, p < .001, η2p = .89, and valence and evaluation type, F(1, 43) = 4.53, p = .039, η2p
= .10. The three-way interaction between valence, validity, and evaluation type was also
significant, F(1, 43) = 270.53, p < .001, η2p = .86. No other effects were significant. As
with Experiment 1, the qualification of the validity × valence effect by evaluation type
does not reflect the expected dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations.
Instead, the interaction reflects a slightly weaker effect size of the valence × validity
cross-over interaction for implicit evaluations, as described below.
To specify the obtained three-way interaction, the effects of the valence and validity
manipulations were assessed separately for both explicit and implicit evaluations, using
raw scores for all analyses. With respect to explicit evaluations, significant main effects
were observed for valence, F(1, 43) = 8.10, p = .007, η2p = .16, and for validity, F(1, 43)
= 5.39, p = .025, η2p = .11, qualified by a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 43) =
445.49, p < .001, η2p = .91. As shown in Figure 3.3, validity information influenced
explicit evaluations as expected, such that explicit evaluations reflected the dominant
valence when it was true and the opposite of the dominant valence when it was false.
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the dominant valence was true, explicit
evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(43) =
21.60, p < .001; but when the dominant valence was false, explicit evaluations favored
negatively described targets over positively described targets, t(43) = 16.67, p < .001.
Moreover, when the dominant valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, explicit
evaluations were more positive when the validity feedback for the dominant information
was true rather than false, t(43) = 21.98, p < .001; but when the dominant valence of
behavioral descriptions was negative, explicit evaluations were more positive when the
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validity feedback for the dominant information was false rather than true, t(43) = 17.17, p
< .001.
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Figure 3.3. Explicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative)
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false), Experiment 3.2. Error bars represent
standard errors.

With respect to implicit evaluations, no main effects were significant but the two-way
interaction between valence and validity was significant, F(1, 43) = 8.31, p = .006, η2p =
.16. As shown in Figure 3.4, the effect of validity information on implicit evaluations was
identical to its effect of explicit evaluations; that is, implicit evaluations reflected the
dominant valence when it was true and the opposite of the dominant valence when it was
false. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the dominant valence was true, implicit
evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(43) =
2.15, p = .037; but when the dominant valence was false, implicit evaluations favored
negatively described targets over positively described targets, t(43) = 2.29, p = .027.
Moreover, when the dominant valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, implicit
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evaluations were more positive when the validity feedback for the dominant information
was true rather than false, t(43) = 2.11, p = .041; but when the dominant valence of
behavioral descriptions was negative, implicit evaluations were more positive when the
validity feedback for the dominant information was false rather than true, t(43) = 2.42, p
= .020.
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Figure 3.4. Implicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative)
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false), Experiment 3.2. Error bars represent
standard errors.

3.2.3

Discussion

The findings of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1 using a measure of
implicit evaluations less sensitive to validity information (Deutsch et al., 2006, 2009).
Once again, perceived validity qualified the effect of object-valence contingencies for
both explicit and implicit evaluations. These results rule out the concern that the absence
of dissociation in Experiment 1 was due to suboptimal measurement procedures.
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3.3

Experiment 3

Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that during a single learning episode, the perceived validity
of object-valence contingencies influences both explicit and implicit evaluations. In other
words, it appears that in situations that involve exposure to information that is considered
invalid, it is possible to exercise control over what is learned. There is, however, evidence
for evaluative dissociations arising from asymmetric influences of validity information on
explicit and implicit evaluations. For example, Gregg et al. (2006) found that both
explicit and implicit evaluations initially reflected the valence of behavioral descriptions
of two novel groups, but that subsequently acquired information about the validity of
these descriptions qualified explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. This finding is at odds
with the results of the preceding experiments, in which validity information qualified
both explicit and implicit evaluations.
An important factor that may account for the difference between the two findings is the
time at which validity information was provided. Whereas in our studies validity
information was available during the learning of the behavioral descriptions, Gregg et
al.’s (2006) study included a substantial delay between the initial learning of the
behavioral descriptions and the subsequent presentation of validity information. Thus,
counter to the notion of learning-related dissociations due to the simultaneous operation
of two distinct learning mechanisms on the basis of the same information, Gregg et al.’s
(2006) findings are better described as a case of expression-related dissociations. Such
dissociations occur when information that has been stored in memory at an earlier time is
later learned to be invalid. In such cases, newly acquired validity information may be
unable to erase previously formed associations from memory, even though these
associations are rejected as invalid in the course of expressing an explicit evaluative
judgment (Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). As a result, newly acquired
validity information will influence explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. In fact, many
examples of evaluative dissociations can be parsimoniously explained by the subsequent
rejection of previously learned information without assuming a simultaneous operation of
two independent learning mechanisms (see Hofmann et al., 2005, for a review).
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If this interpretation is correct, then it should be possible to create an evaluative
dissociation using the present experimental paradigm by manipulating the delay between
the presentation of the behavioral descriptions and information about their validity.
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that, when validity information is available during the
learning of the behavioral descriptions, perceived validity produces equivalent effects on
explicit and implicit evaluations. On the other hand, if the presentation of validity
information is delayed, it must be applied to existing associations post-hoc, presumably
qualifying explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. This pattern would be consistent with
the idea that evaluative dissociations arising from perceived validity are due to
expression-related, rather than learning-related, processes. Experiment 3 was designed to
test this hypothesis.

3.3.1
3.3.1.1

Method
Participants and design

A total of 218 undergraduate students (159 women and 59 men; mean age = 22.03)
participated in a study on impression formation for course credit. Data from 14
participants were unusable due to a programming error and another 15 participants were
excluded due to chance responding on the EPT (error rates > 40%). The final sample
consisted of 189 students (139 women; 50 men). The experiment employed a 2 (Valence:
Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity of Valence: True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type:
Explicit vs. Implicit) × 2 (Validity Timing: Short-Delay vs. Long-Delay) factorial design
with the first three variables varying within-participants and the last varying betweenparticipants. Order of the two evaluation measures was counterbalanced across
participants.

3.3.1.2

Learning procedure

The learning procedure employed in Experiment 3 was broadly similar to that used in
Experiments 1 and 2, with a few important differences. First, a more detailed cover story
was provided, which framed the learning procedure in terms of learning about co-workers
at a new job based on second-hand comments (adapted from Gawronski & Walther,
2008). To strengthen the overall effect of valence during the learning procedure, the four
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impression-formation targets were paired with 100% positive or 100% negative
behavioral descriptions. The guessing component of the procedure was therefore dropped
and the learning task was instead introduced as a slideshow that required only that
participants attend to the information presented. Furthermore, because 100% consistent
behavioral descriptions should be easily learned, only five learning trials were displayed
for each target, for a total of 20 learning trials presented in computer-randomized order.
New positive and negative behavioral descriptions were created to conform with the
“workplace” cover story (adapted from Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 2005).
To test the effects of immediate versus delayed presentation of validity information on
explicit and implicit evaluations, the delivery of validity information during the learning
procedure was manipulated to be either (a) interleaved with the learning trials in the
short-delay condition or (b) presented after all learning trials had finished in the longdelay condition. Instructions prior to the learning task in the short-delay condition
informed participants that some behavioral descriptions would turn out to be false and
that in these cases they should infer that the opposite of the implied evaluation was true.
In the long-delay condition, instructions prior to the learning task informed participants
that some behavioral descriptions would turn out to be false but that they should initially
assume that all of the descriptions are true.
Each learning trial in the short-delay condition (similar to Experiments 1 and 2) began
with the presentation of a photograph of one of the four targets together with a valenced
behavioral description. After 3000 milliseconds, validity information was presented just
below the behavioral description and remained onscreen for another 3000 milliseconds. A
1500 millisecond inter-trial interval preceded the start of the next learning trial. In the
long-delay condition, each learning trial began with the presentation of a photograph of
one of the four targets together with a valenced behavioral description. This information
remained onscreen for 6000 milliseconds and a 1500 millisecond inter-trial interval
preceded the start of the next trial. The total duration of the 20-trial slideshow in both
conditions was 150 seconds.
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Following completion of the slideshow in the short-delay condition, participants were
asked to take a moment to integrate the behavioral descriptions with the validity
information to arrive at a clear impression of each target and to proceed to the next
component of the study at their own pace. In the long-delay condition, participants were
told that the behavioral descriptions for two of the targets were all true whereas the
behavioral descriptions for the other two targets were all false. A photograph of each
target and the validity of the descriptions associated with that target (i.e., “TRUE
COMMENTS” or “FALSE COMMENTS”) were displayed on one screen to make this
clear. Participants were asked to take their time to arrive at a clear impression of each
target in light of the new validity information. In both conditions, the valence and validity
of the four targets were crossed to produce a positive/true, positive/false, negative/true,
and negative/false target. The particular mappings of the four photographs with the four
experimental conditions were counterbalanced across participants.

3.3.1.3

Measurement of explicit and implicit evaluations

The measures of explicit evaluations of each target were identical to those used in
Experiments 1 and 2. Implicit evaluations of each target were assessed using an EPT
identical to that used in Experiment 2, except that the total number of trials was doubled
to 160. Participants were debriefed following completion of the dependent measures.

3.3.2
3.3.2.1

Results
Data preparation

Indices of the explicit evaluation of each of the four impression-formation targets were
calculated as described in Experiment 1 (all Cronbach’s α > .90). In creating indices of
the implicit evaluation of each of the four impression-formation targets, EPT trials with
incorrect responses (4.3%) were excluded. Response cutoffs were also employed to
exclude trials with reaction times shorter than 300 milliseconds or longer than 1000
milliseconds (7.3% of valid trials). Calculation of the implicit indices from the EPT
scores followed the procedure described in Experiment 2.
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3.3.2.2

Explicit and implicit evaluations

The order of the two evaluation measures had no effect, so analyses collapsed across this
factor. To test the effects of delayed validity information on explicit and implicit
evaluations, indices of both explicit and implicit evaluations were standardized and
submitted to a 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity of Valence: True vs.
False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) × 2 (Validity Timing: Short-Delay vs.
Long-Delay) mixed-model ANOVA with repeated measures on the first three factors.
Significant main effects were observed for valence, F(1, 187) = 54.48, p < .001, η2p = .23,
and validity, F(1, 187) = 13.28, p < .001, η2p = .07. In addition, significant two-way
interactions were observed between valence and validity, F(1, 187) = 618.97, p < .001,
η2p = .77, between valence and timing, F(1, 187) = 11.61, p = .001, η2p = .06, between
valence and evaluation type, F(1, 187) = 11.58, p = .001, η2p = .06, and between validity
and evaluation type, F(1, 187) = 4.64, p = .033, η2p = .02. Significant three-way
interactions were observed between valence, validity, and timing, F(1, 187) = 18.91, p <
.001, η2p = .09, between valence, validity, and evaluation type, F(1, 187) = 532.18, p <
.001, η2p = .74, and between validity, timing, and evaluation type, F(1, 187) = 7.27, p =
.008, η2p = .04. Finally, and most relevant to the current hypothesis, a significant fourway interaction was observed, F(1, 187) = 14.07, p < .001, η2p = .07, indicating that the
effects of valence and validity on explicit and implicit evaluations was differentially
moderated by the timing of validity information. To specify the particular nature of this
interaction, analyses of explicit and implicit evaluations are reported separately for each
of the two validity timing conditions.

3.3.2.3

Evaluations under short-delay validity timing

The condition involving a short delay before the presentation of validity information is
conceptually identical to the design employed in Experiments 1 and 2, and analyses will
proceed similarly. To test the effects of valence and validity feedback on explicit and
implicit evaluations in the short-delay condition, standardized indices of explicit and
implicit evaluations were submitted to a 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity
of Valence: True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) repeated
measures ANOVA. A significant main effect was observed for valence, F(1, 102) =
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10.51, p = .002, η2p = .09. In addition, significant two-way interactions were observed
between valence and validity, F(1, 102) = 561.63, p < .001, η2p = .85, and between
valence and evaluation type, F(1, 102) = 4.14, p = .044, η2p = .04. Finally, the three-way
interaction between valence, validity, and evaluation type was significant, F(1, 102) =
393.56, p < .001, η2p = .79. No other effects were significant. As with Experiments 1 and
2, the qualification of the validity × valence interaction by evaluation type does not
reflect the expected dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations. Instead, the
interaction reflected a slightly weaker effect size of the valence × validity cross-over
interaction for implicit evaluations, as described below.
The effects of the valence and validity manipulations were assessed separately for both
explicit and implicit evaluations using raw scores for all analyses. With respect to explicit
evaluations, a significant main effect of valence was observed, F(1, 102) = 17.98, p <
.001, η2p = .15, qualified by a significant two-way interaction between valence and
validity, F(1, 102) = 763.14, p < .001, η2p = .88. As shown in Figure 3.5, validity
information influenced explicit evaluations as expected, such that explicit evaluations
reflected the valence of behavioral descriptions when it was true and the opposite valence
when it was false. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the behavioral descriptions
were true, explicit evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively
described targets, t(102) = 26.27, p < .001; but when the behavioral descriptions were
false, explicit evaluations favored negatively described targets over positively described
targets, t(102) = 20.92, p < .001. Moreover, when the valence of behavioral descriptions
was positive, explicit evaluations were more positive when the validity information was
true rather than false, t(102) = 21.52, p < .001; but when the valence of behavioral
descriptions was negative, explicit evaluations were more positive when the validity
information was false rather than true, t(102) = 25.08, p < .001.
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Figure 3.5. Explicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative)
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false) with short-delay validity feedback,
Experiment 3.3. Error bars represent standard errors.

With respect to implicit evaluations, no main effects were significant but the two-way
interaction between valence and validity was significant, F(1, 102) = 32.37, p < .001, η2p
= .24. As shown in Figure 3.6, the pattern of the valence × validity interaction was
identical to that obtained for explicit evaluations. Specifically, under quick validity
feedback, implicit evaluations reflected the dominant valence when it was true and the
opposite valence when it was false. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the
behavioral descriptions were true, implicit evaluations favored positively described
targets over negatively described targets, t(102) = 4.62, p < .001; but when the behavioral
descriptions were false, implicit evaluations favored negatively described targets over
positively described targets, t(102) = 3.44, p = .001. Moreover, when the valence of
behavioral descriptions was positive, implicit evaluations were more positive when the
validity information was true rather than false, t(102) = 5.11, p < .001; but when the
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valence of behavioral descriptions was negative, implicit evaluations were more positive
when the validity information was false rather than true, t(102) = 3.72, p < .001.
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Figure 3.6. Implicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative)
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false) with short-delay validity feedback,
Experiment 3.3. Error bars represent standard errors.

Taken together, these results replicate the findings of Experiments 1 and 2: When the
delay between the presentation of valence and validity information was short, both
explicit and implicit evaluations reflected the qualification of the behavioral descriptions
by their perceived validity.

3.3.2.4

Evaluations under long-delay validity timing

To test for a potential dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations in the longdelay condition, standardized indices of explicit and implicit evaluations were submitted
to a 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity of Valence: True vs. False) × 2
(Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) repeated measures ANOVA. Significant main
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effects were observed for valence, F(1, 85) = 44.15, p < .001 , η2p = .34, and validity,
F(1, 85) = 11.46, p = .001, η2p = .12. In addition, significant two-way interactions were
observed between valence and validity, F(1, 85) = 161.51, p < .001, η2p = .66, between
valence and evaluation type, F(1, 85) = 6.99, p = .010, η2p = .08, and between validity
and evaluation type, F(1, 85) = 9.02, p = .004, η2p = .10. Finally, the three-way
interaction between valence, validity, and evaluation type was significant, F(1, 85) =
172.05, p < .001, η2p = .67. No other effects were significant. In this case, contrary to the
results under quick validity timing, the qualification of the validity × valence effect by
evaluation type does reflect a dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations, as
described below.
The effects of the valence and validity manipulations were assessed separately for both
explicit and implicit evaluations using raw scores for all analyses. With respect to explicit
evaluations, significant main effects were observed for valence, F(1, 85) = 33.38, p <
.001, η2p = .28, and validity, F(1, 85) = 19.60, p < .001, η2p = .19, qualified by a
significant two-way interaction, F(1, 85) = 254.95, p < .001, η2p = .75. As shown in
Figure 3.7, validity information influenced explicit evaluations as expected, such that
explicit evaluations reflected the valence of the behavioral descriptions when they were
true and the opposite valence when they were false. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that
when the behavioral descriptions were true, explicit evaluations favored positively
described targets over negatively described targets, t(85) = 16.72, p < .001; but when the
behavioral descriptions were false, explicit evaluations favored negatively described
targets over positively described targets, t(85) = 7.93, p < .001. Moreover, when the
valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, explicit evaluations were more positive
when the validity information was true rather than false, t(85) = 16.18, p < .001; but
when the valence of behavioral descriptions was negative, explicit evaluations were more
positive when the validity information was false rather than true, t(85) = 10.11, p < .001.
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Figure 3.7. Explicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative)
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false) with long-delay validity feedback,
Experiment 3.3. Error bars represent standard errors.

With respect to implicit evaluations, a significant main effect of valence was observed,
F(1, 85) = 9.75, p = .002, η2p = .10, qualified by a significant two-way interaction
between valence and validity, F(1, 85) = 9.55, p = .003, η2p = .10. No other effects were
significant. As shown in Figure 3.8, the main effect of valence revealed that implicit
evaluations of the positive targets were on average more positive than evaluations of the
negative targets. This main effect of valence was qualified, however, by the validity of
the behavioral descriptions, such that implicit evaluations reflected the valence of the
behavioral descriptions when they turned out to be true, but this effect was only
attenuated (rather than reversed) when the behavioral descriptions turned out to be false.
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the behavioral descriptions were true, implicit
evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(85) =
38.88, p < .001; but when the behavioral descriptions were false, implicit evaluations of
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negatively described targets were not significantly different from implicit evaluations of
positively described targets, t(85) = 0.31, p = .756. Moreover, when the valence of
behavioral descriptions was positive, implicit evaluations were more positive when the
validity information was true rather than false, t(85) = 2.37, p = .020; but when the
valence of behavioral descriptions was negative, implicit evaluations were more positive
when the validity information was false rather than true, t(85) = 2.25, p = .027.
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Figure 3.8. Implicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative)
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false) with long-delay validity feedback,
Experiment 3.3. Error bars represent standard errors.

Thus, when the delay between the presentation of valence and validity information was
relatively long, explicit and implicit evaluations became dissociated such that explicit
evaluations reflected the full qualification of the behavioral descriptions by the validity
information but effects on implicit evaluations were merely attenuated.
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3.3.3

Discussion

The results of Experiment 3 support the hypothesis that evaluative dissociations may
arise when the acquisition of validity information is delayed. When validity information
was available during the learning of evaluative information, it qualified both explicit and
implicit evaluations, replicating the results of Experiments 1 and 2. When the
presentation of validity information was delayed, however, its impact was significantly
reduced for implicit, but not explicit, evaluations. The current results thus imply a
boundary condition on the emergence of evaluative dissociations, such that validity
information may qualify both explicit and implicit evaluations when it is available during
the acquisition of evaluative information; with the passage of time, however, changes in
the perceived validity of previously acquired information may still qualify explicit
evaluations, but will have a weaker effect on implicit evaluations. Evidence for
asymmetric effects of validity information on explicit and implicit evaluations may
therefore be explained as resulting from expression-related processes, rather than the
simultaneous operation of two independent learning processes.
Although validity information had an asymmetric effect on implicit and explicit
evaluations in the long delay condition, it is worth noting that it was still capable of
partially qualifying implicit evaluations. Instead of reflecting the original valence of the
behavioral descriptions, implicit evaluations did not differ between the two valence
conditions when these descriptions were learned to be false. This attenuation deviates
from Gregg et al.’s (2006) results, where validity information had no effect on implicit
evaluations. Comparing the paradigms of the two sets of studies, there are at least two
possible explanations for this difference. One explanation is that participants in the
current experiments were forewarned that some information might turn out to be false,
raising the possibility that our participants may have suspended belief in the observed
contingencies until they knew their validity. To test this possibility, we conducted a
replication of Experiment 3 in which participants were not informed, prior to the learning
task, that some information might turn out to be false. The pattern of results was identical
to that observed in Experiment 3, suggesting that the qualification of implicit evaluations
observed in the current study is not due to the suspension of belief during learning. A
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second possible explanation is that Gregg et al.’s (2006) experiments involved a much
longer delay between learning of evaluative information and subsequent acquisition of
validity information. Whereas in our study, validity information was provided after all
behavioral descriptions had been presented, participants in Gregg et al.’s studies
completed measures of explicit and implicit evaluations before they were told that the
initial behavioral information had been false. Thus, consistent with our emphasis on time
as a critical factor, longer delays may allow consolidation of the initially formed
associations. As a result, the impact of newly acquired validity information may decrease
with increasing delays between the initial learning of evaluative information and the
subsequent acquisition of validity information. Future research investigating the effects
of continuously increasing intervals may help to clarify the role of time as a critical factor
for the impact of validity information on implicit evaluations.

3.4

General Discussion

The present results provide converging evidence that during a single learning episode, in
which the validity of the evaluation implied by an object-valence contingency can be
quickly assessed, both explicit and implicit evaluations reflect a process of beliefformation rather than distinct effects of belief-based and contingency-based learning
processes. In Experiments 1 and 2, the perceived validity of behavioral descriptions of
social targets qualified both explicit and implicit evaluations of these targets. This result
suggests that validity information is incorporated into the mental representation of
evaluative objects at the time of learning. Expanding on these findings, Experiment 3
demonstrated that validity information can have asymmetric influences later at the time
of expression, when evaluative responses are reconsidered in light of additional
information. Manipulating the delay between the presentation of contingencies and the
presentation of validity information revealed that the impact of validity information was
reduced for implicit, but not explicit, evaluations when validity information became
available after a substantial delay.
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3.4.1

Implications for Dissociations between Explicit and Implicit
Evaluations

Experimentally induced dissociations between explicit and implicit evaluations are often
viewed as evidence for two independent learning mechanisms that may operate
simultaneously on the basis of the same information (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The experiments reported
here suggest that the best interpretation of evaluative dissociations depends on the
specific conditions of the learning situation. Although there is compelling evidence that
dissociations can arise during learning when the valence of an object is manipulated
using multiple, distinct sources of information (e.g., Rydell et al., 2006), the present
experiments found no evidence for the simultaneous operation of dual learning processes
on the basis of the same information. In these situations, when the evaluations implied by
observed contingencies are immediately qualified by validity information, both explicit
and implicit evaluations seem to be driven by a single process of belief-formation.
Considering earlier evidence for evaluative dissociations arising during a single learning
episode, it is worth noting that virtually all of this evidence can be straightforwardly
interpreted as resulting from expression-related, rather than learning-related, processes.
For example, using a learning procedure with a single, consciously available source of
information, Ratliff and Nosek (2010) found that explicit evaluations showed the classic
illusory correlation effect, whereas implicit evaluations reflected the actual contingencies
of the observed information. Although they interpreted this finding as support for the
independent operation of belief-based and contingency-based learning processes during a
single learning episode, the dissociation can also be explained as a result of expressionrelated processes. In particular, illusory correlation effects may occur for explicit
evaluations to the extent that infrequent information is more salient (Hamilton & Gifford,
1976), and salient information is given more weight in the process of generating an
evaluative judgment. Importantly, such biases in the weighting of salient information
may occur even if the relative strength of the underlying associations does not differ from
the associations reflecting less salient information. From this perspective, the evaluative
dissociation obtained by Ratliff and Nosek may not be due to the simultaneous operation
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of two learning mechanisms, but to processes operating during the generation of
evaluative judgments.

3.4.2

Implications for Dual-Process Theories

The present findings seem, prima facie, more compatible with recent arguments for
single-process theories of learning, according to which all learning is the product of a
single process of belief-formation (e.g., Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009).
Evidence for dual-process learning in other situations notwithstanding, drawing such a
conclusion in the present case seems premature for both empirical and epistemological
reasons. First, it is always possible that in a single learning episode, the belief-based
learning process is simply more powerful than the contingency-based learning process,
thereby obscuring evidence for the operation of the latter process. Second, because
theoretical entities cannot be observed directly, claims about their existence are not
subject to direct empirical tests (Popper, 1934). Instead, existence claims have be
evaluated indirectly by testing empirical predictions derived from assumptions about
these entities. The underlying existence claims gain a measure of support when
predictions are confirmed, but they will most likely be rejected when predictions
repeatedly fail (Quine, 1969).
From this perspective, the current experiments can be understood as failing to confirm
predictions derived from specific assumptions about contingency-based learning. The
failure to confirm these predictions does not, however, conclusively demonstrate the nonexistence of contingency-based, as opposed to belief-based, learning processes. Indeed,
there is evidence for the operation of both contingency-based and belief-based learning
processes in certain conditions, such that specific conditions may promote the operation
of one process and inhibit the operation of the other (e.g., Rydell et al., 2006). The
current findings do, however, challenge the idea that two learning processes operate
simultaneously and lead to divergent explicit and implicit evaluations on the basis of the
same information (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). In these situations, it appears
that conscious beliefs exert a strong qualifying influence on the evaluations implied by
observed contingencies at the time of learning. The current findings thus impose a
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constraint on the conditions under which dual learning processes may produce divergent
outcomes, though they do not rule out their existence.

3.4.3

Implications for Mental Control

The findings of the present research also shed light on the question raised at the outset of
this paper: Were Obama’s supporters justified in worrying about an uncontrollable
influence of negative images on voters? The answer seems to be: It depends. The
experiments reported here suggest that beliefs about the invalidity of perceived objectvalence contingencies (e.g., between Obama and terrorism) can qualify how that
information is encoded and mentally represented, but only when the perceiver invalidates
that information quickly. Otherwise, as the delay between the perception of a contingency
and its invalidation increases, the mental association resulting from that contingency
becomes more difficult to qualify (Gregg et al., 2006; Petty et al., 2006). Thus, if a
potential voter observed the illustration of Obama as a terrorist, she might be able to
prevent the depicted link from being stored in memory by immediately rejecting it as
false; failing to do so, however, might lead to the formation of a mental association that
directly reflects it. This outcome would indeed be worrisome for Obama’s supporters, as
implicit evaluations have been shown to predict significant behavioral outcomes,
including choice decisions in the political domain (e.g., Galdi et al., 2008; Payne et al.,
2010). Nevertheless, there seems to be some room for control over the evaluations we
form in typical learning situations, such that contingency-based learning may not be
powerful enough to create mental associations that contradict our beliefs about what we
observe. If we are puppets on a string to those who would seek to influence us, we at least
have a brief opportunity to pull back.
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4

General Discussion

In this chapter, I will explore a new approach to carving cognition in light of the
challenges the present research poses for existing approaches. I will first work up to a
specification of this new version of the cognitive covariation thesis by considering a
distinction between two kinds of mental representation. Second, I will discuss the
implications of this new version of the thesis for the problem of measurement, both with
regard to the reinterpretation of existing measurement procedures and the design of new
procedures. Finally, I will describe directions for future research implied by the new
versions of the cognitive and psychometric covariation theses developed here.

4.1

A new approach to carving cognition

The findings from the present research underscore the empirical challenges facing the
contextualization and validation hypotheses. The self-construal research reported in §2
provides further evidence for top-down influences on implicit cognition; this finding is
consistent with the validation hypothesis, but contradicts the assumption of the
contextualization hypothesis that the direction of influence between processes is
essentially bottom-up. The evaluative learning research reported in §3 suggests that
implicit cognition is, under certain conditions, sensitive to perceived validity; this finding
is consistent with the contextualization hypothesis, but contradicts the assumption of the
validation hypothesis that only higher-level cognition is sensitive to perceived validity.
Together with the difficulties addressed in the introduction, these findings call into
question the accuracy of the underlying monitoring-and-correction processing schema for
modeling human cognition: Perhaps, despite its folk psychological appeal, the
characterization of lower-level cognition as requiring higher-level correction to be made
situationally appropriate is simply incorrect.
In this section, I will sketch an alternative approach to carving cognition that does not
rely upon the monitoring-and-correction schema. The basic insight can be found with a
closer examination of the studies of evaluative learning presented in §3, particularly
Experiment 3. The original conclusion drawn from this experiment was that temporal
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delay weakened the top-down influence of negation on implicit evaluations and thereby
produced a dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations. It is not immediately
clear, however, why time between the encoding of valence information and the encoding
of validity information should asymmetrically influence these evaluations—in other
words, why implicit evaluations (compared to explicit evaluations) should show such a
strong primacy effect (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). The validation hypothesis, as
described in the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, in press) and the RIM
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004), provides no inherent reason why implicit evaluations should
show a stronger primacy effect than explicit evaluations, especially given that implicit
evaluations were sensitive to validity information when it was available without delay
(see Experiments 3.1 and 3.2). The contextualization hypothesis might provide a basis for
this prediction based on the assumptions that, once learned, the simple object-valence
associations underlying implicit evaluations are less sensitive to contextual information in
general, and that when validity information was presented after a delay it was somehow
more “contextual” than when it was presented immediately during the learning task. Yet
the assumption that lower-level, implicit processing is generally less context-sensitive
than higher-level, explicit processing has not been supported by empirical evidence (see
§1.2.1.2); for example, the experiments on self-construal in §2 demonstrated that
contextual changes in the accessibility of information (Experiment 2.1) or in motivational
orientation (Experiment 2.2) effectively influenced the implicit self-concept. It is
therefore difficult to argue that the delayed presentation of validity information had an
asymmetric effect solely because it created a stronger distinction between object and
context.
Neither of the major approaches to dual-process social-cognition, then, provides a
satisfactory account of why the temporal delay in Experiment 3.3 uniquely weakened the
influence of validity on implicit evaluations. A promising alternative approach, however,
is based on the insight that in this experiment, temporal delay was confounded with
quantification, by which I mean the notion of quantifying across a number of tokens by
grouping them into a single type. This is in fact an accurate description of the delayed
validity manipulation in Experiment 3.3, in which participants were required to quantify
across all of the object-valence associations they had previously observed for each target
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by labeling the whole group as true or false. This manipulation required participants to
create a new type-level representation for each of the four targets, comprising each of the
(token-level) object-valence associations observed in the learning task. Crucially, it was
the evaluation of this quantified, type-level representation that participants in this
condition were asked to negate, rather than each individual (token-level) object-valence
association. Reversing learned evaluations after a delay, therefore, amounted to
quantified negation, and this may be the reason that implicit evaluations were insensitive
to perceived validity after the delay: The key distinction between higher-level and lowerlevel cognition may be the capacity for quantification, such that lower-level cognition
represents unique tokens, whereas higher-level cognition is capable of grouping these
tokens into abstract types and manipulating these abstractions via quantified operations.

4.1.1

Grounding the cognitive covariation thesis in mental
representation

In order to state this quantification hypothesis more clearly as a specification of the
cognitive covariation thesis (i.e., in terms of operating conditions and operating
principles), it will help to clarify first why the capacity for quantification might be
expected to distinguish between kinds of cognition. In the earlier discussion of the unity
problem (§1.3), the monitoring-and-correction processing schema was criticized as
lacking a reasonable explanation for distinguishing between kinds of cognition in terms
of sensitivity to the situational context. The weakness of the various explanations,
however, was not a result of the appeal to context-sensitivity itself but to the manner in
which that distinction was applied. In particular, both the contextualization and validation
hypotheses view higher-level processing as more sensitive to situational context (either in
general or with respect to situational consistency) than lower-level processing, the basic
idea being that higher-level processing “corrects” lower-level processing by taking
aspects of the situational context into account. The architectural explanation attempts to
derive this distinction from differences in mental representation, such that similaritybased processing in connectionist networks is corrected by rule-based processing in
classical architectures. When mental representation is assumed to be exclusively
compositional, however, the classical/connectionist distinction fails to justify this
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argument: Compositionality requires that representation in both classical and
connectionist architectures be localist (i.e., represent a discrete object or concept), with
the consequence that neither architecture is inherently more context-sensitive. Likewise,
the phylogenetic explanation for viewing higher-level processing as more situationally
sensitive is unconvincing. Insofar as quick responses need to be evolutionarily adaptive,
early cognition must be more, not less, sensitive to the situational context (Schwarz,
2007); carving percepts into discrete stimuli and sorting these into abstract categories
would seem to be luxuries afforded by time and cognitive capacity.
As anticipated earlier (see §1.2.3), the basic problem with the monitoring-and-correction
processing schema may be that it rests on the assumption that mental representation is
exclusively compositional—that is, that representations in one kind of process are
completely reducible to those in another kind of process. Indeed, if the contrast between
classical and connectionist architectures has any value for dual-process theories, it is that
it makes possible a distinction between localist, compositional representation and
distributed, non-compositional representation. This distinction between kinds of mental
representation, moreover, is capable of grounding a distinction between kinds of
cognitive process in terms of context-sensitivity, though in a way fundamentally different
from that envisioned by the monitoring-and-correction processing schema. Specifically,
distributed representation is not just context-sensitive but context-dependent: Not being
composed from discrete units of meaning, distributed representations lack a clear
distinction between object and context; instead, such representations are holistic in that
the object of representation is a unique “object-in-context” (Chrisley, 1998; Ferguson &
Bargh, 2007; Smolensky, 1988; cf. Fodor, 1987; Fodor & Lepore, 1992). The major
consequence for present purposes is that, because holistic representations lack discrete
units of meaning, they are fundamentally non-conceptual and non-linguistic—and
therefore cannot be reduced to localist representations in a classical architecture. Indeed,
the contrast between these two kinds of mental representation has long been recognized
as central to cognitivist psychology. James (1890) devoted an entire chapter of his
Principles to describing the holistic “stream of thought,” and he placed heavy emphasis
on the notion that cognition is not altogether discrete and linguistic:
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Language works against our perception of the truth. We name our
thoughts simply, each after its thing, as if each knew its own thing and
nothing else. What each really knows is clearly the thing it is named for,
with dimly perhaps a thousand other things. It ought to be named after all
of them, but it never is. Some of them are always things known a moment
ago more clearly; others are things to be known more clearly a moment
hence. (p. 241)
I will refer to this distinction between kinds of mental representation, and the kinds of
cognitive process that operate upon them, as holistic and symbolic.

12

Holistic

representation is distributed, which entails that it is non-compositional, non-linguistic,
and context-dependent. Holistic processing is assumed to be realized by distributed
connectionist architectures that operate according to principles of similarity and
contiguity across patterns of activation (Smolensky, 1988). In contrast, symbolic
representation is localist, which entails that it is compositional, linguistic, and contextindependent. Symbolic processing is assumed to be realized by classical architectures that
are essentially rule-based Turing machines (i.e., manipulators of abstract symbols), per
the Computational Theory of Mind (Horst, 2009; Newell, 1980).
By virtue of the underlying distinction between kinds of mental representation, the
relation between these two kinds of cognition involves quantification: Unique, holistic
tokens at the lower level may be abstracted into symbolic types at the higher level.

13

12

A brief note on nomenclature: Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) distinguish between analytic
and holistic cognition, whereas Smolensky (1988) distinguishes between symbolic and subsymbolic
cognition. With regard to the former case, I have chosen to use the term symbolic rather than analytic
because it gives a clearer sense of the representational assumptions underlying this kind of cognition. In the
latter case, I have chosen to use the term holistic rather than subsymbolic because is offers a direct, rather
than relative, characterization of the representational assumptions underlying this kind of cognition.
13

With its emphasis on the relation between abstract type-level representations and unique token-level
representations, the quantification hypothesis might be seen as similar to existing social-cognitive theories
that take the “level of representation” of an object into account (e.g., Lord & Lepper, 1999; Trope &
Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). This similarity is only superficial, however, given that these
theories assume that all representations are localist, though they can differ in degrees of abstraction. The
quantification hypothesis, in contrast, assumes a qualitative distinction between kinds of representation
(i.e., holistic vs. symbolic), meaning that representations at different levels are not reducible. Thus, for

113

Thus, quantification across context-dependent tokens creates context-independent types
that can be processed in a classical architecture. In formal logic, the relevant notion of
quantification is specifically universal quantification, denoted . The capacity assumed
to be the hallmark of higher-level, symbolic cognition is therefore any quantified
predication of the form ሺݔሻݔܨ, which is read “for all tokens of type ݔ,  ݔis ܨ.” In this
sense, types are mental categories (i.e., concepts) that subsume similar tokens. For
example, in the statement “Dogs are red,” it is obvious that dogs is a category. Yet even
in predications of singular concepts, such as in the statement “My dog is red,” my dog is
equally categorical, for the reason that the predication subsumes all representational
instances or tokens of my dog in memory or perception; essentially, my dog is a type
rather than a token in the current perspective because it is repeatable. Quantified
predication is therefore involved in any attribution of a property to a linguistic concept
(i.e., a noun), which is obviously a frequent occurrence in human cognition. Conversely,
holistic processing in connectionist architectures is incapable of quantification, because
distributed representations cannot be treated as discrete, repeatable types. Once again,
James (1890) gave lucid expression to this point:
Every thought we have of a given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and
only bears a resemblance of kind with our other thoughts of the same fact.
When the identical fact recurs, we must think of it in a fresh manner, see it
under a somewhat different angle, apprehend it in different relations from
those in which it last appeared. And the thought by which we cognize it is
the thought of it-in-those-relations, a thought suffused with the
consciousness of all that dim context. (p. 233)
Although quantification is a powerful cognitive capacity, its use involves a tradeoff
between representational flexibility and sensitivity to the immediate situation. Symbolic,

example, token-level representations in Trope and Liberman’s (2003) construal level theory would
nevertheless be viewed as type-level, abstract representations from the perspective of the quantification
hypothesis. Most importantly, tokens in the current perspective are assumed to be represented holistically.
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type-based processing allows for the consideration of counterfactuals, such that
alternatives to the immediate situation can be conceived via context-independent
representation (Roese & Olson, 1995); yet the symbolic processing that makes
counterfactual cognition possible also requires that the holistic meaning of the immediate
situation to the organism is lost. Essentially, the tradeoff is that symbolic processing
facilitates long-range planning, but requires a compositional reconstruction of the
immediate situation in terms of discrete, quantifiable types (i.e., linguistic concepts) that
can be mentally manipulated to simulate various contingencies; holistic processing
facilitates immediate, context-sensitive responses, but being context-dependent cannot
perform such counterfactual manipulations.
In light of this tradeoff, it is important to note that neither kind of cognition is inherently
normative from the perspective of the quantification hypothesis. The monitoring-andcorrection processing schema locates the distinction between kinds of cognition in their
relative complexity, such that higher-level processing is assumed to be more sensitive to
situational context (either in general or with respect to situational consistency). The
implication of this schema is that higher-level processing will always be more
“situationally appropriate,” because it is able to take more situational information into
account. In contrast, the distinction between holistic and symbolic cognition avoids this
normative implication, because it does not locate the distinction in the relative amount of
information considered but in the kinds of information considered, which serve
complementary functions for an organism. Thus, holistic representations, being contextdependent, make possible behavioral responses that are acutely sensitive to immediate
contingencies. Symbolic representations, being context-independent, make possible
behavioral responses that can take counterfactual contingencies into account. Neither
kind of cognition, however, is inherently more normative than the other, as each serves
distinct goals that are potentially adaptive for an organism (cf. Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
Indeed, this perspective offers a more nuanced view of normativity in psychology by
recognizing that the “situational appropriateness” of a behavioral response can be
understood in terms of both immediate and long-term contingencies, and that both can
serve adaptive functions for an organism. Which of these two responses might be more
“correct” when they conflict cannot be decided a priori, based on the principles by which
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holistic and symbolic cognition operate, but is rather a question that depends on external
assumptions about what constitutes normative behavior (Rey, 2007). In this sense, the
quantification hypothesis altogether dispenses with the monitoring-and-correction
processing schema for modeling human cognition, which has informed the vast majority
of dual-process research in social-cognitive psychology.
We are now in a position to return to the question raised at the beginning of this section:
Why might the capacity for quantification be expected to distinguish between kinds of
cognition? In contrast to the contextualization and validation hypotheses, the
quantification hypothesis is grounded in a distinction between kinds of mental
representation that provides the foundation for reasonable responses to the unity problem.
First, the architectural and neurophysiological explanations become defensible with the
distinction between genuinely different kinds of mental representation (cf. §§1.3.1-1.3.2).
As discussed above, the relation between holistic and symbolic representations can be
described as a process of quantification. Thus, if the human mind is characterized by
these two kinds of representation in particular, it makes sense that the capacity for
quantification would be the key distinction between kinds of cognition. Second, the
quantification hypothesis is more amenable to a phylogenetic explanation. As discussed
earlier (§1.3.3), one problem with the monitoring-and-correction processing schema is
that it makes little sense that the behavior of lower animals, which presumably lack
higher-level cognitive capacities, would be evolutionarily adaptive if it were based on
normatively deficient cognition. In particular, the idea that early, resource-efficient
cognitive processing is insensitive to immediate contingencies, including situational
consistency, is difficult to square with the fact that lower animals are capable of
manifestly intelligent behavior. The quantification hypothesis suggests, instead, that it is
not the amount of information guiding behavior that distinguishes between different
kinds of cognition, but the kind of information: Thus, behavior in lower animals should
be guided more or less exclusively by similarity-based processing across holistic
representations, a contention supported by comparative research on category learning and
use (e.g., Smith, Minda, & Washburn, 2004; Smith et al., 2011). Such context-dependent
cognition would be eminently adaptive in the short term, but would lack the capacity for
counterfactual representation that makes long-range planning possible. It may not be
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coincidental that this capacity for “decoupling” cognition from the immediate situation is
frequently identified as the hallmark of human sentience (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000;
Dienes & Perner, 1999; Stanovich, 2004).
These considerations offer a final push toward a precise specification of the
quantification hypothesis. In particular, they suggest that the conditions under which
holistic and symbolic processes operate can be characterized with respect to their
complementary functions: Holistic processing, though tied to the immediate situation,
facilitates context-sensitive responding much faster than would be possible if the
situation were reconstructed compositionally, in terms of discrete concepts; symbolic
processing, on the other hand, does depend on such an effortful reconstruction (via
quantification), but the decomposition of a holistic representation into discrete, contextindependent concepts makes possible counterfactual thinking. Based on this
characterization of holistic and symbolic cognition, the key distinction between their
respective operating conditions would appear to be the sensory-dependence of cognitive
processing. Thus, holistic cognition should be expected to operate under conditions of
high sensory-dependence, whereas symbolic cognition should be expected to operate
under conditions of low sensory-dependence—in other words, when a person has time to
“think about” his or her response. Indeed, this colloquial expression is intended quite
literally here, as the proposed relation between holistic and symbolic cognition is
essentially metacognitive: Holistic cognition can be considered first-order, experiential
cognition, whereas symbolic cognition involves thinking about these first-order processes
(Dienes & Perner, 1999; Rosenthal, 2002). It is this capacity for discretizing holistic
representations—essentially, abstracting repeatable types from unique tokens—that is the
hallmark of symbolic cognition.
The relation between high and low sensory-dependence and the more traditional
distinction between automaticity and control (e.g., Bargh, 1994) is likely not isomorphic,
and this is an important area for future research (see §4.2.1 for further discussion). For
the present, I will simply emphasize that sensory-independence should require time and
capacity to decouple cognition from perception (i.e., to make the leap from experiential to
metacognitive processing). A rough assumption, then, is that (all else being equal) early
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responses will be highly sensory-dependent and later responses should be less so.
Furthermore, in specifying the operating conditions of the quantification hypothesis, I
will use the terms online and offline to refer to conditions of high and low sensorydependence, respectively (for similar uses of these terms, see Niedenthal, Barsalou,
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005, and Wilson, 2002). One reason for doing so is
that these terms succinctly capture the meaning of the proposed distinction between
operating conditions, such that cognitive processing under high sensory-dependence is
directly connected to experience, whereas processing under low sensory-dependence is to
some degree decoupled from experience as a result of quantification. Second, the
online/offline nomenclature avoids the normative connotations inherent in the distinction
between automaticity and control, and thus carries no implications about which operating
conditions are more likely to produce more adaptive responses.

4.1.2

The quantification hypothesis

The quantification hypothesis is presented in Table 4.1 as a proposed specification of the
cognitive covariation thesis.

The Quantification Hypothesis
Operating Conditions
Online
High sensory-dependence
(“Experiential”)

Offline
Low sensory-dependence
(“Metacognitive”)

Operating Principles
Holistic
Distributed/Connectionist*
Situation-dependent
Continuous

Symbolic
Localist/Classical*
Counterfactual
Discrete

Table 4.1. The specification of the cognitive covariation thesis per the quantification
hypothesis.
*
Denotes the key distinction between cognitive operating principles.
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The basic claim of the quantification hypothesis is that online cognition is characterized
by the principles of holistic processing, whereas offline cognition is characterized by the
principles of symbolic processing. The hypothesis assumes that these two kinds of
cognition are related via a process of quantification, in which holistic representations are
decoupled from immediate experience to produce abstract, context-independent concepts
that can be manipulated via quantified operations (e.g., linguistic syntax, formal logic,
etc.). This perspective suggests that the distinctions drawn by the monitoring-andcorrection approach to dual-process cognition (i.e., in terms of automaticity/control and
situational sensitivity; Table 1.1) were on the right track, but the quantification
hypothesis turns this approach on its head by suggesting that early processing should be
more sensitive to situational context rather than less so (cf. §§1.2.1.1, 1.2.2.1). According
to this new approach, generality is an effortful cognitive achievement, not the starting
point of cognitive processing (Ferguson & Bargh, 2007).

4.1.2.1

Sources of influence on holistic and symbolic cognition

The quantification hypothesis implies that, due to the nature of distributed vs. localist
representation, the early meaning of a stimulus to an individual should be contextdependent and later meaning should be less so. This suggests how the current scattershot
approach to investigating the context-sensitivity of implicit cognition—which essentially
involves testing whether a given contextual factor (e.g., visual background, active goals,
physical environment, etc.) influences implicit processing—might be brought into focus:
by recognizing that it is not what is manipulated, but how, that is responsible for
asymmetric effects on higher-level and lower-level processing. In particular, the symbolic
meaning of a stimulus can be directly assigned, independent of context, simply by
relabeling a symbol to mean something else; in other words, symbolic cognition is
capable of predication, as described in §4.1.1. In contrast, holistic meaning is determined
by the situational context and cannot simply be changed through reassignment, since
there is no discrete symbol upon which the (quantified) reassignment can operate.
Consequently, the quantification hypothesis predicts that attempts to change the meaning
of a stimulus through direct reassignment should affect symbolic (explicit) processing but
not holistic (implicit) processing; conversely, attempts to change meaning by
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manipulating the context of a stimulus should affect holistic (implicit) processing but not
symbolic (explicit) processing.
These predictions are borne out by existing research on the context-sensitivity of implicit
processing (see §1.2.1.2), but go further by providing a general rationale that ties these
varied findings together: Manipulations of context directly influence early, contextdependent meaning, whereas reassignments of meaning directly influence late, contextindependent meaning. An experiment by Foroni and Mayr (2005) provides an excellent
illustration of this point. When participants were simply told to think of insects as
positive and flowers as negative, implicit evaluations of insects and flowers were
unaffected, with insects being more strongly associated with negativity than flowers on
an IAT (see also Gregg et al., 2006). This is a standard finding and is assumed to reflect
the evaluation associated with each stereotype (i.e., insects are bad, flowers are good;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In another condition, however, participants
were asked to imagine that they were searching for food in a post-apocalyptic world in
which flowers are highly radioactive and insects provide the only safe source of
sustenance. This manipulation, which changed the meaning of the targets via the context
in which they were perceived, successfully reversed implicit evaluations, such that
flowers were more strongly associated with negativity than insects. In general, then,
lower-level processing might be usefully understood as reflecting the contextual meaning
of a stimulus, whereas higher-level processing reflects its decontextualized (assigned)
meaning.
From this perspective, the current, somewhat atheoretical approach to investigating the
context-sensitivity of implicit cognition can be viewed more coherently as a program
seeking to identify the aspects of situational context that are relevant to the determination
of holistic meaning—and it seems there are indeed many (see §1.2.1.2). This perspective,
moreover, conceptually integrates the explosion of findings within the “situated” and
“embodied” cognition literatures, in which a supposedly irrelevant aspect of the
situational context systematically influences behavior (Niedenthal et al., 2005; Smith &
Semin, 2004). For example, Williams and Bargh (2008) found that holding a warm (vs.
cold) mug of coffee increased perceptions of interpersonal warmth, despite the fact that
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participants reported no awareness of this influence. Lee and Schwartz (2010) found that
asking participants to wash their hands (ostensibly as part of an unrelated product testing
study) reduced feelings of regret after making a choice between two equally attractive
alternatives. Although such findings are generally regarded as novel, they appear much
less surprising when it is simply assumed that holistic meaning (which presumably
mediates the behavioral outcomes in such experiments) is dependent on the situational
context. Put the other way around, these findings are counterintuitive only if it is assumed
that the meaning of a stimulus is always context-independent and that the only contextual
factors that might influence meaning are those that have been explicitly identified.
Although such computer-like cognition might be viewed as the ideal (at least within
analytic Western cultures; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), research in social
psychology has long made clear that cognition is heavily influenced by context,
regardless of whether it is explicitly identified or not (Markus, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson,
1977). For example, Schwarz and Clore (1983) famously found that reports of lifesatisfaction were systematically influenced by the weather at the time of the interview.
Likewise, the extensive literature on affective forecasting errors reveals that people have
a difficult time controlling for the influence of the immediate context, and taking
counterfactual contexts into account, when predicting their behavior in future situations
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).
The current fascination with “situated” effects in social psychology is due largely to an
experiment by Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996), the history of which helps to illuminate
the broader point being made here. In this experiment, participants surreptitiously primed
with words related to the “elderly” stereotype were found to walk more slowly after
leaving the laboratory. Bargh et al. interpreted this finding as evidence for the activation
of the “elderly” concept (i.e., stereotype) in memory, which had a direct influence on
behavior. In later work, however, Cesario, Plaks, and Higgins (2006) found that this
effect was moderated by individual differences in participants’ associations with the
elderly, such that participants with positive associations walked more slowly after being
primed whereas participants with negative associations walked more quickly. Cesario et
al. concluded that these behavioral differences could be understood as a result of
participants’ preparation to interact with the primed group; in other words, participants
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with more positive associations behaved more sympathetically, presumably to smooth
social interaction (see also Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005). Contrary to
Bargh et al.’s (1996) interpretation, this conclusion suggests that “priming” via the
manipulation of supposedly irrelevant aspects of the situational context does not activate
a context-independent concept, or stereotype, but rather activates the meaning of the
prime within that specific situation—that is, a holistic, rather than symbolic, meaning (for
similar accounts, see Perugini & Prestwich, 2007; Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007).

4.1.2.2

Directions of influence

So far, I have focused on the relation between holistic and symbolic cognition in terms of
a bottom-up process of quantification. Thus, the evaluative dissociation observed in
Experiment 3.3, which resulted from the introduction of a delay between the learning of
object-valence associations and their validity, may be more fruitfully interpreted as the
result of the unique influence of quantified negation on symbolic representations, which
have been abstracted from lower-level, holistic representations. Yet it is clear that topdown influences can also occur, such that changes in directly measured cognition appear
to mediate changes in indirectly measured cognition (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
From the perspective of the quantification hypothesis, Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, which
involved a short delay between the learning of object-valence associations and their
validity, would not in fact be interpreted as top-down effects, since the hypothesis allows
for the direct influence of perceived validity at both levels; the critical difference is
whether or not the application of the truth-value is quantified, and in these two
experiments this was not the case.
Experiment 2.2 does, however, provide a good example of how a top-down influence can
be understood from the perspective of the quantification hypothesis. In that experiment,
participants were motivated to assert an abstract belief about themselves (e.g., “I am
extraverted”). Essentially, this belief can be understood as a quantified affirmation, such
that it asserts the validity of any and all token-level self-knowledge that confirms the
type-level belief. In order to substantiate this belief, participants were presumably
motivated to engage in a search through token-level self-knowledge in memory biased
toward confirmation (Kunda, 1990). Thus, from the perspective of the quantification
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hypothesis, top-down influences can be broadly conceptualized as “deductive” in the
sense that higher-level assertions serve as premises that lead to the activation of specific
lower-level knowledge. Conversely, the bottom-up route of self-construal observed in
Experiment 2.1 can be understood as an “inductive” relation between type-level and
token-level processes. In this case, an abstract, type-level belief (e.g., “I am extraverted”)
is induced from the prior activation of multiple tokens of self-knowledge (e.g., specific
memories of one’s own extraverted behaviors).

4.1.3

Summary

The quantification hypothesis is proposed as a response to the conceptual and empirical
challenges facing the contextualization and validation hypotheses. The quantification
hypothesis is grounded in a distinction between genuinely different (irreducible) kinds of
mental representation, and the properties of each kind of representation that are assumed
to inform the operating principles of cognition: Specifically, distributed representations
underlie holistic processing whereas localist representations underlie symbolic
processing. The process of translating between these two kinds of representation—
referred to as quantification—is assumed to characterize dual-process interactions, both
in a bottom-up, inductive direction and a top-down, deductive direction. Moreover, the
hypothesis suggests that holistic processing should be directly influenced by changes in
situational context that affect the meaning of a stimulus, whereas symbolic processing
should be directly influenced by reassignments of meaning to a stimulus. The operating
conditions of the quantification hypothesis are derived from the complementary functions
of each kind of cognition, which serve to generate responses based on either immediate
situational contingencies or counterfactual contingencies. Thus, online operating
conditions are highly sensory-dependent (“experiential”), whereas offline operating
conditions are less sensory-dependent (“metacognitive”).

4.2

The measurement problem: Leveraging the cognitive
covariation thesis

Dual-process theories of cognition do not just provide a basis for explanations of human
behavior—they also provide the basis for the design and interpretation of the
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measurement procedures necessary for testing such explanations. As noted in §1.1, this
dialectical relation between observed behavior and explanatory theory can be approached
from either direction, and in the present discussion I have focused initially on the
theoretical assumptions used to characterize different kinds of cognition. Beyond offering
a new cognitive framework for explaining behavior, however, this hypothesis also sheds
light on the enduring problem of measurement: That is, what are our measurement
procedures measuring? In this way, the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis
can be leveraged to refine the specification of the psychometric covariation thesis (Figure
1.2). In this section, I will first address the prospects for reinterpreting existing
measurement procedures in light of the quantification hypothesis and then discuss
implications for the development of new measurement procedures. Finally, I will explore
the possibility that the distinctions between the operating principles and operating
conditions of cognition are not qualitative but graded.

4.2.1

Reinterpreting existing measurement procedures

In the received view of dual-process cognition, direct and indirect measurement
procedures are classified in terms of the operating conditions of automaticity and control,
and existing measurement procedures have generally been designed with this distinction
in mind. This complicates the application of the quantification hypothesis to the
reinterpretation of existing measurement procedures, since this hypothesis draws an
alternative distinction between operating conditions in terms of online and offline
processing. Thus, the first obstacle to reinterpreting these measurement procedures is to
determine the degree to which the respective operating conditions overlap: In particular,
how well does the automatic/controlled distinction map on to the online/offline
distinction? This is a complicated question in itself, given that many functional properties
of automaticity have been proposed without a clear consensus in the social-cognitive
literature (Bargh, 1992, 1994; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). For example, some indirect
measurement procedures are designed to emphasize distinctions in conscious awareness
(e.g., subliminal priming), whereas others are designed to emphasize distinctions in
resource-efficiency (e.g., through the use of a distracter task). Moreover, as mathematical
modeling has revealed, it is unclear how distinct the proposed features of automaticity
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and control actually are and how well measurement procedures can selectively establish
them (Sherman, Klauer, & Allen, 2010).
Nevertheless, there is at least a family resemblance between the automatic/controlled and
online/offline distinctions, which might best be captured by the overlap between the
features of resource-efficiency and sensory-dependence. The link between these two
features is that the cognitive resources upon which resource-heavy processes depend may
be precisely those that are required to take online, sensory-dependent cognition offline—
that is, via the (effortful) quantification of holistic representations. From this perspective,
existing measurement procedures that emphasize resource-efficiency (e.g., through the
use of a distracter task) might be most easily reinterpreted with the quantification
hypothesis, insofar as they discriminate between the conditions upon which the capacity
for quantification depends. If this is the case, then the quantification hypothesis implies
that such measurement procedures reflect the operation of holistic cognition, rather than
“implicit” cognition as characterized by the contextualization and validation hypotheses
(Table 1.1 and Table 1.2). This would mean that such measurement procedures should be
influenced by situational contingencies in general, including perceived validity, but
should be specifically insensitive to quantified manipulations (compared to direct
measurement procedures that allow for resource-inefficient processing).

14

Although the link to resource-efficiency seems to be the most promising route to
exploring the quantification hypothesis with existing measurement procedures, some
theorists have suggested that indirect measurement procedures in general can be
reinterpreted from this perspective based on their demonstrated sensitivity to context. For
example, Ferguson and Bargh (2007), arguing against the traditional assumption that
behaviors can be explained as cognitive responses to discrete objects, have suggested that
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Resource-efficiency was selected as the feature of automaticity that best approximates the online/offline
distinction not only for the positive reasons discussed here, but also for the negative reason that the other
commonly proposed features of automaticity (Bargh, 1994) crosscut the online/offline distinction. In
particular, offline processing is not assumed to be uniquely influenced by intentions to start or stop
processing; instead, differences should depend on whether or not these intentions are quantified. Likewise,
online processing is not assumed to operate outside conscious awareness per se, but is better understood as
“first-order” awareness (see §4.2.3 for further discussion of this issue).
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indirect measurement procedures reflect responses to “object-centered contexts.”
Likewise, De Houwer (2005) has suggested that the most commonly used indirect
measurement procedure, the IAT, should be regarded as a general measure of similarity,
which is essentially a function of the situational meaning of a stimulus. Although such
reinterpretations of existing measurement procedures offer important challenges to the
received view of dual-process cognition, the preceding discussion suggests that a note of
caution is in order. Specifically, the reinterpretation of existing measurement procedures
designed with the automatic/controlled distinction in mind may not be fully justified if
newly proposed operating principles are assumed to correspond to different operating
conditions (e.g., online/offline). Thus, before reinterpreting the results of existing direct
and indirect measurement procedures or employing them in the investigation of newly
proposed distinctions between kinds of cognition, more research is needed to understand
which operating conditions existing procedures establish (De Houwer, TeigeMocigemba, Spruyt & Moors, 2009). Based on similarities and differences in the
observation conditions that existing measurement procedures establish, inferences can
then be drawn about what, exactly, the various existing procedures are measuring.

4.2.2
4.2.2.1

Implications for the development of new measurement
procedures
Re-specifying the psychometric covariation thesis

Given the complications involved with reinterpreting existing measurement procedures, it
is useful to consider how new measurement procedures might be designed to take the
distinction between online and offline operating conditions into account. The first step is
to draw out the implications of the quantification hypothesis for the psychometric
covariation thesis, which requires identifying the observation conditions that correspond
to online and offline operating conditions. In other words, what are the observation
conditions that a measurement procedure must establish to select, as exclusively as
possible, online or offline processing (and hence, via the cognitive covariation thesis,
holistic or symbolic processing)?
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As suggested above, the key distinction between online and offline operating conditions
is the degree of sensory-dependence, which is inversely related to the capacity for
metacognition: Sensory-dependence decreases as holistic representations are quantified,
or “thought about,” as higher-order symbols. Consequently, online measurement
procedures should establish observation conditions that preclude metacognition, whereas
offline measurement procedures should facilitate the operation of this capacity. Given
that metacognition requires effort and time, online measurement procedures should
generally feature speeded responses to tap the early cognitive response to a stimulus and,
as discussed in the previous section, should generally be unaffected by demands on
cognitive resources. In addition, based on the assumption that holistic processing is
distributed and hence non-linguistic, online measurement procedures should require
responses that do not depend on linguistic processing. For the same reason, such
procedures should not require discrete responses of any sort, but should make use of
continuous measures that do not require the participant to discretize responses.
Offline measurement procedures would be characterized conversely, being designed to
select conditions that facilitate the operation of metacognitive processing. Thus, these
procedures should not require speeded responses, should not be employed under high
resource-demand, should require linguistic, or at least verbalizable, responses, and should
generally require discrete rather than continuous responses. The specification of online
and offline measurement procedures in terms of the psychometric covariation thesis is
presented in Table 4.2.
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The Psychometric Covariation Thesis per the Quantification Hypothesis
Observation Conditions
Online
Speeded/Early
High resource demand
Non-linguistic
Continuous

Offline
Non-speeded/Late
Low resource demand
Linguistic
Discrete

Operating Conditions
Online
High sensory-dependence
(“Experiential”)

Offline
Low sensory-dependence
(“Metacognitive”)

Table 4.2. The specification of the psychometric covariation thesis per the quantification
hypothesis.

Whereas existing indirect measurement procedures designed to select implicit cognition
often require speeded responses and are frequently employed under conditions of high
resource demand, they do not, as a rule, require non-linguistic and continuous responses.
These differences from the proposed characteristics of online measurement procedures
may account for the lack of process purity for which indirect procedures are often
criticized (see §1.1.1), and the relation between indirect and online measurement
procedures is an important direction for future research. On the other hand, there is a
much closer alignment between the characteristics of direct measurement procedures and
those proposed for offline procedures. Generally, both direct and offline measurement
procedures rely upon self-report, which is most often assessed without time constraints,
under low resource demands, and which requires linguistic processing and discrete
responses.

4.2.2.2

Measuring continuous cognition

Perhaps the most challenging aspect of online measurement, as described here, is the use
of continuous rather than discrete responses. Continuous responses are assumed to better
reflect holistic processing, which is not obviously segmented—either temporally or
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semantically—in the way that symbolic processing is (due to the dependence of symbolic
processing on localist, compositional representation). It might be objected, however, that
the notion of continuous measurement is a contradiction in terms, given that
measurement inherently requires the discretization of observed behavior by placing it on
a metric.

15

For just this reason, James (1890) saw little hope for the empirical study of

continuous, holistic cognition:
The object of every thought … is neither more nor less than all that the
thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the
matter…. It is needless to say that memory can seldom accurately
reproduce such an object, when once it has passed from before the mind.
It either makes too little or too much of it. Its best plan is to repeat the
verbal sentence, if there was one, in which the object was expressed. But
for inarticulate thoughts there is not even this resource, and introspection
must confess that the task exceeds her powers. The mass of our thinking
vanishes for ever, beyond hope of recovery, and psychology only gathers
up a few of the crumbs that fall from the feast. (p. 276)
While it is true that measurement requires discretization, James perhaps did not place
enough stock in the development of alternatives to direct/offline measurement
procedures, which would make possible the observation of behavior at a much more finegrained resolution. The outcomes of such procedures, being necessarily discretized at
some level, are inevitably approximations of holistic processing, but these procedures
nevertheless represent the best option for countering James’ pessimism about the limits of
empirical psychology.

15

Indeed, this point suggests a powerful analogy between conceptions of science and reality on the one
hand and symbolic and holistic cognition on the other: Each relation essentially involves measurement.
Thus, the process of quantification, through which holistic representations are translated into symbolic
representations, can be understood as a kind of introspective (metacognitive) measurement procedure.
Taking the analogy a step further, symbolic representations might be viewed as abstract reconstructions of,
or theories about, holistic representations.
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In fact, measurement procedures have already been developed that possess many of the
features of online measurement described above. For example, using a mouse-tracking
procedure that continuously records the motion of a participant’s hand during the
generation of response behaviors, Freeman and Ambady (2009) found that early
responses to stimuli are more holistic, being sensitive to features of the individual
stimulus, before resolving to more discrete, categorical assessments. Spivey and Dale
(2006) have reached similar conclusions using eye-tracking procedures. Wojnowicz,
Ferguson, Dale, and Spivey (2009) also employed a mouse-tracking procedure to shed
light on the cognitive processing underlying self-reported evaluations of social targets;
their results suggested that early representations are sensitive to multiple sources of
information before “self-organizing” into the categorical representations required by selfreport procedures. In addition, a small but growing number of researchers have begun to
apply the dynamical systems approach to psychology (e.g., Bechtel, 2008; Vallacher,
Read, & Nowak, 2002; Wiese, Vallacher, & Strawinska, 2010). This approach, inspired
by the cybernetics movement that originated in the mid-twentieth century, assumes that
much cognitive processing is continuous and non-linear. A common feature of these
various approaches to measurement is the emphasis on the time course of cognitive
processing, which is a crucial aspect of the relation between holistic and symbolic
cognition. In contrast, direct and indirect measurement procedures have typically ignored
the temporal aspect of cognitive processing, providing only static cross-sections of
presumably dynamic processes.
James’ worries about holistic cognition touch upon a second problem for empirical
psychology, however: Holistic cognition is not only temporally continuous, but
semantically continuous as well. This is a consequence of the fundamental contextdependence of holistic representation, and it poses a serious threat to the practice of
empirical psychology (Fodor, 1987). In short, if holistic cognition is tightly bound to the
situational context in which it operates, then it becomes extremely difficult to produce
valid generalizations about these psychological processes. The solution in mainstream
psychology has been to ignore this possibility and assume that all cognition can be
described in general, aggregate-level terms, essentially as if all cognition were symbolic
(i.e., discrete, linguistic, etc.). In practice, this requires heavy dependence upon the use of
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ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation to subsume all of the unidentified
variation that can influence the link between an “operationally defined” stimulus and a
behavioral response (Fodor, 1989). This solution, however, seriously undermines the
value of general psychological explanations. The difficulty is that psychologists seeking
to provide precise descriptions of psychological mechanisms cannot ignore the possibility
that some of those mechanisms may be context-dependent, and in these cases, sweeping
the “random error” due to context-sensitivity into a ceteris paribus clause precludes the
possibility of precisely describing the cognitive mechanism underlying behavior
(Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; Cronbach, 1975; Molenaar, 2004;
Runkel, 1990).

16

The covariation theses offer the framework for a more adequate solution to this problem
by helping researchers empirically distinguish between conditions under which cognitive
processing will be more or less context-dependent. The quantification hypothesis thus
suggests that under online (compared to offline) conditions, descriptions of cognitive
processes will need to be more context-dependent. The practical problem with this
suggestion is that mainstream empirical psychology depends heavily upon aggregation in
the analysis of behavioral data (Epstein, 1979, 1980), and aggregation is inherently
decontextualizing. One potential solution to this problem is the use of multi-level
analyses, which allow for the modeling of data at both the aggregate and the individual
level. Although the practice is not yet mainstream, the tools for measuring and analyzing
multi-level data are already available (e.g., Hamaker, Dolan, & Molenaar, 2005;
Molenaar, 2007; Nesselroade & Ram, 2004). Collectively, then, psychometric advances
offer reason to doubt James’ pessimistic conclusion: The measurement and analysis of
online, holistic cognition is not only possible but empirically practical.

16

In considering the threat holistic processing poses to the generality of psychological explanation, Conrey
and Smith (2007) claim that “Fortunately, the aspects of context that are most important to social
psychology are relatively few” (p. 254). To the extent this is true, the problem of distinguishing between
behaviors that require context-dependent vs. context-independent explanations would be relatively
innocuous, and traditional (aggregative) empirical methods could be applied unconditionally. In light of the
wide variety of contextual cues to which social behavior is sensitive (see §1.2.1.2), however, the
assumption that holistic processing is not too holistic appears unwarranted.
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4.2.3

The possibility of graded distinctions

Beyond the measurement of continuous cognition, the quantification hypothesis presents
another challenge for empirical research: Whether the distinction between kinds of
cognition is itself discrete or continuous—and in the latter case, if the principle of
covariation loses its value as a guide to theory and measurement (cf. §1.1.2). To begin
with, the quantified relation between holistic tokens and symbolic types has been
described as metacognitive. Yet metacognition implies a continuum, from first-order
cognition through successively higher orders of cognition, each of which “objectifies” the
preceding level (Rosenthal, 2002). If the transition from holistic to symbolic cognition
were perfectly graded in this way, lacking any sharp distinction, the cognitive covariation
thesis would indeed lose much of its value: It is covariation between kinds of operating
principles and operating conditions that makes the thesis useful for drawing inferences
about what kind of cognition has been measured and for designing measurement
procedures to select specific kinds of cognition (Figure 1.2). In short, a graded distinction
between kinds of cognition undercuts the process purity assumption that makes the
principle of covariation useful for guiding empirical research. Without an empirical
criterion for inferring when psychological mechanisms will be more or less contextsensitive, researchers will have no principled way to move beyond imprecise ceteris
paribus explanations, as discussed above.
Of course, whether the distinction between kinds of cognition is qualitative or graded
depends on assumptions about the operating principles that characterize them. The
validation hypothesis, with its clear-cut distinction between sensitivity to perceived
validity, is not amenable to graded distinctions. But the contextualization hypothesis,
which distinguishes between relative sensitivity to situational context, could be
interpreted in this way. In fact, Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, and Van Bavel (2007)
developed their Iterative Reprocessing Model specifically along these lines, such that the
time course of cognitive processing upon observation of a stimulus is described as a loop
in which each iteration adds contextual information to an initially rough object
representation. The quantification hypothesis takes just the opposite approach, assuming
that the time course of cognitive processing is essentially a process of decontextualizing
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initially holistic representations of the immediate situation. But the notion of iterative
reprocessing still applies: Following the initial transition from first-order, holistic, to
second-order, symbolic cognition, the “metacognitive loop” may continue to cycle,
producing successively abstract, generalized representations with each iteration. An
eventual product of these higher-level iterations may be communicable linguistic
concepts.
The critical point, however, is that the initial iteration of this metacognitive loop, which is
responsible for the translation of holistic representations to symbolic representations,
involves a difference of kind, not just degree. As argued in §4.1.1, the quantification
hypothesis is rooted in the assumption that there are two genuinely different kinds of
mental representation (i.e., holistic and symbolic) that are not reducible. Thus, there is a
qualitative difference between holistic, non-compositional representation and symbolic,
compositional representation, analogous to the difference between a bitmap image of a
scene and a linguistic description of the same scene—the description, but not the image,
is built from meaningful parts (Fodor, 2007). Based on the assumptions specified in the
quantification hypothesis (Table 4.1), therefore, the distinction between holistic and
symbolic processing cannot be understood as thoroughly graded.
Assuming that the distinction between operating principles is qualitative implies that the
distinction between operating conditions must be as well. With regard to the
quantification hypothesis, this is true insofar as the operating conditions are understood
as “experiential” (first-order) and “metacognitive” (higher-order), but the notion of
sensory-dependence underlying these descriptions is naturally graded (see §4.1.1). This
discontinuity, however, is an inevitable fact of empirical research. Operating conditions,
being the link between the cognitive covariation thesis and the psychometric covariation
thesis, serve a critical mediating role in the relation between theory (i.e., operating
principles) and observation (i.e., observation conditions; Figure 1.2). In the case of the
quantification hypothesis, the mapping between theory and observation is necessarily
approximate, since the distinction between operating principles is assumed to be
qualitative, but two of the four observation conditions specified in the psychometric
covariation thesis (i.e., the speed and resource-dependence of responses) are graded
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(Table 4.2). While measurement procedures either do or do not require linguistic or
otherwise discrete responses, the speed and resource-dependence of those responses is
more obviously a matter of degree. Thus, bringing the quantification hypothesis—and the
underlying assumption of process purity—to bear upon empirical observation requires a
bit of compromise. For this reason, it is recommended that measurement procedures
designed or interpreted from the perspective of the quantification hypothesis be
characterized in terms of the relative speed and resource-dependence required of
responses (Keren & Schul, 2009; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Establishing a useful
standard of comparison for relative characterizations of observation conditions remains
an important goal for future research.

4.2.4

Summary

The cognitive covariation thesis is an indispensible tool for resolving the problem of
measurement in cognitivist psychology: It not only sheds light on what kind of process is
being measured, but also guides the development of new measurement procedures based
on assumptions about how cognitive processes operate. From the perspective of the
quantification hypothesis, existing indirect and direct measurement procedures are not
designed to select the appropriate operating conditions of cognition, and therefore cannot
be straightforwardly reinterpreted in terms of holistic and symbolic processing.
Nevertheless, evidence from these procedures may be informative to the degree that the
indirect/direct and online/offline distinctions overlap, which is an important empirical
question. Designing measurement procedures specifically based on the quantification
hypothesis, however, raises the problem of measuring holistic cognition, which is
assumed to be temporally and semantically continuous. Fortunately, psychometric
advances suggest that the measurement of continuous cognition is not an insurmountable
problem. Finally, because the distinction between holistic and symbolic cognition is
qualitative rather than graded, the quantification hypothesis and the underlying principle
of covariation remain useful as a guide to theory and research. The quantification
hypothesis suggests that the metaphor of “carving cognition at its joints” is accurate, but
is necessarily approximated in empirical applications given that some observation
conditions are graded.
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4.3

Future directions

Although the research reported in §2 and §3 is consistent with the quantification
hypothesis, it represents only preliminary support for its central predictions. In future
work, it will be critical to pit the key predictions of the contextualization, validation, and
quantification hypotheses against one another. In addition, interpretation of this work
should be sensitive to potential discrepancies between existing indirect measurement
procedures and the proposed design of online measurement procedures. In this section, I
will discuss four directions for future research suggested by the quantification hypothesis:
first, an empirical approach to comparing the quantification and validation hypotheses;
second, implications regarding the processing of negations; third, predictions regarding
mediation patterns; and finally, implications for the interpretation and design of
measurement procedures.

4.3.1

Comparing the quantification and validation hypotheses

As discussed in §4.1.2.1, the quantification hypothesis suggests that asymmetric
influences on higher-level and lower-level processing are not due to what is manipulated
but how; in particular, the hypothesis suggests that it is not the content of a manipulation
but its quantification that should determine which kind of process it directly influences.
This point can be used to draw out an important contrast with the validation hypothesis,
which essentially picks out sensitivity to a particular contextual factor (i.e., situational
consistency) as the key distinction between operating principles of cognition. The basic
approach would involve crossing how the meaning of a stimulus is manipulated (i.e., via
reassignment vs. change in situational context) with the content of the manipulation—in
this case, the perceived validity of a stimulus. Practically speaking, this would require
manipulating perceived validity either through direct assignment (i.e., labeling stimuli as
true or false) or through the situational context (i.e., such that the truth or falsity of a
stimulus is implied by the situation in which it is perceived). Whereas the validation
hypothesis would predict a holistic/symbolic dissociation due to content (i.e., the
perceived validity of the stimulus), the quantification hypothesis would predict a
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dissociation due to how perceived validity was manipulated (i.e., via direct assignment
17

vs. situational context).

Interestingly, the existing social-cognitive literature relevant to these predictions is
mixed. Gawronski and Strack’s (2004) finding that induced compliance manipulations
influence explicit but not implicit evaluations (see §1.2.2.2) appears to disconfirm the
prediction of the quantification hypothesis, assuming that the manipulation altered the
context in which the target stimulus was perceived rather than directly reassigning its
truth-value. On the other hand, Schul, Mayo, and Burnstein (2004) found that statements
delivered by untrustworthy-looking faces were automatically perceived to be false; in this
case, the contextual manipulation of perceived validity did appear to have a direct
influence on lower-level processing. Future work might seek to disentangle these
findings, perhaps by focusing on differences in how manipulations of situational context
are empirically realized.

4.3.2

Negation

The quantification hypothesis suggests that in Experiment 3.3, it was not temporal delay
that caused the dissociation between implicit and explicit evaluations but rather the
different ways in which object-valence associations were negated (see also Gregg et al.,
2006). In the short-delay condition (similar to Experiments 3.1 and 3.2), participants were
able to negate false associations immediately after viewing them, which amounted to
token-level, non-quantified negation. In the long-delay condition, however, the negation
had to be applied to an entire set of false associations, which amounted to type-level,

17

This approach would be less useful for empirically comparing the quantification and contextualization
hypotheses, since they essentially differ with regard to the influence of how the meaning of a stimulus is
manipulated without making any claims about the differential influence of particular kinds of content (e.g.,
perceived validity). It is in this sense that the quantification hypothesis is the converse of the
contextualization hypothesis: The former predicts that manipulating the meaning of a stimulus via changes
in situational context should directly influence lower-level processing, whereas the latter predicts a direct
influence on higher-level processing. This is because, from the perspective of the contextualization
hypothesis, controlled processing is assumed to make possible the incorporation of situational context for
individuating initially stereotypical representations. Notably, this prediction has been repeatedly
disconfirmed by evidence that manipulations of situational context directly influence implicit processing
(see §1.2.1.2 and Experiment 2.1).
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quantified negation. As argued in §4.1, there is no obvious reason to expect that temporal
delay per se should lead to a primacy effect on implicit but not explicit evaluations. Thus,
an important direction for future research is to deconfound time and quantification as
potential moderators of the influence of negation on implicit (or online) evaluations.
On the other hand, the quantification hypothesis is challenged by evidence that nonquantified, token-level negations fail to influence implicit evaluations (e.g., Deutsch,
Gawronski, & Strack, 2006). Although the influence of negation on implicit evaluations
appears to depend on the type of indirect measurement procedure used (Deutsch, KordtsFreudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009), at least when using an evaluative priming task
the negation of valenced primes is not efficiently processed unless the negation has a
familiar referent. For example, “no cockroach” fails to facilitate evaluations of positive
target words, but “no luck” does facilitate evaluations of negative target words (see also
Mayo, Schul, & Bernstein, 2004). At a conceptual level, this finding is actually consistent
with the quantification hypothesis because a negation that lacks a concrete (token-level)
referent (e.g., “no cockroach”) is inherently an abstract concept, and therefore should be
incapable of holistic representation according to the principles proposed earlier (Table
4.1). As Osherson and Smith (1981) pointed out, the “fuzzy logic” by which distributed
connectionist networks operate is incapable of representing logical truth-values per se,
but instead must represent them in terms of concrete instances; without a concrete
referent, a negation is purely an abstract concept. A second response to these findings is
that, because Deutsch et al.’s (2006) evaluative priming task used linguistic negations,
the procedure was not actually measuring online (and hence holistic, token-level)
cognition (Table 4.2). Thus, an interesting prediction of the quantification hypothesis
would be that, using an online measurement procedure, pictorial negations should be
processed efficiently only when they have a concrete referent, but linguistic negations
should not be processed even when a concrete referent is available.

4.3.3

Mediation patterns

The quantification hypothesis also makes specific predictions regarding the mediation
patterns that should be observed between holistic and symbolic cognition, due to
differences in how each is directly influenced and the nature of bottom-up (inductive) and
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top-down (deductive) processing. Bottom-up mediation patterns should be observed
when the meaning of a stimulus is manipulated via changes in the situational context that
are explicitly unidentified. Such manipulations should still have a direct influence on
holistic processing, but would influence symbolic processing only indirectly via
metacognitive awareness. It remains an interesting question whether changes in the
situational context that are explicitly identified nevertheless produce simultaneous
influences on holistic and symbolic cognition, or if explicit identification of contextual
manipulations somehow disrupts their influence on holistic meaning. Top-down
mediation patterns should be observed when meaning is directly reassigned. Experiment
2.2 provides a relevant example. In this case, the newspaper clipping caused participants
to directly assign new meanings to their self-concepts (e.g., “I am extraverted”). This
reassignment then appeared to cause participants to engage in a confirmatory search
through token-level self-knowledge stored in memory, resulting in a top-down influence
on holistic cognition.

4.3.4

Measurement

The quantification hypothesis implies that current indirect measurement procedures are
not optimized for the assessment of holistic cognition. An important goal for future
research, then, is to design genuinely online measurement procedures and to investigate
the extent to which existing indirect procedures might be considered online. As discussed
in §4.2.2, there have already been advances in online measurement that make use of
mouse-tracking and eye-tracking (e.g., Freeman & Ambady, 2009; Spivey & Dale, 2006;
Wojnowicz et al., 2009), and these procedures can be employed to test the major
predictions of the quantification hypothesis. For example, the quantification and
contextualization hypotheses essentially disagree on how the time-course of mental
representation is characterized: either from context-dependent to context-independent or
the reverse. Online measurement procedures are necessary for distinguishing between
early and late mental representations, and are therefore crucial for testing differences in
context-sensitivity over time.
With regard to investigating the extent to which existing indirect measurement
procedures can be considered online, research suggests that the most popular indirect
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procedure, the IAT, is especially sensitive to type-level as opposed to token-level
knowledge (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005; Olson & Fazio, 2003). For example,
Foroni and Bel-Bahar (2009) found that IAT effects were significantly larger when
stimuli were words rather than pictures, presumably because there was a closer match in
level of representation between the abstract response categories and the words. Findings
such as these suggest that the IAT may not be particularly adaptable to online
measurement, as it relies heavily upon categorical (and hence symbolic) knowledge.
Other indirect measurement procedures, however, may be more suitable given that they
are less reliant upon categorical responses. For example, preliminary data from a study I
have conducted with Bertram Gawronski suggest that the AMP, with slight
modifications, can provide a window onto holistic processing. In earlier work,
Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, and Deutsch (2010) asked participants to pay attention
to either the race (black vs. white) or the age (young vs. old) of the primes in an AMP
and an EPT. They found that implicit evaluations measured with the EPT were not
influenced by the unattended dimension but that responses on the AMP were, suggesting
that primes in the AMP were perceived more holistically. The present study sought to test
the prediction, derived from the quantification hypothesis, that the context-sensitivity of
responses on the AMP would be higher early on and would decrease over time, once the
stimuli became represented in terms of discrete categories. In order to test this prediction,
the delay between presentation of the prime and the Chinese character was manipulated,
such that in the “early response” condition the delay was 125 ms (the standard stimulusonset asynchrony used for the procedure) whereas in the “late response” condition the
delay was 1000 ms (see Hofmann, van Koningsbruggen, Stroebe, Ramanathan, & Aarts,
2010, for a similar modification of the AMP). Although the data pattern was not
statistically significant, the trends were consistent with the prediction that responses made
quickly after viewing a stimulus were influenced by both race and age, whereas responses
made relatively later were influenced more strongly by the attended category. These
findings suggest that there may be substantial overlap between particular indirect
measurement procedures and the proposed design of online procedures, but this remains
an empirical question that will benefit from future research.
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4.4

Conclusion:
Placing the quantification hypothesis in context

In closing, I would like to address a much broader question: Is the quantification
hypothesis supposed to provide the basis for all psychological explanations of behavior?
The short answer is no; the hypothesis is meant to provide structure specifically for
intentional explanations, which appeal to an individual’s mental representations (i.e.,
what a person is thinking about) to explain behavior (Dennett, 1987; Haugeland, 1978).

18

One way to view the contribution of the quantification hypothesis is that it attempts to
structure intentional explanations when the possibility of non-localist, non-compositional
representation is taken into account. The intentional explanations at which the
quantification hypothesis is aimed characterize the cognitivist, subjective tradition of
empirical psychology. There is, however, a behaviorist, objective tradition as well, which
regards mental representation as externally determined (De Houwer, 2011; Fodor, 1980;
Putnam, 1975). Psychological explanations formulated from this latter perspective are
effectively non-intentional, since any internal variance in mental representation is
assumed not to play an explanatory role in the stimulus-response link. In its purest form,
this approach assumes that behavior can be explained in terms of veridical perception of
the environment.
Intriguingly, the cognitivist and behaviorist approaches to psychological explanation each
appear to be valid, though under different conditions. For example, it has been found that
perceptions of the size of objects are influenced by cognitive illusions, but that motor
movements designed to interact with those objects are nevertheless well calibrated to
their actual size (e.g., Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995; Goodale & Humphreys,
1998). Such findings suggest that a higher-order covariation thesis may be required to
distinguish between the conditions under which behavior is better explained with
cognitivist vs. behaviorist principles. In specifying the quantification hypothesis, I have

18

In Franz Brentano’s original formulation, intentionality is the mark of the mental; in other words, the
capacity to represent, or be “about,” something else, is what distinguishes mental from physical
phenomena. The present usage of the term intentional should not be confused with its more colloquial
meaning, which typically denotes a planned behavior.
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assumed that the world does not arrive at perception pre-categorized, and hence that
quantification (i.e., the categorization of percepts) is an effortful process. But there may
be senses in which the world can be viewed as pre-categorized, most obviously with
regard to “natural” or biological kinds (e.g., Bird & Tobin, 2009; Millikan, 1984), and it
is reasonable to think that cognition would have evolved to exploit these regularities—
even though they are ultimately no less theoretical than ad hoc categories. Thus, the
possibility of operating conditions that distinguish between cognitivist and behaviorist
principles of cognition, and their potential interaction (i.e., the point of connection
between “narrow,” subjective and “wide,” objective representation; Loar, 1988;
Pereboom, 1995) offer deeply interesting questions for future empirical and theoretical
work.
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